

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

**Towards a Sociology of the Global:
An Inquiry into the Prospects and Possibilities**

by

Dalibor Mišina



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of Sociology

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1998



National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-34317-0

Canada

University of Alberta

Library Release Form

Name of Author: Dalibor Mišina


Title of Thesis: *Towards a Sociology of the Global: An Inquiry into the Prospects and Possibilities*

Degree: Masters of Arts

Year this Degree Granted: 1998

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly, or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.




405 - 11111 87th Avenue
Edmonton AB T6G 0X9

August 31, 1998.

University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research


The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Toward a Sociology of the Global: An Inquiry into the Prospects and Possibilities* submitted by Dalibor Mišina in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts.



Raymond A. Morrow



Sourayan Mookerjee



Jerrold Kachur

31 August 1998

THESIS ABSTRACT

The advent of the global challenges the preeminence of sociology as a (or the) discipline of the social. Evidenced as sociology's increasing inadequacy at dealing with social life in its global dimension, the challenge of the global forces the discipline to explore the possibilities for facing effectively the emanant question of 'What is to be done in the light of respecifications of social life along the trajectories of the global?'

Taking the notion of the crisis of sociology as an investigative point of departure the thesis examines both main sources of confusion in attempts to get at globalization in its substantive and conceptual dimensions and potentialities for reorientation of sociology towards productive sociological discipline of the global. Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory, an argument is made, provide the discipline of sociology with constructive grounds for successfully dealing with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?'. 6

*...I kako to da povorke ljudi čudnih sudbina
nikad poražene nečim
što nije strah, ljubav, ili bijes
(ili možda ljepotom naslaganih godina)
mirno plove između klošara
živeći u prošlosti
iza osvijetljenih lađa...*

- Branimir Štulić -

To the homeland lost and the people broken apart

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to thank deeply Dževad Dedić, Fikret Eminović, Vladimir Karajica, Julio Tresierra, John Laffey, John McGraw, Greg Nielsen, and Raymond Morrow for having such an immense impact on me, both as a student and a human being. Without them, this thesis would have been impossible. Also, my thanks to Sourayan Mookerjea and Jerrold Kachur for all of their understanding, encouragement and support.

Table of Contents

Chapter One

SETTING THE GROUND:

Globalization as Substantive and Conceptual a Phenomenon

The Ghost of Globalization	1
The Two Meanings of Globalization	2
Globalization as the Substantive Phenomenon	4
<i>Capitalism and What it is</i>	6
<i>The 'Globalization' of Capitalism in Historical Perspective</i>	9
<i>The Era of Mercantile Capitalism: c. 1450-1760</i>	12
<i>The Era of Industrial Capitalism: c. 1760-1917</i>	15
<i>The Era of Financial Capitalism: c. 1917-Present</i>	18
Defining Capitalism and What it is	20

Chapter Two

THEORIZING THE SHIFT:

Organized Capitalism and Beyond

The 'Second Structural Shift'	22
The Industrial and Post-industrial Society:	26
Images and Understandings	
The Information Society Thesis: An Overview	28
<i>Yoneji Masuda</i>	30
<i>Manuel Castells</i>	34
The Post-Fordist Thesis: An Overview	38
<i>Michael Piore and Charles Sabel</i>	40
<i>The New Times Project</i>	44
The Post-Modernist Thesis: An Overview	50
<i>Charles Jencks</i>	53
<i>Frederic Jameson</i>	55
<i>David Harvey</i>	58
<i>Ulrich Beck</i>	62
<i>Martin Albrow</i>	68
The Theories of the Post-Industrial Society:	73
Preliminary Lines of Evaluation and Critique	

Chapter Three

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN'S WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: The Theory of Globalization as a Substantive Phenomenon

Sociology of the Global:	75
On the Prospects and Possibilities Thereof	
Immanuel Wallerstein: The Concept of World-System	77
World-Systems Analysis:	83
Capitalist World-Economy as a Global System	
The Capitalist World-System:	88
The Spatio-Temporal Dimension	
Immanuel Wallerstein's world-Systems Analysis:	93
A Summary	

Chapter Four

ROLAND ROBERTSON'S 'VOLUNTARISTIC' WORLD SYSTEM THEORY: The Theory of Globalization as a Conceptual Phenomenon

Towards a Sociology of the Global:	96
On Theorizing and Analysis, Rudimentarily	
Roland Robertson: The Concept of Globalization	97
Robertson's 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory	99
'Voluntaristic' World System Theory:	101
The Particular-Universal Relationship	
The Global Field as a Process of Symbolic Construction	103
The Global Field: differing Images of World Ordering	105
Globalization in the Spatio-Temporal Dimension	109
Roland Robertson's 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory:	112
A Summary	

Chapter Five

ON IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN AND ROLAND ROBERTSON, COMPARATIVELY AND METATHEORETICALLY: A Comparative and Metatheoretical discussion of World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory

On the Course of Comparative and Metatheoretical Analysis	115
On Ontology, Epistemology, Action and Explanation as the Forms of Metatheory, Rudimentarily	116

World-Systems Analysis: Metatheoretical Presuppositions	117
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Ontology</i>	118
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Epistemology</i>	119
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Explanation</i>	120
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Action</i>	121
'Voluntaristic' World System Theory:	121
Metatheoretical Presuppositions	
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Ontology</i>	122
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Epistemology</i>	123
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Explanation</i>	123
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Action</i>	124
On the Metatheory of World-Systems Analysis and	125
'Voluntaristic' World System Theory, Comparatively	
On Research Practice	128
<i>Investigative Interests</i>	128
<i>Methodological Strategies</i>	129
<i>Empirical Procedures</i>	130
<i>Practical Methodological Grounds</i>	131
World-Systems Analysis as a Research Practice	132
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Investigative Interests</i>	132
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Methodological Strategies</i>	133
<i>World-Systems Analysis: Empirical Procedures</i>	134
<i>World-Systems Analysis:</i>	135
<i>Practical Methodological Grounds</i>	
'Voluntaristic' World System Theory as a Research Practice	136
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Investigative Interests</i>	136
<i>'Voluntaristic' World system Theory: Methodological Strategies</i>	137
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Empirical Procedures</i>	138
<i>'Voluntaristic' World System Theory:</i>	139
<i>Practical Methodological Grounds</i>	
On the Prospects of Merging World-Systems Analysis and	140
'Voluntaristic' World System Theory into a Research Practice	
of the Global	
World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System	143
Theory Comparatively and Metatheoretically: Concluding	
Reflections	

Chapter Six

GLOBALIZATION AS A SUBSTANTIVE AND CONCEPTUAL PHENOMENON REVISITED: Secondary Observations, Tentative Conclusions

The Contours of the Global	146
----------------------------	-----

The Propositions on Globalization as the Substantive Phenomenon: A Critique	147
The Propositions on Globalization as the Conceptual Phenomenon: A Critique	149
<i>The Information Society Thesis: A Critique</i>	150
<i>The Post-Fordist Thesis: A Critique</i>	152
<i>The Post-Modernist Thesis: A Critique</i>	153
From World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory to the Research Practice of the Global Sociology of the Global: Prospects and Possibilities	159
REFERENCES	164

List of Tables

4.1: Differing Images of World Ordering	107
---	-----

Chapter One



SETTING THE GROUND:

Globalization as Substantive and Conceptual a Phenomenon

The Ghost of Globalization

A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING US - the spectre of globalization. From our daily conversations, over every imaginable form of media, and to the world of academia the topic of globalization has entered the world of our mundane and (for some of us) professional aspects of life as the subject of ever proliferating forms of global-awareness discussion and discourse. The 'globe talk' seems to be all around us - from the people we meet in our daily lives, over the things we hear, see or download through various sources of entertainment, to our educational and professional practices everyone and everything seem to have that global perspective, that recognition of being connected to, and being a part of, something bigger, something outside of our immediate purview.

But what do we mean by globalization? A tough question. The pervasiveness of global awareness would seem to suggest that we have understood, mastered and "digested" the concept of globalization; however, nothing could be farther from the truth than that. Don't believe it? Just go ahead, ask that very simple - and yet very fundamental - question 'What is globalization?' and see what kind of answers (if any) you get. While everyone seems to be aware of the concept and apparently feels quite comfortable using it, when it comes right down to it very few seem to be able to - in a manner of speaking - put their finger on it.

The situation is not all that much different in our places of learning - in the institutions of scholarly and academic enterprise where, at least to an everyday mind, 'those smart guys must know answers to all those simple yet complex and confusing questions'. Think so? Think again. When it comes to globalization (and, it might be added, not only globalization) opinions, positions, and arguments within the 'scholarly and academic community' are

as opposed and as wide-ranging as they can get. While for some members of academia the problem(atic) of globalization is not a problem(atic) to begin with (because, in very simple terms, it does not fall within the scope of their immediate research and scholarly interests), those who do attempt to deal with globalization find themselves in the midst of ever-proliferating debates about the 'Whats?', 'Hows?', 'Whens?' and 'Whys?' and, more often than not, with little or no agreement on any of them.

And that is not surprising.

Both as the concept to be addressed and the problem(atic) to be investigated globalization is indeed difficult to get at. Partly, this is because the term as such has been 'appropriated' and included in our vocabulary fairly recently; partly, it is because of the fact that in our thinking about globalization we (for the most part unconsciously, or 'unreflexively') tend to conflate two of its meanings - namely, what I would term as *substantive* and *conceptual*. Obviously, the two are interrelated; however, each is characterized by its own distinctive 'properties' that make for mutual differentiation and the need for categorical separation.

I believe that differentiating between the two meanings of the concept is a useful point of departure in an attempt to - in one way or the other - deal with the phenomenon of globalization. It is useful because it makes for the realization that any form of 'globe talk' commences with an adherence to either one or the other meaning of globalization - the meaning that, in some very fundamental respects, impacts our frame of reference, our mode of thinking, our level of discourse, and - in the final analysis - our way of understanding the problem(atic) in question. Thus, while I do not think that positing the substantive and the conceptual meaning of globalization resolves all the difficulties related to the concept as such and the processes thereof, I do believe that making, and being aware of, the distinction rids us of some of the confusion regarding our ways of conceiving of, and dealing with, globalization as a form of awareness, a point of reference, and a mode of analysis.

The Two Meanings of Globalization

For all of their apparent diversity, various versions of popular and populist 'globe talk' revolve essentially around the two assumptions about the phenomenon of globalization. In the context of the first one, globalization is used to refer to the growing interdependence across the world on a number of different dimensions; within the framework of the second, globalization is used as a means of denoting the process of worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities and practices. Regarding the first notion of globalization as a substantive problematic, thus, the *growing state of interdependence* is, for the most part, explored and emphasized in economic terms, although political, social and - most recently - cultural spheres have

not remained unaddressed. With respect to the second one, the *worldwide expansion of institutions, collectivities and practices* is mostly referred to as 'going global', whether the focus is being placed upon given economic (understood both in its narrow and broader sense), political, social or cultural movements. Common to any form of the 'going-global talk', then, is the discussion of 'internationalization' as the notion inherent in the process of worldwide expansion.

Cutting across the two notions of globalization employed within the framework of popular and populist discourses is the idea of *local-to-global processes*, on the one hand, and of ever increasing *interconnectedness*, on the other. Thus, implicit in both globalization as the growing state of interdependence and as the process of worldwide expansion is, on the one hand, the notion of (in Giddens' terms) 'lifting' or 'disembedding' of structures and activities from their local(ized) contexts so as to become global(ized) and, on the other, the acknowledgment that, as a process of increasing expansion and interdependence, globalization as such generates an ever increasing interdependence which places certain constraints upon the process of formation and the general structure of the *world-as-a-global-place* (or the *world-as-a-whole*). The two processes are perceived as being - in a manner of speaking - tangible and real, both in terms of their workings and their consequences upon various *global actors*. Within the framework of globalization as a *substantive phenomenon* (that is, as the resultant, as it were; of globally oriented, and - increasingly - constituted, economic, political, social and cultural expressions of today's world), then, the processes of worldwide expansion and ever-increasing interconnectedness are looked upon as the most important points of reference in configuring social, cultural, political, and economic expressions at this stage of human history.

Apart from the above outlined approach to globalization as the substantive phenomenon there is yet another sense in which the phenomenon of globalization has been addressed and dealt with. This one is of primarily conceptual nature and it has to do with different forms of theorizing about the ways in which the world has become (and has come to be perceived as) one - that is, as the *global place* (or the *global field*). Thus, the main difference between globalization in its substantive and its conceptual meaning lies in the 'scope of perception': whereas, as we have seen, globalization in its substantive meaning refers to concrete, historically constituted processes and practices that gave (and still give) shape the contemporary global circumstance, globalization in its conceptual meaning has to do with accounting for 'organizational features' of the world-as-a-whole - that is, with (as Giddens would have it) *structuration* of the world along certain (and often contested) historically configured trajectories. Consequentially, it could be argued that globalization in the substantive sense is historically specific and, for the most part, focused on contemporary global processes whereas

globalization in the conceptual sense refers to an all-encompassing, overarching attempt to account for the transformation of, so to speak, the *world in-itself* to the *world for-itself*. The further implications of this argument are that, firstly, the processes considered under globalization as the substantive phenomenon are subsumed within the purview of globalization as the conceptual phenomenon and, secondly, that, in fact, defining globalization in the substantive terms is possible only to the extent that there exists, in one form or the other, the notion of globalization in the conceptual sense¹.

Globalization as the Substantive Phenomenon

Whether considered and dealt with in terms of the growing interdependence across the world on a number of different dimensions or in terms of the process(es) of worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities and practices globalization in its substantive meaning - that is, globalization as the substantive phenomenon - has, in its most fundamental respects, to do with concrete, historically constituted social, political, economic and cultural processes that have generated, molded, and sustained the growing interdependence across the world and the worldwide expansion of given institutions, collectivities and practices. In fact, as the substantive phenomenon globalization can be thought of as *being coterminous* with these concrete, historically constituted social, political, economic and cultural processes.

Evidently, the social, political, economic and cultural processes "constitutive" of the states of ever-growing worldwide interconnectedness and expansion do not exist in vacuum, as it were, but are integral components of the larger, overall socio-historical formation within which they subsist and operate. The nature of that socio-historical formation, thus, inevitably corresponds to the nature of the processes "embedded" therein. In other words, if the 'resultant' of the overall characteristics of social, political, economic and cultural processes at work within the framework of given socio-historical structure is the condition of ever-growing interconnectedness and expansion across the globe then the 'resultant' of the overall characteristics of that socio-historical structure must necessarily correspond to the very same condition of ever-growing interconnectedness and

¹ Dealing with what I have denoted as substantive and conceptual meanings of globalization Robertson observes the following:

[T]here is no contradiction between these [that is, substantive] ways of defining globalization and the model which I have announced, so long as what I call the dominant [that is, conceptual] form of globalization is accorded a central place in any attempt to make the issue of globalization into a genuine research program. Each of these seemingly alternative ways of approaching or defining globalization depends in varying degrees, but usually implicitly, upon something like my own conceptualization of the dominant form, or frame, of globalization (Robertson 1992a: 176).

expansion across the globe. For, after all, any given structure (socio-historical and otherwise) is but a "derivative" of the processes that enter into its composition, its structural make up.²

If indeed the characteristics of the overall socio-historical structure can be thought of as being coterminous with the characteristics of the social, political, economic and cultural processes that, operating within the context of that structure, bring about the state of ever-growing worldwide interconnectedness and expansion, and if - as previously established - these are coterminous with the notion of globalization as the substantive phenomenon than - by implication - it follows that, in its substantive meaning, globalization as such is coterminous with the overall socio-historical structure within which those given social, political, economic and cultural processes subsist and operate. Thus, to enter debate about globalization as the substantive phenomenon is, ultimately, to engage in debating the specific socio-historical structure and the properties thereof; to historicize globalization as the substantive phenomenon so as to be able to account for the specificities of the social, political, economic and cultural processes which have brought about both the growing 'multidimensional' interconnectedness of the world and the worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities and practices is to engage in an historical analysis of the specific socio-historical structure and the social, political, economic and cultural dimensions thereof.

Now if the above reasoning holds true and if, indeed, globalization as the substantive phenomenon corresponds to the specific socio-historical structure, than our most immediate task should be to identify that structure. Thus, before anything else we should pronounce the specific socio-historical structure characterized by the properties of the processes corresponding to globalization as the substantive phenomenon by means of answering the simple, yet crucial question: "How do we term it?"

How, then, do we term it?

The concrete, socio-historical structure (or formation) characterized by the need for (and, thus, the state of) ever-greater world-wide expansion and, hence, ever-greater interconnectedness across the globe corresponds to the notion of *capitalism* as the substantive, historically constituted configuration of social, political, economic and cultural relations and arrangements. In fact, one of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism as the particular socio-historical formation - if not *the* fundamental - is the need for constant and 'unfettered' expansion, the need for extending its sphere of presence and operation. This need is, in its most fundamental respects, crucially related to

² This, of course, is not to say that the structure as such cannot to a degree be characterized by its uniquely own, *emergent properties*. However, to the greatest extent the latter are "composites" of variously intermeshed and interconnected 'primordial', essential social, political, economic and cultural processes constitutive of that structure.

capitalism's main tenets, to its central premises and presuppositions. Delineating and elaborating upon these, in turn, entails defining capitalism as a real, historical category and entity.

Capitalism and What it is

In many important respects, attempts to get at more or less common(alized) understanding and categorical defining of capitalism bring forth many of the same complexities at work within endeavor to definitionally frame the notion of globalization. Very much in the fashion of different strands of the 'globe talk', the various forms of dialogue, discussion, and discourse about capitalism are permeated by some kind of a tacit, intuitive belief that those engaging in the latter share more or less commonly accepted understanding of what might be meant by capitalism; much the same as with the 'globe talk', this intuitive belief is more of a 'wishful thinking' than really operational, existing a 'materiality'. Thus, while, for the most part, everyone agrees that there is such a thing as capitalism when it comes to its defining this unanimous accord of initial exuberance dissolves itself in a multitude of differing and - often - opposing definitional 'entrenchments'. As Dobb was to observe in his classic study on capitalism,

[b]ut if to-day Capitalism has received authoritative recognition as an historical category, this affords no insurance that those who claim to study this system are talking about the same thing....[This] difference of verbal usage is not only associated with a different emphasis in the search for what is relevant among the multitude of historical incidents and with a different principle of selection in composing the chronicle of events, but is apt to lead to a different mode of interpretation and a different causal-genetic story³ (1963: 2).

³ Elaborating upon this particular point Dobb (1963: 4-8) identifies three distinct, separate meanings assigned to the notion of capitalism that, in his view, represent the three most important positions on the definitional framing of capitalism as a socio-historical formation. The first one is the meaning espoused in the writings of Werner Sombart who sought the essence of capitalism, not in any aspect of its economic anatomy or its physiology, but in the totality of those aspects as represented in the *geist* or *spirit* that has inspired the life of a whole epoch. Thus, Sombart sought the origin of capitalism in the development of states of mind and human behavior conducive to the existence of those economic forms and relationships characteristic of the modern, capitalist world. These states of mind, the *geist* or *spirit* that brought about the capitalist epoch is identified by Sombart as a synthesis of the spirit of enterprise or adventure and the *bourgeois spirit*. The second is the meaning which identifies capitalism with the organization of production for a distant market. Within the framework of this meaning capitalism could be regarded as "being present as soon as the acts of production and of retail sale came to be separated in space and time by the intervention of a wholesale merchant who advanced money for the purchase of wares with the object of subsequent sale at a profit". Thus, the underlying principle of capitalism, from the point of view of this particular perspective, is thought to be a system of exchange economy in which the fundamental economic activity is the pursuit of unrestricted profit. The third one is the meaning given by Karl Marx who sought the essence of capitalism in a particular *mode of production* - that is, the state of productive forces, the ownership of the means of production,

Where the problem(atic) of defining capitalism differs from the complexities of getting at the more or less common(alized) understanding of globalization in general is on the point of 'involvement' of the various approaches at conceptually encapsulating the phenomenon of capitalism. This difference is a direct consequence of differing histories of both the concept as such and its use: whereas, as we have seen, the concept of globalization entered the awareness of general and specialized audiences fairly recently - about thirty years ago - the concept of capitalism and its usage (definitional and other) have much longer history - about two centuries in duration. For most of the time, the history of capitalism and of the understanding thereof has been permeated by various forms of 'interested knowledge(s)' within the framework of which differing standpoints on the issues of definitional framing and analytical discourse of capitalism have been driven by social, cultural, and, especially, political and economic persuasions of different orientations. In that context, thus, the diverse and - often - opposing definitional and analytical discourses of capitalism corresponded to ideological tenets of those espousing particular mode of defining or analysis.

Another way of getting at the specifics of the history of capitalism and the understanding thereof, as they pertain to its definitional framing, is to recognize that - ultimately - as a real, historically constituted socio-economic formation capitalism has always been conceptualized and defined in light of a particular 'social problem(atic)' (understood, of course, in the broadest possible sense) of interest to those putting forth different forms of understanding of the capitalist system.⁴ Thus, the process of conceptualizing and defining capitalism has - prevalently - been framed within the specific set(s) of concerns, often (as it was to turn out) sociological in their very

and the social relations between individuals resulting from their location in the overall production-process. In Marx's view, the historical prerequisite for emergence of capitalism was the concentration of the ownership of the means of production in the hands of *capitalists*, the dominant class consisting of only a minor section of society, and, consequentially, the emergence of *proletariat*, a propertiless class for whom the sale of their labor-power, their ability to work, was their only source of livelihood. Thus, for Marx, the defining characteristic of capitalism was the existence of *capitalist* mode of production - the system of production-relations under which labor-power had become a commodity like any other and was bought and sold on the market like any other object of exchange.

⁴ When considering the main figures of the nineteenth century soci(ologic)al thought - Marx, Durkheim and Weber - and their treatment of capitalism what comes to mind is that, for example, Marx offered his understanding, treatment, and analysis of capitalism in light of what he perceived to be the most pressing social problem(atic) in the new society - namely, exploitation of the majority of population taking place in the context of a capitalist mode of production as a new form of organizing economic life. Similarly, Durkheim provided his definitional understanding and analytical treatment of capitalism in light of his concern with ever greater specialization of the division of labor and the implications that the latter exerted upon the process of social-life formulation and organization. Finally, Weber's understanding and analysis of capitalism was proffered as a reflection of his concern with ever greater bureaucratization of life and its ramification on the nature of social life (in general) and political life (in particular) of the period.

nature. These, in turn, were reflections of what were perceived as 'shortcomings' (to put it in neutral terms) of a new, qualitatively different mode of organizing social, cultural, political and economic life.

The main point here is that, when it comes to capitalism (and, it might be added, not only capitalism) and its defining, there is no such a thing as a 'neutral', 'value-free', disinterested' understanding, or definition, of this particular socio-historical formation. Regardless of the presence or absence of particular political or (more broadly) ideological presuppositions underlying the specific understanding of capitalism, the latter is, almost inevitably, framed within the context of some specific concern(s) (soci(ologic)al in its orientation) that require(s) proper understanding, adequate treatment, and - often - effective resolution. Thus, ultimately, it is these concerns that inform and, very often, "condition" an understanding of capitalism as the overall socio-historical structural formation within which the latter - concerns, that is - are located and given form.

If the knowledge(s) that make(s) for understanding capitalism - whether in terminological, definitional, analytical or other terms - is/are inevitably 'interested', how then do we get at the definition of capitalism useful for the purposes of our own concern - globalization? An obvious and - dare I say - most fruitful way would be to 'derive' our definition from the specifics of the problematic under investigation that needs to be grasped conceptually. As previously discussed, the latter is identified as globalization in its substantive sense - as globalization as the substantive phenomenon - which is, in turn, made coterminous with capitalism in its (world-) historical dimension. Thus, we would formulate our definition of capitalism in light of our most immediate concern with globalization as the substantive phenomenon and, following Dobb's (1963: 8) 'dictum' that "[t]he justification of any definition must ultimately rest on its successful employment in illuminating the actual process of historical development[,] on the extent to which it gives shape to our picture corresponding to the contours which the historical landscape proves to have", pronounce it valid only insofar as it facilitates our appreciation of globalization as the substantive phenomenon - that is, our understanding of capitalism as the global socio-historical structural formation.

As identified in our previous discussion, two of the most fundamental processes of globalization in its substantive dimension (and, thus, of capitalism as the global socio-historical phenomenon) are, firstly, the growing interdependence across the world on a number of different dimensions and, secondly, the process of worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities and practices. Implicit in these is the idea of diffusion, the notion of capitalism extending its sphere of reach, influence, and domination by means of imposing its *modus operandi* upon ever increasing portion of the globe - by means of 'globalizing' itself. The 'globalization' of capitalism, in

turn, is 'necessitated' by its central and most fundamental categorical delineation - the accumulation of capital. The latter makes it mandatory for capitalism to continuously reach into new areas of the world, previously (fully or partially) devoid of its 'mode of operation' and its 'laws of organization', bring them under its orbit of dominion and - ultimately - mastery, and thus provide for its own viability by means of, on the one hand, generating new pools of cheap labour and, on the other, creating new markets and spaces for repatriation of profits. Capital that does not grow is a dead capital; capitalism that does not expand is a dead capitalism. To live, both are in constant need of - in the former's case - new means of growth and - in the latter's - new means of expansion. The 'globalization' of capitalism, or - which is but its coterminant - globalization as the substantive phenomenon, then, is nothing but a 'processual attempt' on the part of the system based upon constant growth and expansion to secure its own 'means of subsistence' by means of conquering ever greater portion of the globe.

Thus, being integral for capitalism's viability, its 'globalization' - globalization as the substantive phenomenon - is not only a 'necessity' needed for perpetuating the latter's existence but necessarily a crucial component in the overall process of capitalism's being in time - the process of its inception, development and - so far - continuation. As such, as an integral in the overall process of capitalism's history, globalization as the substantive phenomenon is not only a 'phenomenological necessity' in the history of capitalism but, necessarily, a historical process itself - the process with the history of its own existence. Coming to terms - as it were - with that history is crucial for any attempt at proffering a definitional understanding of capitalism as the global socio-historical structural formation.

The 'Globalization' of Capitalism in Historical Perspective⁵

The beginnings of capitalism and - thus - of its 'globalization' can be traced back to the period that marks the transition from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century. As White was to observe in *Global Spin: Probing the Globalization Debate (Where in the World are We Going?)* (1995: 15),

[t]he earliest beginnings of what is called the globalization process in the late twentieth century can be traced as far back as the start of the sea-borne imperial expansion of Europe, in what the Western Christian Calendar calls the fifteenth century.

⁵ Any attempt at offering a detailed narrative of the process of historical development of capitalism as a structural formation with global tendencies would greatly exceed the scope and space limitation of this writing. What follows, hence, is a sketch out of the main social, political, economic, and cultural tendencies central for the formation, development and solidification of capitalism as the global socio-historical phenomenon.

Known at variance as the 'age of discovery', 'age of reconnaissance', and 'age of expansion'⁶ this period is - most of all - characterized by the processes of further extension of European trade routs into Asia, European conquest and expansion into the newly 'discovered' territories of the Americas, and the 'deepening' of European ties with the continent of Africa (and especially its coastal territory) by means of imposing an ever firmer hold on the practice of slave trade. In the words of Karl Marx,

[t]he discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalised the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production (Marx in Tucker 1978: 435).

Obviously, locating the origins of capitalist system in the period of transition from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century does not warrant the notion of a sudden - conceivably mysterious - transformation from one 'mode' of social, political, economic and cultural life-organization and conduct to the other, qualitatively different. Rather, it implies the 'maturation' of certain historically constituted social, political, economic and cultural 'trajectories' whose germination and eventual permeation within already existing system of social, political, economic and cultural relations made for the gradual emergence of a new, qualitatively different 'mode' of organization and conduct of social, political, economic and cultural life. As observed by Dobb (1963: 11),

systems are never in reality to be found in their pure form, and in any period of history elements characteristic both of preceding and of succeeding periods are to be found, sometimes mingled in extraordinary complexity. Important elements of each new society, although not necessarily the complete embryo of it, are contained

⁶ As observed by McKay *et al.* (1991: 459),

[t]he "Age of Discovery" refers to the era's phenomenal advances in geographical knowledge and technology, often achieved through trial and error. In 1350 it took as long to sail from the eastern end of the Mediterranean to the western end as it had taken a thousand years earlier. Even in the fifteenth century, Europeans knew little more about the earth's surface than the Romans had. By the 1650, however, Europeans had made an extensive reconnaissance - or preliminary exploration - and had sketched fairly accurately the physical outline of the whole earth. Much of the geographical information they had gathered was tentative and not fully understood - hence the appropriateness of the term the "Age of Reconnaissance."

The designation of the era as the "Age of Expansion" refers to the migration of Europeans to other parts of the world. This colonization resulted in political control of much of South and North America; coastal regions of Africa, India, China and Japan; and many Pacific islands. Political hegemony was accompanied by economic exploitation, religious domination, and the introduction of Europeans patterns of social and intellectual life.

within the womb of the old; and relics of an old society survive for long into the new.

Thus the emergence of capitalism as a way of living and interrelating, a means of political organization, and a system of economic production at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century is, in a manner of speaking, an end-point of long historical process with its 'roots' - that is, certain social, political, economic, and cultural practices the development and solidification of which was fundamental for shaping of the capitalist system - firmly embedded in the period of high and later Middle Ages.

What then are those specific social, political, economic, and cultural developments? The fundamental and most important was the emergence and rise of towns throughout Europe as the places of business and commerce and, thus, the environment within which a new business and commercial class came into being. As observed by McKay *et al.* (1991: 326),

the rise of towns and the development of a new business and commercial class...was to lay foundations for Europe's transformation from a rural agricultural society into an industrial urban society - a change with global implications.

Emerging in the context of newly created urban spaces that, in the course of time, constituted themselves as legal and political autonomies, this new business and commercial class - to be referred to as the *bourgeoisie*⁷ - was to imbue the medieval society of Europe with the new possibilities of economic advancement, social mobility, and improvement in legal status and, thus, provide an impetus for social reform, change and, ultimately, transformation.

The second important development was the revitalization and expansion of the long-distance commercial trade that began in the course of eleventh century. Centered for the most part in towns and controlled by merchants and professional traders this 'commercial revolution' of the high and later Middle Ages was to generate ever more wealth and facilitate gradual industrial development in different parts of Europe. As well, the success of long-distance commercial trade was to establish the cities of Europe, especially the Northern Italian cities (such as Venice, Genoa and Florence), as the places of trade, commerce, banking and political power.

The third important development - for the most part result of an ever increasing influence of the cities upon the social, political, and economic tendencies of Europe - was an emergence of gradual centralization of political power, the creation of professional civil service bureaucracy, and the

⁷ *Bourgeois* - a person who lives or works inside the walls - is derived from the Old English and Old German words 'burg', 'burgh', 'borg' and 'borough', meaning 'a walled fortified place'. This was because the medieval towns of Europe were, as a rule, surrounded by a wall that protected the place from raids and unwanted intruders.

formation of permanent standing military power. Fundamentally, these were important for the fact of laying a basis for the new form of political governance and, eventually, a new 'mode' of political organization - the nation-state.

Finally, the fourth important development was a cultural movement of the Renaissance that emerged in Italy and subsequently spread throughout Europe. The Renaissance infused the European continent with a self-conscious awareness about living in a new era, an era of individualism, secularism, and (Christian) humanist sentiment. As such, it introduced within the purview of European social and cultural milieu a new individualist attitude towards man, women, and the world in general that stressed personality, genius, uniqueness, the fullest development of capabilities and talents, and - in consequence of these - a driving ambition for the complete achievement of human potential that, for the most part, manifested itself as the desire for success and the quest for glory. The Renaissance also imbued the European continent with the new secular spirit that, differently from the then prevalent religious outlook and its focus on the spiritual, the eternal and the otherworldly, placed an emphasis on the material world, on the here and now, and, more often than not, on the acquisition of material wealth. Finally, the Renaissance provided for a new humanist sentiment that placed a great deal of interest on education and moral behavior, and, in the form of Christian humanism that developed in the northern part of Europe (that is, north of Italy), on developing an ethical way of life by means of combining the classical ideals of calmness, stoical patience, and broadmindedness with the Christian virtues of love, faith, and hope.

Thus, it was these four general tendencies - the emergence and rise of towns and, as a consequence, of the new bourgeois stratum, the revitalization and expansion of the long-distance commercial trade, the centralization of political power and governance, and the cultural movement of Renaissance - that, taking shape and maturing in the period of high and later Middle Ages and solidifying and permeating Europe at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, provided for the new, qualitatively different social, political, economic, and cultural 'mechanisms' and, thus, for the new, qualitatively different social, political, economic, and cultural relations that are propelled Europe in to the 'age of discovery, reconnaissance and expansion', and gave rise to the new, *capitalist system* of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements that, once let loose from the womb of Europe, was to spread out and seek after the rest of the world.

The Era of Mercantile Capitalism: c. 1450-1760

The first phase of the 'globalization' of capitalism is characterized by the formation of the mercantilist network of trade and commerce. Resting upon

the European expansion and subsequent control of overseas territories - driven by the force of the above-discussed four social, political, economic, and cultural developments - the phase of mercantile capitalism⁸ was to

⁸ The debate about significance of mercantilism for the rise of the capitalist system rests upon the distinction between 'unfree' and 'free' labor and the notion about the source of surplus value. Those - primarily of Marxist orientation - who argue that the only source of surplus value is 'free' commodified labor exploited in the context of capitalist relations of production dismiss - in the most extreme case - the notion of mercantilism as the 'pre-capitalist' era during which profits were generated in the sphere of 'commodity-circulation' - that is, through the practices of trade and commerce - rather than the sphere of production. As the argument goes, given the fact that within the framework of mercantilism the 'laws' of capitalist relations of production do not hold - for, given the fact that most of labor is coerced and therefore not 'free', there exists no distinction between the propertied class of the *bourgeoisie* and the propertiless working class and, hence, no existing capitalist relations of production in the context of which the exploitation of labor-power could take place - the idea of mercantile capitalism, as the initial phase of capitalism's development, is simply untenable. On the less extreme end, the notion of mercantile capitalism is accepted as the phase of the so-called 'primitive accumulation' of capitalism - that is, the period of initial capital accumulation during which the material and economic basis for the emergence of 'true' capitalism was generated. For both 'extremists' and 'lesser extremist' the 'true' capitalism begins only after the English industrial revolution, in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Those who adhere to the notion of mercantile capitalism argue that mercantilism constitutes a legitimate, initial phase of capitalism's development insofar as it gives form to an economic system in which commodities are produced for sale in a market, with the economic objective of realizing profits and accumulating capital over time - the latter being the fundamental premise of capitalism. For the most part, they reject the notion of capitalism emerging only after the industrial revolution, holding that the latter was but a phase in the overall developmental process of the capitalist system.

I believe that these two opposing positions can be 'reconciled' in a fruitful manner and that there is a legitimate need and possibility for integrating them both so as to arrive at the proper understanding of capitalism as both the particular socio-historical structural formation and the system of particular economic relations. Thus, I would argue for the validity of the latter claim about incorporating mercantilism in the overall 'schema' of capitalism's rise and development for, in my view, it is essential for understanding capitalism as the socio-historical phenomenon with systemic structural properties. Indeed, insofar as the accumulation of capital is the fundamental premise of capitalism (and on this point, to my understanding, there is an agreement on both sides of the debate) the idea about mercantile capitalism as the initial phase in capitalism's development in which capital was accumulated by means of trade and commerce needs to be incorporated in the overall analytical apparatus. On the point of the lack of distinctly capitalist relations of production during the phase of mercantile capitalism, I would submit that although within the context of mercantilist relations these are indeed not evident in any formal sense, the *mechanism* that underlies the process of creation of surplus-value within the framework of capitalist relations of production - appropriation of surplus labor by its 'beneficiary' - is very much at work in the context of mercantile capitalism. If the worker's daily labor 'resolves' itself into *necessary* and *surplus* labor, and if the former is the amount of labor needed to secure worker's subsistence and the latter the amount of unpaid labor 'bestowed' upon the product of labor and *realized* as a profit on the part of its 'appropriator' in the process of selling that product on the market, then, irrespectively of labor being 'free' or 'unfree', the same *underlying mechanism* is at work within both the mercantile capitalist and the industrial capitalist relations of production. In both contexts, surplus - that is, 'unrewarded' - labor is being performed and - thus - surplus-value being created in the process of production; in both contexts, necessary labor is being utilized as a means of securing worker's subsistence - in the case of 'unfree' labor, by means of providing laborer with enough means of subsistence so as to maintain him/her in life; in the case of 'free' labor, by means of paying worker just enough so that he/she is to be able to make use of the most elementary means of subsistence and thus maintain him/herself as a worker. Thus, in both cases

provide the basic arrangements of the capitalist enterprise the successful functioning and development of which was to secure the 'widening' and 'deepening' of capitalist social, political, economic and cultural relations.

The basic 'structural arrangement' of mercantile capitalism was predicated upon the processes of conquest and colonization of the parts of Central and South America (and, about a century later, the territories of North America), the regions of coastal Africa and the East Indian islands, motivated primarily by the economic imperative of the quest for wealth and material profit and - although important but subsidiary to the economic motive - the desire to bring under the wing of Christianity the pagan peoples of the then known world. Within the framework of the mercantilist 'structural arrangement' the conquered and colonized parts of the world were used as the places for extracting raw materials, agricultural staples, and precious commodities (Central and South America, the East Indies), the pools of cheap and - more often than not - free (slave⁹) labour (Central America and

there is a mechanism of exploitation and a mechanism of surplus-value creation working in, I would argue, an identical manner. In the case of 'unfree' labor, exploitation of labor and - thus - the creation of surplus-value might be 'coerced', while in the case of 'free' labor they might be 'free' or 'voluntary'. However, regardless of the difference with respect to their apparent forms the two are, for all practical purposes, fundamentally identical.

In addition, the 'commonality' of mercantile capitalism and industrial capitalism rests upon the fact that, within the context of both, profits are *realized* and - thus - capital accumulated in an identical manner - by means of selling products of labor (be it 'free' or 'unfree') on the market, at the price that is higher than the cost of begetting those products. Thus in both cases we find that the type of production corresponds to the M-C-M' 'schema' - that is, to the capitalist, exchange-value form of production where objective is capital accumulation - rather than to the C-M-C, characteristic of the simple commodity, use-value form of production where objective is an exchange of objects of utility.

As hopefully demonstrated by the above discussion, the proper understanding of capitalism as the particular socio-historical phenomenon and as - necessarily - the particular set of economic arrangements and relations necessitates (indeed demands) making a distinction between the mercantile and the industrial form of capitalism (to that end, Sanderson's distinction (1995) between *protocapitalism* and *capitalism*, for example, might be contemplated as potentially useful) and incorporating the former into the overall schema of capitalism's course of historical development. For although each with its own particular properties, both epochs of capitalism's overall developmental process are the two specific historical instances of the 'material expression' of capitalism's fundamental and underlying premise - capital accumulation - and, as such, the two particular historical moments in the overall process of 'genesis' of the capitalist system.

⁹ The practice of slave trade is not specific to the period of mercantile capitalism nor is the system of slave labor-based agricultural production employed in the West Indies (and later on in the North America) specific to Portuguese and Spanish imperial practices. The 'prototype' of agricultural production based on slave labor was developed in Italy in the course of the fourteenth century, after a series of famines and disease-epidemics depleted the population and generated labor-force shortages. The prosperous Italian cities resolved the problem of labor shortage by purchasing slaves from the Balkans and the Black Sea region. However, the 1453 Ottoman capture of Constantinople halted the flow of white slaves from those areas so that Mediterranean Europe, cut off from its traditional source of slaves, had to resort to an alternative region for slave labor - sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, although much greater in volume and much more crucial in its significance in the context of the system of mercantile-capitalist relations of production, the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch (and later on English

parts of South America, coastal Africa), and the posts for trade and commerce (coastal Africa, the East Indies), while Europe, as the 'domestic geography' of conquerors and colonizers (namely, Portugal, Spain, and The Netherlands), was designated as the place of profit- and capital-gain accumulation.

The basic understanding of mercantilism was the notion that the colonies existed for the economic benefit of the mother country; the basic underlying principle of mercantilist practices was the idea 'buy cheaply, sell dearly'. In this context, most of profits and capital accumulation were achieved by using the colonies as, on the one hand, the suppliers of already existing precious commodities (such as spices) obtainable at highly competitive rates and, on the other, as the places of cheap commodity-production for distant markets, and utilizing the European markets (as well as the markets created in the colonies) as the places of trade, commerce, and profitable economic and financial activities in general.

The Era of Industrial Capitalism: c. 1760-1917

The period between the mid-eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by the development of several important social, political, economic, and cultural tendencies which, building upon the gains of the process of 'primitive accumulation'¹⁰ of the mercantilist era, transformed the social, political, economic, and cultural geographies of Europe and North America and, in the process, introduced a 'new mechanism' of capital accumulation in the form of full-blown relations of industrial production. In the realm of social relations, the main tendency manifested itself as the gradual emergence of the class of propertied industrialists, on the one hand, and the class of propertiless industrial workers, on the other. In its most crucial respects result of the changes in the domain of landed property relations¹¹, this polarization into the capitalist *bourgeoisie* and the working-

and French) slave trade of the coastal regions of Africa is the continuation, as it were, of already established practices of Italian slave-traders.

¹⁰ In its most general sense, 'primitive accumulation' refers to the process of initial generation of wealth by the colonial empires of the mercantilist era that was - in the form of capital - to be used as a material basis for further advancements in social, cultural, political, and - especially - economic relations of Europe and - in terms of the economic relations - its colonies..

¹¹ The main 'agent' of change in the sphere of landed property relations was the practice of enclosing the open farmland and the common pasture that, aided by the series of 'enclosure acts' which legalized the fencing of open fields and the division of the common in proportion to one's property in the open field, created, in the course of the eighteenth century, a mass of landless rural proletariat and a mere handful of large landowners. In the view of E. P. Thompson,

[e]nclosure (when all the sophistications are allowed for) was a plain enough case of class robbery, played according to the fair rules of property and law laid down by a Parliament of property-owners and lawyers (Thompson in McKay *et al.* 1991: 605).

The course of further historical developments saw a transformation of landless rural proletariat into a propertiless urban proletariat and an expansion of the propertied class of bourgeoisie by means of creating a stratum of land owners with the monopoly on landed property.

class *proletariat* was to provide the basic social framework within which the newly-emerging industrial relations are to concretely manifest themselves as a new, *capitalist* mode of production. The political tendencies of the era of industrial capitalism manifested themselves as the continuation of political centralization that, firstly in the form of *absolutism* and *constitutionalism* and later on in the form of 'enlightened' *monarchical absolutism* and - towards the end of the eighteenth century - *classical liberalism*, amounted to the process of nation-state building that, in the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, saw solidification of the nation-state as distinctly modern political project. The main economic tendencies of the period evidenced themselves as the radical changes in agriculture and, especially, industry¹² that, by means of introducing specialized and commercialized market-oriented agriculture and increasingly mechanized processes of production coupled with the development and expansion of large-scale factory industry, revolutionized the nature of work and created new industrial economic space. Overarching the social, political, and economic tendencies of the era of industrial capitalism was the transformation of the medieval *Weltanschauung* - that is, medieval world-view, concretized as the particular set of beliefs constituting an outlook on the world - into modern, capitalist *Weltanschauung*. Resting upon the legacy of the Renaissance and building directly upon the

¹² The transformations of agriculture and industry in the period of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century are commonly referred to as the Agricultural and the Industrial Revolution. The Agricultural Revolution is usually thought of in terms of diverse agricultural innovations (such as enclosed fields, continuous rotation, heavy manuring, and a wide variety of crops) that led to more intensive, commercially oriented agricultural production. The Industrial Revolution that started in England in the 1780s and spread around continental Europe in the course of the nineteenth century is defined by Peter Stearns as

a massive set of changes that begin when radical innovations in technologies and organizational forms are extensively introduced in key manufacturing sectors and that end, in the truly revolutionary phase, when these innovations are widely, though not necessarily universally, established in the economy at large (Stearns in Sanderson 1995: 245).

Sanderson (1995), however, cautions against thinking about the Industrial Revolution as a specific historical event and, instead, suggests the idea of a *process of industrialization* as the evolutionary dynamic of industrial development. In his view, industrialization, as "a process of mechanization within capitalism that has been a constant feature of the evolution of capitalism" (248), is something that is 'embedded' in the process of development of the capitalist system. Thus, following Daniel Chiot, Sanderson identifies five major stages of industrialization: (1) textile manufacturing, dominated by Britain and running from 1760 to about 1830; (2) railroads and iron (dated from 1830 to about 1870), also dominated by Britain, but with the United States and several European countries also being prominent; (3) steel and organic chemistry (dated from 1870 to World War I and dominated by the United States and Germany), a stage that saw the emergence of new industries based on producing and using electrical machinery; (4) automobiles and petrochemicals, dominated by the United States and running from World War I to about 1970; and, beginning in the early 1970s and continuing into the early part of the next century, (5) electronics, information and biotechnology, still dominated by the United States, but with increasing encroachment by Japan and western Europe.

achievements of the Scientific Revolution¹³ and the eighteenth-century Enlightenment's notions of 'reason' and 'progress'¹⁴, this new, modern world-view was to replace medieval period's primarily religious and theological outlook on the world with the one that is primarily secular and scientific, and thus provide a new cultural framework for the realization of social, political, and economic accomplishments of the era of industrial capitalism.

As the new 'mechanism' of capital accumulation, then, industrial capitalism was characterized by the fully developed *capitalist* mode of production in the context of which profits are generated by means of exploiting labour-power in the process of industrial production. The realization of profits and, thus, accumulation of capital was achieved through satisfying 'needs' of constantly expanding national markets - both domestic and foreign - for ever greater volume of commodities. Set by the might of political and economic power, the rules and regulations of domestic and international market-trade were customized so that the largest share of ever increasing gains from trade, technological advancements, and migration flows to the West and its propertied class.

The institutional and legal framework for industrial capitalism was provided by the nation-state whose central role was to regulate and protect respective national economy, as well as to define the rule of international trade and commerce. Alternating between the *laissez-faire* and *protectionist* mode, the political expression of economic regulation by the nation-state was "tailored" so as to suit the needs of domestic and international capital. Thus, in the era of industrial capitalism the nation-state was a legal and political expression of the dominant, propertied class in society; its strength and

¹³ The importance of the Scientific Revolution lies in its substituting the medieval form of speculative knowledge with the modern form of empirical, experimental, and research-oriented knowledge, embodied in the new *scientific method*. Following J. D. Bernal, Sanderson (1995: 317-318) observes three distinct phases of the period of the Scientific Revolution:

[t]he first was associated with Copernicus's substitution of a heliocentric for a geocentric view of the universe. The second phase was marked by the attempts of such thinkers as Tycho Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo to demonstrate the accuracy of the new Copernican view. In the third phase the first scientific societies were formed and science was well on its way to becoming an institutionalized part of western European society.

¹⁴ The Enlightenment's central concepts 'reason', 'social science', and 'progress' are concrete philosophical expressions ('philosophical' being understood in its broadest sense) of the achievements of the Scientific Revolution. The notion of 'reason' referred to the idea that the principles of the scientific method of the natural sciences *could* and *should* be employed to examine and understand all aspects of life; thus, everything was to be submitted to the rational and critical scientific inquiry. Building upon the possibility of 'reason', the idea of 'social science' developed out of the belief that the scientific method of the natural sciences is capable of discovering the laws of human society and that, therefore, it can be applied to the study of social world. Finally, the notion of 'progress' was based upon the belief that, using the scientific method, the social sciences are capable of discovering the laws of social reality and - based on that knowledge - improving existing social conditions by offering the possibility of creating a better society and better individuals.

vitality, therefore, were of crucial importance for the successful functioning of industrial capitalism as the form of dominant class' capital accumulation.

The Era of Financial Capitalism: c. 1917-Present

The success of industrial capitalist enterprise at the turn of the nineteenth century, manifested concretely as the penetration of capitalist industrial relations of production into the yet unconquered parts of the world, introduced the need for financial back-up of the capitalist enterprise. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the further expansion and solidification of capitalism within the territories of North and South America, Africa, and the regions of East Asia: establishing market and industrial relations needed for the success of capitalist projects in these areas required their development according to the tried and tested principles of industrialist enterprise of the West; these, in turn, necessitated considerable financial investments into the projects of capitalist development and expansion. Banks and financial institutions of various sorts played a crucial role in the whole project; in the process, they created, in the course of the twentieth century, an autonomous financial system that offered a new avenue for capital accumulation, this time through buying, selling and lending monetary products worldwide. As observed by Amin (1996),

the financialization of the system (modern, capitalist) is a process by which financial capital affirms its dominance over productive capital: in the terms proposed by Marx, the dominance of direct process M-M' (converting money into money) over the productive process M-P-M' (238).

Thus, in the context of the 'financial mode' of capital accumulation profits are made on the financial market, by means of investing money so as to beget money with 'surplus value'. Put simply, the value of money invested is not equal, but lesser, to the value of money obtained; the difference between initial financial investment and subsequent financial return constitutes financial profit that, used as the financial capital, is reinvested on the financial market and 'reproduced' as yet another financial profit, to be invested anew.

The process of creating an international monetary system which allows for the possibility of accumulating profit by means of capitalizing on financial investment is crucially related to the process of 'deregulation' of the financial system of the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. In its initial stage, the international financial system was characterized by a strong and close articulation between productive industry and banks, in the context of which commercial activities based on the existence of international economic exchanges (that included the financing of trade, foreign exchange dealing, brokerage for commodity purchase and sale, and insuring commodities and transport) were conducted in a 'regulated' financial

environment based on the nation-state as the legal and political framework and nationally-based banks as the 'guardians' of 'national financial sovereignty'. However, the internationalization of banking industry that incorporated the processes of (1) the extension of international branch networks, primarily by American banks in Western Europe and by European banks in North America and elsewhere; (2) the formation of international banking groups; (3) the establishment of international consortia banks to serve a particular area, or a certain kind of business, or a particular sort of industry (Lash and Urry 1987: 202) and, even more importantly, the practice of 'deregulation' of the financial service industry (that is, of gradual elimination of the legal framework that governs the banking system) transformed the initial 'non-speculative' financial system into a highly 'speculative' global banking characterized by great scale and speed of financial activity and a total deregulation that leaves banks and other financial institutions (such as brokerage firms, insurance companies, and thrifts) 'unfettered' from any means of effective control.

The single most important occurrence in the overall process of creation of the speculative financial market was deregulation of international money transactions by means of ending fixed and introducing floating exchange rates¹⁵. This effectively "freed" money from its place and from most connections to its former sources of value - commodities and services - and "bound" it to the global financial market place where its value was now set. As observed by Barnet and Cavanagh (1996: 370-371),

[n]o longer rooted in any community or nation, money was losing any relationship to the concrete world of goods and services. The value of money was now totally afloat and was based on how it was viewed by money traders and speculators.

[...]

Borrowers all over the world, including the largest corporations, could now shop around the world for money, and they could borrow it in many different forms on a wide variety of terms. Investors could hedge against risks in one national economy or in one industry by buying foreign stocks.

Thus, in the context of what Barnet and Cavanagh call a 'casino economy' buying, selling and lending of monetary products worldwide became businesses in themselves, for the most part completely devoid of any connection to investments in either production or commerce. This

¹⁵ Unfortunately, complexities related to the process of substituting fixed with floating exchange rates cannot be dealt with adequately within the scope of this writing. For discussion on this particular issue see, for example, Lash and Urry 1987: 201-209 and, especially, Hirst and Thompson 1996: 31-44.

deregulated¹⁶ global financial environment provides currency speculators all over the world with the possibility of constantly moving their financial capital electronically and accumulating profits through 'surplus-returns' on their financial speculations. In the words of Randall White (1995: 108),

...the globalized international financial system of the late twentieth century...is dominated by speculators and effectively managed by the proverbial 25-year-old trader in red suspenders. These traders and speculators, attuned to little more than the narrowest logic of reaping profits (or losses) from short-term money transactions, have powerful new high-technological tools at their fingertips (in-text quotation marks omitted).

Defining Capitalism and What it is

The main task of the foregoing exposition was to establish historically oriented social, political, economic, and cultural parameters within which the definitional framing of capitalism as the socio-historical formation with 'globalizing' tendencies - and, thus, of globalization as the substantive phenomenon - can take place. The exposition was premised upon an understanding that globalization as the substantive phenomenon and capitalism in its (world-) historical dimension refer to an identical process of expansion of a particular system of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements, resulting in an ever-growing interdependence across the world on a number of different dimensions, on the one hand, and a worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities and practices, on the other, and, in turn, predicated upon the most fundamental 'functional' premise of capitalism as the socio-historical formation with 'globalizing' tendencies - capital accumulation.

Establishing that any definitional framing of capitalism is an 'interested' one, in a sense that it implies invoking specific soci(ologic)al concern in light of which capitalism is to be understood and defined, we have suggested that, in light of our most immediate concern with globalization as the substantive phenomenon, our understanding and defining of capitalism need necessarily be 'derived' from its treatment as the substantive socio-historical structural formation, global in its orientation. Thus, we proffered an historical exposition of the 'globalization' of capitalism by means of delineating specific social, political, economic, and cultural tendencies characteristic of the three specific phases of capitalism's development - mercantile, industrial, and financial - and elaborating upon the basic

¹⁶ Crucially, 'deregulated' refers to the inability of any government to control the processes of global financial trade.

'structural' arrangements of the each period. Implicitly, each of the three phases of capitalism's development was delineated as a particular historical instance in the overall process of 'globalization' of the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations and - thus - as a particular historical instance of the phenomenon of globalization in its substantive sense.

In conclusion, based on our historically oriented exposition on globalization in its substantive dimension we can now propose our definitional understanding of both capitalism as the global socio-historical formation and - by implication - globalization as the substantive, socio-historical phenomenon. In their substantive, socio-historical sense the two refer to *a set of historically constituted social, political, economic and cultural arrangements that gave form to a particular framework of social, political, economic, and cultural relations which, driven by the 'functional prerequisite' of the overall structural formation within which they stand "embedded", expanded worldwide and, in the process, generated condition of ever-greater interconnectedness as the 'material expression' of the process of structuring the world-as-a-whole.* Obviously, this definitional framing does not pretend to any form of 'demarcational exclusiveness'. At best, any claim to 'exclusivity' can be laid only in the context of our immediate soci(ologic)al concern - globalization in its substantive dimension.

Chapter Two

THEORIZING THE SHIFT: Organized Capitalism and Beyond

The 'Second Structural Shift'

IN CHAPTER ONE WE INTRODUCED a two-fold distinction pertaining to an attempt to come to terms with globalization as an overall form of awareness, a conceptual point of reference, and a particular mode of analysis. Thus we made a categorical separation between *globalization as the substantive phenomenon*, on the one hand, and *globalization as the conceptual phenomenon*, on the other. Further, we posited that in its substantive sense globalization refers to a particular set of social, political, economic, and cultural relations that have given rise to an ever-increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world and, thus, to its transformation from the *world in-itself* to the *world for-itself*; in its conceptual dimension globalization has to do with various forms of interpreting, or theorizing (understood, obviously, in the broadest possible sense), the process of constitution of the world as a single, global place, or as a *global field*. Finally, in a remainder of Chapter One we dealt at length with globalization as manifested in its substantive dimension - that is, as evidenced in the historical process of 'globalization' of the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations.

The task of Chapter Two is to proffer an exposition on globalization as the conceptual phenomenon - that is, to deal with a corpus of theoretical attempts at apprehending the process of constitution of the world as a *global field*. Thus we shall be dealing with the three variants of the *post-industrial society thesis* - *theories of the information society*, *theories of post-Fordism*, and *theories of post-modernity* - as the three most prominent 'theoretical constructs' for getting at globalization in its conceptual dimension. Given diversity both within and among the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis, our treatment will necessarily be selective and, thus, incomplete - selective in a sense that we shall chose to deal with certain aspects of each of the approaches, in preference to some of their other - for the purposes of our

exposition 'marginal' - dimensions; incomplete for, by means of being selective, our discussion of the post-industrial, post-Fordist, and post-modernist theses shall inevitably prove to be "lopsided". However, our task here is not to provide an all-encompassing, general treatment of the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis; rather, it is to treat these in light of our most immediate concern - globalization in its conceptual sense. To that end, we shall introduce each of the theories by offering a general overview of each of their respective claims and then proceed with somewhat more 'specialized' a discussion of the specifics, as their pertain to the problematic under investigation.

The conceptual point of entry to our treatment of the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity is crucially related to isolating a 'common denominator' to all three theoretical strategies for dealing with globalization as the conceptual phenomenon. In other words, it is predicated upon identifying the common analytical premise that all of them employ as their theoretical point of departure in an attempt to deal with globalization in its conceptual dimension, and to which all of them accord centrality in the process of constitution of the world as a single, global field. Given the fact that, in its most crucial respects, getting at globalization in its conceptual dimension has to do with theoretically apprehending the tendencies at work within globalization as the substantive phenomenon that are deemed central in the process of 'constructing' the world as a global field, and that these are, in turn, inevitably related to the historical process of 'globalization' of the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations, the common analytical premise of the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis is thus to be located - and grasped theoretically - within the processes of the capitalism's functioning and operation, as unfolded within the framework of 'globalization' of the capitalist relations of social, political, economic, and cultural organization and functioning. Ultimately, the 'common denominator' of the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity is "concretized" as the theoretical understanding of the changes in capitalism's 'logic of operation', taking place in the context of the process(es) of global-field constitution.

How then are the changes in capitalism's logic of operation understood by the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity?

The 'common analytical denominator' that encompasses an understanding of the changes in capitalism's logic of operation by all the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis can be delineated as the *second structural shift*. Essential to the 'second structural shift' thesis is the claim that the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations has undergone a fundamental structural change and, concomitantly, a change in its logic of operation, and that it is this transformation in

capitalism's 'structural make up' and its logic of operation that has paved the path, as it were, for bringing forth the system's global dimension and, thus, for "concretization" of the world as a single, global field. This shift in structural make up and logic of operation is understood in terms of capitalism's moving away from its *organized* period and entering a new phase of *late, disorganized*, or (in some interpretations) *post-capitalist* structural and operational logic. As observed by Lash and Urry (1987: 3-7), the movement of capitalism away from its organized phase implies the transformation of the system of capitalist relations characterized by

1. [t]he concentration and centralization of industrial, banking and commercial capital - as markets become progressively regulated...
2. the growth of the...separation of ownership from control, with the bureaucratization of control and the elaboration of complex managerial hierarchies.
3. The growth of new sectors of managerial/scientific/technological intelligentsia and of a bureaucratically employed middle class.
4. The growth of collective organizations in the labour market, particularly of regionally and then nationally organized trade unions and of employers' associations, nationally organized professions etc.
5. The increasing inter-articulation between the state and the large monopolies; and between collective organizations and the state as the latter increasingly intervenes in social conflicts; development of class-specific welfare-state legislation.
6. The expansion of empires and the control of markets and production overseas.
7. Changes in politics and the state, including: the increasing number and size of state bureaucracies, the incorporation of various social categories into the national political arena; the increased representation of diverse interests in and through the state; and the transformation of administration from merely 'keeping order' to the attainment of various goals and national objectives.
8. Various ideological changes concerning the role of technical rationality and the glorification of science.
[...]
9. The concentration of industrial capitalist relations within relatively few industrial sectors and within a small number of centrally significant nation-states.
10. The development of extractive/manufacturing industry as the dominant sector with a relatively large number of workers employed.
11. The concentration of different industries with different regions, so that there are clearly identifiable regional economies based on a handful of centrally significant extractive/manufacturing industries.

12. The growth of numbers employed in most plants as the economies of scale dictate growth and expansion within each unit of production.
13. The growth and increased importance of very large industrial cities which dominate particular regions through the provision of centralized services (especially commercial and financial).
14. a cultural-ideological configuration which can be termed 'modernism'...

into the one distinguished by

1. [t]he growth of a world market combined with the increasing scale of industrial, banking and commercial enterprise [in the context of which] national markets...become less regulated by nationally based corporations....
2. The continued expansion of the number of white-collar workers and particularly of a distinctive service class (of managers, professionals, educators, scientists etc.)...
3. Decline in the absolute and relative size of the core working class, that is of manual workers in manufacturing industry, as economies are de-industrialized.
4. Decline in the importance and effectiveness of national-level collective bargaining procedures in industrial relations and the growth of company and plan-level bargaining, [accompanied by] an important shift from Taylorist to 'flexible' forms of work organization.
5. Increasing independence of large monopolies from direct control and regulation by individual nation-states; the breakdown of most neo-corporatist forms of state regulation of wage bargaining, planning etc., and increasing contradiction between the state and capital...; development of universalistic welfare state legislation and subsequent challenges from left and right to the centralized welfare state.
6. The spread of capitalism into most Third World countries [accompanied by] increased competition in many of the basic extractive/manufacturing industries...and the export of the jobs of part of the First World proletariat, [as well as the shift in] the industrial/occupational structure of First World economies toward 'service' industry and occupations.
7. The decline of the salience and class character of political parties....
8. An increase in cultural fragmentation and pluralism, resulting both from the commodification of leisure and the development of new political/cultural forms since the 1960s....
9. The considerable expansion in the number of nation-states implicated in capitalist production and the large expansion in the

number of sectors organized on the basis of capitalist relations of production.

10. Decline in the absolute and relative numbers employed in extractive/manufacturing industry and in the significance of those sectors for the organization of modern capitalist societies. Increased importance of service industry for the structuring of social relations....
11. The overlapping effect of new forms of the spatial division of labour...weaken[ing] the degree to which industries are concentrated within different regions.
12. Decline in average plant size because of shifts in industrial structure, substantial labor-saving capital investment, the hiving off of various sub-contracted activities, the export of labour-intensive activities to 'world market factories' in the Third World, and to 'rural' sites in the First World etc.
13. Industrial cities...declin[ing] in size and in their domination of regions....
14. The appearance and mass distribution of a cultural-ideological configuration of 'postmodernism' [that] affects high culture, popular culture and the symbols and discourse of everyday life.

Thus, it is within the framework of this general understanding of capitalism's second structural shift¹⁷ - that is, the transformation in the structure and logic of operation of the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations - that the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity lay their specific claims regarding the transformative impact of particular social, political, economic and cultural tendencies upon the process of constitution of the world as the global field.

The Industrial and Post-industrial Society: Images and Understandings

As the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis whose interests lie in explicating social, political, economic, and cultural developments at work within the context of 'global post-industrial condition', the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity formulate and develop their respective lines of reasoning from a shared understanding of modern industrial society as the 'historical predecessor' of their 'immediate analytical frame of reference', the post-industrial society. Thus, in order to properly grasp the themes developed within the framework of the three theories of 'post-industrialism' under consideration, our initial task should be to illuminate the notions of industrial and post-industrial society - that is, to

¹⁷ In reference to the second structural shift, the first transformation - or structural shift - of the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations is generally understood as the transition from the *laissez-faire*, or 'unregulated' mode of capitalist enterprise to the *organized*, 'regulated' mode of capitalism's functioning.

delineate the features that, on the one hand, define the two and, on the other, qualitatively separate one from the other.

The discussion about the nature of, and the differences between, the industrial and the post-industrial society is to be couched in an understanding of that period in history known as *modernity*¹⁸. Most broadly, modernity is associated with the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution which, by giving moderns the confidence that they could match and even surpass the achievements of the ancients, provided the epoch with the grand themes of *progress, reason, revolution, and emancipation* that, in one form or the other, shored up most of the politics of the western world from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. The most immediate roots of modernity, however, are to be traced back to the French Revolution of 1789 and the British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century - the two 'historical watersheds' that furnished the period with its characteristic form of consciousness - revolution based on reason - and its material substance - the modern and industrial world. Ultimately, then, it is in this period of the 'age of reason' that the idea of modernity was born.

As a "natural" outcome of the modern world of the age of reason, there emerged modern industrial society as the framework of social, political, economic, and cultural organization characterized by the principles of secularization, rationalization and bureaucratization, on the one hand, and centralization, 'equalization', and 'democratization', on the other. Its economic realm was characterized by the existence of a capitalist mode of production and (increasingly specialized) division of labor; its political structure, by the emergence of the nation-state as a political entity and the presence of the state as the main political and authoritative body; its social structure, by a class-divided society; and its cultural realm, by the presence of a distinct class-defined culture(s). Thus, in terms of its 'organizational components', it is the concentration, centralization and regulation of economic enterprises within the framework of the nation-state; mass-production along Fordist and Taylorist lines; a corporatist pattern of industrial relations; geographical and spatial concentration of people and production in industrial towns; and cultural modernism that stood out as the hallmarks of modern industrial society.

How about the post-industrial society? According to Daniel Bell (Waters 1996: 105-123), it is principally in the realm of the economy and social structure that the post-industrial society differs from the industrial. Specifically, within the framework of economic activity, the post-industrial

¹⁸ A more elaborate treatment modernity is developed in Chapter One, in the context of discussion of the cultural developments in the era of industrial capitalism (15-18). Sufficient to note here will be that, in general terms, our understanding of modernity coincides with that proffered by Krishan Kumar (1995). With regards to modernity he observes the following (67): "'Modernity' I take to be a comprehensive designation of all the changes - intellectual, social and political - that brought into being the modern world".

society is not primarily a goods-producing but a service economy; in occupational structure, blue-collar workers are replaced by white-collar workers as the single largest category in the labor force, with the professional, scientific, and technical groups becoming increasingly predominant; in the domain of technology, the older machine technology is supplemented by the rise of the new 'intellectual technology' - that is, management and problem-solving systems that make extensive use of the computer and allow for rational planning, prediction, monitoring, and self-sustaining technical growth in all areas of society. Overarching all these changes is the 'axial principle' of the new society - the centrality of 'theoretical knowledge' as the source of innovation and policy-formation within the framework of which there emerges a tendency for 'theory' to take the primacy over 'empiricism'. This tendency is seen in the rise to prominence of the science-based industries, the use of macro-economic theory in the management of the national economy, or the computer-based simulation procedures in many areas of decision-making. Thus, in the context of 'societal post-industrial condition' theoretical knowledge becomes the strategic resource of society; its custodians - the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology - the key social group, replacing the industrialists and the entrepreneurs of the industrial society; and (superseding the business firm of the "old" society) its institutions - universities, research organizations, experimental institutions - the 'axial structures' of the new post-industrial 'mode of organization'.

The Information Society Thesis: An Overview

The theories of the information society build upon the notion of the post-industrial society as delineated by Daniel Bell. Within their framework, the information society is a product of the Third Revolution¹⁹ - an 'information revolution' - that culminated in the introduction of the computer as the 'central symbol' and 'analytical engine' of change that inaugurated the coming of the information society. What brought an information society into being is the convergence of the computer with telecommunications (and thus the emergence of the mass-media) that had broken down the long-standing distinction between the processing of knowledge and its communication, mashed the world together into a unified knowledge grid, and respecified

¹⁹ The notion of the Third Revolution coincides closely with the line of reasoning put forth by Stephen Sanderson (1995) (For an overview, see footnote 12 (16) in Chapter One). As observed by White (1995), in the context of this three-stage mode(l) of industrial development the First Revolution refers to the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century; the Second Revolution refers to the rise of new industries based on the late nineteenth century advances in chemical and electrical science and on a new, mobile source of power - the internal combustion engine; the Third Revolution refers to the 1960s 'third great wave' in advancements in automation, air transport, and atomic power and, especially, the 1990s 'fourth great wave' in the spread of microelectronic, communication, and information technology.

diverse information flows into a unified information stream. Resulting from the emergence and gradual expansion of the new form of mass-media, a new 'info-sphere' of the information society introduced the age of 'de-massified media' which, operating in a global context, allowed for the segmentation and splitting of both senders and receivers of information into discrete and discontinuous units and, correspondingly, for processing, selecting, and retrieving of information so as to suit the most specialized, as well as the most individualized, requirements.

As argued in the context of the information society thesis, emergence of the information society and to it corresponding 'info-sphere' resulted in the compression of space and time into a new 'world oikoumene' oriented towards the future - that is, in the eclipse of distance, the foreshortening of time, and, almost, the fusion of the two. In other words, space has now been enlarged to the entire globe and is tied together in almost 'real time'; at the same time, the sense of time which had been oriented to continuity and the past, has now become geared to the future. As Kumar (1995) observes:

Industrialism confirmed space in the nation state while replacing the rhythms and tempo of nature with the pacing of the machine. The clock and the railway timetable are the symbols of the industrial age. They express time in hours, minutes, seconds. The computer, the symbol of the information age, thinks in nanoseconds, in thousandths of microseconds. Its conjunction with the new communication technology thus brings a radically new space time framework for modern society (10-11).

The central premise underlying the information society thesis is the movement from a goods-producing to an information- and service-producing society and, consequentially, the rapid growth of professional and technical employment, in the context of which knowledge and information become strategic resources and transforming agents of the post-industrial, information society. Concomitantly, advocates of the information society proposition argue that it is the mass-production of information that is the driving force of economy of the information society, so much so that it brings about the change at the most fundamental level of society - its mode of production. In their view, the shift from the goods-producing to the information- and service-producing society introduces a change in the very source of wealth creation and the governing factor in production: labor and capital - the central variables of the industrial society - are replaced by information and knowledge - the principal tenants of the information society - to the extent that it is knowledge, not labor, which is the source of value of the information society. Ultimately, it is the predominance of knowledge

capital over material capital in the structure of the economy²⁰ that, in the view of the information society proponents, stands as the hallmark of the post-industrial, information society.

Yoneji Masuda: The Information Society as Post-industrial Society

Masuda's vision of the information society as the particular kind of the post-industrial societal arrangement follows the general line of argumentation proffered by the information society thesis. For Masuda, the main 'engine' of societal transformation is to be located within the process of innovations in the *system of social technology*. In his view, this process of innovations within the 'axial forces of societal transformation' observes the following pattern (Masuda 1980: vii): different kinds of innovational technologies come together to constitute one complex social system; the system spreads throughout society and gradually becomes established; the result of this establishment is a rapid expansion of a new type of productivity, whose development has a societal impact sufficient to bring about the transformation of existing societal forms to the new ones, qualitatively different. Following this general line of reasoning, Masuda posits that emergence of the information society is an outcome of an *information epoch* - that is, of

the span of time during which there is an innovation in information technology that becomes the latent power of societal transformation that...bring[s] about an expansion in the quantity and quality of information and a large-scale increase in the stock of information (Masuda 1980: 49).

In Masuda's view, then, the development of the information society is based on the process of development of the information technology (that is, computers and communication technology) and, concomitantly, on the creation of the *information space* as the concrete expression of the range of a computer information network. As he observes (1980: 59),

[t]he information epoch to be brought about by computer-communications technology...will demonstrate a force of societal change powerful enough to bring about the transformation of society

²⁰ Kumar (1995: 13) notes that while Bell insists on the principle of 'the disjunction of realms', that is, the notion that economy, polity, and culture are distinct realms which respond to different norms, have different rhythms of change, and are therefore regulated by different, even contrary, 'axial principles', other proponents of the information society thesis (e.g. Toffler, Naisbitt, Masuda) argue that changes in the 'techno-economic structure' generate an impact upon the 'socio-sphere', the 'power-sphere', the 'bio-sphere', and the 'psycho-sphere'. Thus Kumar observes that "it is clear that for most of these thinkers the new information society...is to be welcomed and celebrated not simply as a new mode of production but as a whole way of life."

into a completely new type of human society, which is the information society.

As postulated by Masuda, the information society, eventuated by the revolutionary transformative influence of the information technology upon the processes of social, political, economic, and cultural societal organization, is qualitatively different from its 'historical predecessor' - the modern, Western-type industrial society. The modern industrial society's social structure is based upon the principles of *individualism*, on the one hand, and *class-based divisions*, on the other; its political process upon the system of *representative parliamentary democracy*; its economic life upon the production of *material values*, and its cultural sphere upon the project of *modernity*. In contrast, the new information society introduces a new 'mode' of societal organization whose social structure is built upon the principle of *voluntary communitarianism*, its political process upon the system of *direct participatory democracy*, its economic life upon the production of *information values*, and its cultural sphere upon the 'neo-renaissance' idea of *globalism*. As observed by Masuda (1980: 136, original emphasis), "the core social structure of the information society will be *voluntary communities* [as] *the form of society in which people, of their own choice, will participate in building a community by their own efforts*". As the fundamental units of social organization in the information society, these voluntary communities are characterized by (1) voluntary association of individuals, (2) voluntary management of community's affairs, (3) a sense of mission in the form of actualization of common goals of community, (4) synergism, concretized as working together in a mutually complementary way so as to achieve a shared goal, (5) information space as "invisible but perceptible space functionally bound together by information networks based on computer communication technology" (140, emphasis omitted), and (6) multi-centered and multi-layered community interconnectedness (Masuda 1980: 138-141). As posited by Masuda, there are basically two types of voluntary communities - *local* and *informational*. The first refers to a type of voluntary association of individuals tied to particular spatial locality; the second denotes a potentially global voluntary association-network of individuals bound by their common philosophy and goals in daily life.

The political process of the information society is based upon the principle of direct participatory democracy, or, as Masuda (1980: 101) would have it, "a form of government in which policy decisions both for the state and for local self-government bodies will be made through the participation of ordinary citizens." As such, the system of direct participatory democratic governance is based upon six fundamental principles (Masuda 1980: 104-107): (1) the spirit of synergy and mutual assistance that permeates the overall political process; (2) the participation of all, or at least the maximum number of citizens in the decision-making process; (3) availability of all relevant

information to the public; (4) equitable distribution among all citizens of all benefits received and sacrifices made; (5) dialogue and agreement as a means of seeking solutions to political problems; (6) cooperation of all citizens in the process of applying solution to given political problem. As Masuda observes, considered from the point of its direct participatory democratic political practice, the post-industrial information society is a 'citizens' society of a new type - a participatory, synergetic, and knowledge-creating human society.

The economic life of the postindustrial society is premised upon the production of information value. Concretely, this implies that the information society is characterized by an *information axis economy* in which (1) information is the core of society's economic needs, (2) the economy, and society itself, grow and develop around this core of the production and use of information values, and (3) the importance of information as an economic product exceeds goods, energy, and services (Masuda 1980: 87). According to Masuda (1980: 88-90), this kind of economy is based on the information-led type of industrial structure consisting of 'quaternary', information-related industries: *information industries* (that is, industries that produce, process, and service 'cognitive information'²¹, or produce and sell related equipment), *knowledge industries* (that is, education and research and development industries), *arts industries* (that is, industries that produce, process, and service 'affective information'²², or produce and sell related equipment), and *ethics industries* (that is, industries that produce, process and service information of religious and ethical content). Of crucial importance to the overall economic structure of the information society are, what Masuda calls, *system industries* whose task is to link up existing primary, secondary, and tertiary industrial sectors with quaternary sector of the information industries and thus enable for the existence of a *synergetic economic system*, characterized by voluntary synergy as a means of achieving shared economic goal, synergetic production and shared utilization, autonomous restraint of consumption as a means of ensuring stabilized development of the economy, and increased management and capital participation in the overall public economic activity (Masuda 1980: 97-100).

Finally, the cultural ethos of the information society is permeated by a 'neo-renaissance' attitude of globalism. As the new spirit of the post-industrial times the attitude of globalism is, according to Masuda (1980: 69-70), characterized by the three categorical principles: *spaceship thought, the idea*

²¹ For Masuda, cognitive information refers to "an informed situational relation between a subject and an object that makes possible the action selection by which the subject itself can achieve some sort of use value" (Masuda 1980: 55). For Masuda's discussion on cognitive information see Masuda 1980: 52-56.

²² Differently from cognitive information which is based on 'logic' and 'action-selection' affective information, as postulated by Masuda (1980: 52), is based on 'sensitivity' and 'production of emotion'. As such, "[i]t embraces all the information that conveys sensory feelings, such as 'comfort', 'pain' and the emotional feelings of 'happy' and 'sad'."

of *symbiosis*, and the notion of *global information space*. The first principle, 'spaceship thought', refers to the realization about the finitude of natural and 'spatial' resources of the globe - that is, to the notion that human life is taking place amidst the confines of natural and spatial geographies. The second principle, the idea of *symbiosis*, builds directly upon the notion of finitude of human habitat and refers to the dictum of harmonious relationship between humans and nature as a means or future existence and prosperity. Finally, the notion of *global information space* refers to an awareness of space without regional boundaries, connected by information networks. As posited by Masuda, the latter are constructed as an *information utility*, that is, as public information processing and service facilities that combine computer and communication networks and thus enable anyone to anywhere and at any time easily, quickly, and inexpensively access any information that needs to be obtained (Masuda 1980: 75).

Masuda's idea of the information society is animated by the vision of *global futurization*²³ society as the form of societal organization in which each individual pursues and realizes 'time-value'²⁴, has freedom of decision (that is, the right to voluntarily determine the ways of using future time, in the form of goal-oriented action, so as to achieve desired goal) and equality of opportunity (that is, the right to equal opportunities for achieving goals they have set for themselves), and in which there is flourishing of diverse voluntary communities, realization of interdependent synergistic societies, and actualization of functional societies free of dominant, overruling power. As Masuda (1980) puts it himself,

[t]he global futurization society will be a society in which everyone pursues the possibilities of one's own future, actualizing one's own self-futurization needs by acting in a goal-oriented way. It will be global, in which multi-centered voluntary community of citizens participating voluntarily in shared goals and ideas flourish simultaneously throughout the world (147, emphasis omitted).

[...]

People, while individually pursuing their own futuralization needs through goal oriented action will participate and work together in one or more voluntary communities, and as members of a global

²³ Masuda uses the term 'futurization' to denote the process of realizing future goals by means of undertaking the most appropriate, goal-oriented action. Thus, in the context of this project, for example, futurization would refer to the process of realizing the goal of finishing the thesis by means of undertaking the action of working on it consistently up to the point of its successful completion.

²⁴ Masuda (1980) defines 'time-value' as

the value which man creates in the purposeful use of future time. Put in more picturesque terms, man designs a goal on the invisible canvas of his future, and goes on to attain it (71, emphasis omitted).

A few pages later (73) he offers yet another definition of 'time value' in the context of which "[t]ime-value means value created by the expenditure of free time in an objective-oriented way."

community, will cooperate in solving the problems and crises that are common to all mankind.

That is how I see the future information society ultimately functioning (144-145).

Manuel Castells: Dialectics of the Informational Mode of Development

Castells' understanding of the changes taking place in the context of ever increasing importance of information technologies in the process of reshaping contemporary social, political, economic, and cultural tendencies is proffered through the prism of the *informational mode of development*²⁵ as a new, qualitatively different, mode of - as he would have it (Castells 1989: 1) - 'socio-technical organization'. In Castells' view, the informational mode of development introduces a break in the continuity of the process of historical development of capitalist relations for it supplants the *industrial mode of development*, in the context of which the main source of productivity is to be located in the introduction of new energy sources and in the ability to decentralize the use of energy throughout the production and circulation processes, with the one that assumes the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication as the principal source of productivity of the production process. As Castells observes,

[i]n the informational mode of development...the source of productivity lies in the quality of knowledge.... [S]pecific to the informational mode of development is that...knowledge intervenes upon knowledge itself in order to generate higher productivity. In other words,...in the informational mode of development knowledge mobilizes the generation of new knowledge as the key source of productivity through its impact on the other elements of the production process and on their relationships. (1989: 10)

In Castells' view, the mobilization of knowledge in the context of the informational mode of development is to have a revolutionary impact upon the process of reshaping the system of capitalism's social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Concretely, it is to respecify these along the lines of

²⁵ Castells defines modes of development as "the technological arrangements through which labor acts upon matter to generate the products, ultimately determining the level of surplus. Each mode of development is defined by the element that is fundamental in determining the productivity of the production process" (1989: 10).

advanced, *informational capitalism* (Castells 1996: 18) as a particular form of global structural arrangement²⁶.

As elaborated by Castells (1989, 1996), the informational mode of development is a 'dialectical resolution', as it were, of the convergence of two structural processes, unfolding in the course of the last quarter of the twentieth century: on the one hand, a series of scientific and technological innovations that culminated in constitution of a new technological paradigm; on the other, the process of restructuring²⁷ of the system of capitalist relations. Regarding the first process, the core of scientific and technological innovations is crucially related to advancements in the areas of microelectronics, computers, telecommunications, and biotechnology and their diffusion in a multiplicity of applications and uses that feed back into scientific and technological innovations and, thus, accelerate, broaden, and diversify the sources, the speed, and the scope of technological changes. In Castells' words,

the relatively simultaneous emergence of these various technologies, and the synergy created by their interaction, contributed to their rapid diffusion and application, and this in turn expanded the potential of each technology and induced a broader and faster development of the new technological paradigm (1989: 12-13).

The diffusion and application of scientific and technological innovations in the context of the new technological paradigm of *informationalism* materializes, according to Castells (1989: 29-32), in a series of technological and organizational 'structural trends' that revolutionize the material basis of the system of capitalist relations: on the side of technological trends, information technologies constitute themselves as the 'agents' for (1) implementing an increase in the rate of profit, (2) staving off the

²⁶ Castells' discussion of informational capitalism tends to place relative emphasis on the system of economic relations, as manifested on global scale. On this point he observes that

[a] new economy has emerged in the last two decades on a worldwide scale. I call it informational and global to identify its fundamental distinctive features and to emphasize their intertwining. It is *informational* because the productivity and competitiveness of units of agents in this economy...fundamentally depend upon their capacity to generate, process, and apply efficiently knowledge-based information. It is *global* because the core activities of production, consumption, and circulation, as well as their components...are organized on a global scale, either directly or through a network of linkages between economic agents. It is informational and global because, under the new historical conditions, productivity is generated through and competition is played out in a global network of interaction. (1996: 66)

²⁷ In the context of Castells' proposition, restructuring refers to "the process by which modes of production transform their organizational means to achieve their *unchanged* structural principles of performance" (Castells 1989: 11, original emphasis). As he observes,

[r]estructuring process can be social and technological, as well as cultural and political, but they are all geared toward the fulfillment of the principles embodied in the basic structure of the mode of production. In the case of capitalism, private capital's drive to maximize profit is the engine of growth, investment, and consumption (Ibid.).

accumulation and domination functions of state intervention, and (3) internationalizing (and, thus, 'globalizing') capitalist economy; on the side of organizational trends, there emerges (1) a growing concentration of knowledge-generation and decision-making process in high-level organizations that effectively monopolizes both information and the capacity of its processing, (2) an ever greater flexibility of the capitalist system and the relationships among its units, and (3) the shift from centralized large corporations to *decentralized networks* made up of a plurality of sizes and forms of organizational units. As Castells points out, with the general emphasis on flexibility and decentralization of the material basis of capitalist relations, the new technological paradigm of informationalism provides for a 'socio-technological milieu' within which restructuring of capitalism, and its respecification along the lines of an advanced, informational mode of organization, is to be made possible.

Restructuring of capitalism and its reconstitution along the lines of informational mode of organization is regarded by Castells as a response to "the challenges to the expansionary logic of a given system at a particular historical juncture" (Castells 1989: 3). In his view, in the mid-1970s the system of capitalist relations experienced a series of structural crises that threatened viability of the fundamental aims of the capitalist enterprise: enhancing the rate of profit for private capital; finding new markets; controlling circulation processes; and assuring the social reproduction and the economic regulation of the system. In the most fundamental respects, the structural crises of capitalism had to do with 'rigidity' of its system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations, based upon the principles of, what Castells terms as, 'progressive Keynesianism', and characterized by socially sanctioned regulatory practices on the part of the nation-state. Consequentially, the challenges to the expansionary logic of the system were confronted by a series of changes in the 'institutionalized means' of achieving capitalism's systemic goal, constructed around the principles of deregulation, privatization, and the dismantling of the social contract between capital and labor as a means of instituting flexibility in the system's structural make up. As observed by Castells (1996: 19), the aims of the changes were deepening the capitalist logic of profit-seeking in capital-labor relationship; enhancing the productivity of labor and capital; globalizing production, circulation, and markets, seizing the opportunity of the most advantageous conditions for profit-making everywhere; and marshaling the state's support for productivity gains and competitiveness of national economies, often to the detriment of social protection and public interest regulations. To that end, restructuring of capitalism was undertaken along the lines of

greater flexibility of management; decentralization and networking of firms both internally and in their relationships to other firms; considerable empowering of capital *vis-à-vis* labor, with the

concomitant decline of influence of the labor movement; increasing individualization and diversification of working relationships; massive incorporation of women into the paid labor force, usually under discriminatory conditions; intervention of the state to deregulate markets selectively, and to undo welfare state, with different intensity and orientations depending upon the nature of political forces and institutions in each society; stepped-up global economic competition, in a context of increasing geographic and cultural differentiation of settings for capital accumulation and management (Castells 1996: 1-2).

What emerged (and, if considered on a global scale, is still emerging), according to Castells, is a new mode of capitalist organization characterized by (1) the appropriation by capital of a significantly higher share of surplus form the production process, achieved by combining increases in productivity and increases in exploitation in the context of a fundamental restructuring of the work process and labor market; (2) a substantial change in the pattern of state intervention, with the emphasis shifting from political legitimation and social redistribution to political domination and capital accumulation; and (3) accelerated internationalization of all economic processes as a means of increasing profitability and opening up markets through expansion of the system (Castells 1989: 23-27).

Now central to the overall process of reconstitution of the system of capitalist relations, and thus to the emergence of a new model of informational capitalism, was the simultaneous occurrence of an articulation of the new technological paradigm of informationalism, on the one hand, and of the process of capitalism's restructuring, on the other, both converging in the dialectic of the informational mode of development. As Castells points out, computer and communication technologies, with their emphasis on knowledge and information as a means of greater flexibility and decentralization, proffered a 'socio-technological matrix' for a new mode of organizing social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Capitalism, in need of a new mode of organizing its social, political, economic and cultural relations so as to overcome its structural crisis, embraced the socio-technological matrix of informationalism and its possibilities of greater flexibility and decentralization. Together, the two converged in a new, informational mode of development, in the context of which the successful employment and performance of the informational mode of organizing the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations, and further expansionary development thereof, are crucially related to the successful development of the technological paradigm of informationalism, as well as the development of the technological paradigm of informationalism to the successful evolution of the informational mode of organizing the capitalist system.

The Post-Fordist Thesis: An Overview

If the information society is a product of the Third, 'information' Revolution, the post-Fordist society is a result of the 'second industrial divide'. As delineated within the framework of the post-Fordist thesis, industrial society of the Western type fully developed as an outcome of the so-called 'first industrial divide' - that is, in the context of the rise of mass-production in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. Its mode of industrial organization was characterized by the existence of 'industrial establishments', the structure of which was built around the principle of a large-scale, centralized, and hierarchically coordinated mode of organization, and which depended upon the unskilled or semi-skilled detail workforce. Thriving in the period from about the 1930s until the late 1960s, this Fordist-type of industrial organization had, as its central premise, the objective of being able to deliver standardized goods cheaply and on a mass scale. However, the fundamental shift in the nature of the market in the late twentieth-century (the fragmentation of mass-market into a diversity of consumer groups, each pursuing different 'modes of consumption' and rapidly discarding current patterns of consuming in search of new ones) brought about the so-called 'second industrial divide' - the rise of small-firm, craft production in the late 1960s, exacted by the need for rapid turnover and swift changes of production. As the latter were not conducive to the Fordist pattern of mass production that made use of unskilled and semi-skilled detailed labor put to work on standard-purpose machines so as to mass-produce standard(ized) consumer goods, there emerged a new mode of industrial organization, characterized by post-Fordist principles of customized, short-run production, geared toward highly specific wants and needs in a constant state of flux.

As put forth by proponents of the post-Fordist thesis, the new post-Fordist pattern of production-organization is characterized by what is known as *flexible specialization*. In its most general formulation, flexible specialization involves the principles of diversity, differentiation, and fragmentation, in the context of which a small-scale, decentralized production and devolved managerial responsibility supersede a large-scale, centralized, and hierarchically coordinated mode of industrial organization of the Fordist kind. Specifically, this implies that, at the technological level, flexible specialization needs 'flexible technology' - that is, the technology with computer-controlled machine-tools that make possible speedy changes of output, all in response to new opportunities and new needs; and, at the level of labor force, a 'core' of multi-skilled craft-type workers, allowing for 'functional flexibility' of tasks and products, and a 'periphery' of casually-employed, relatively unskilled workers, allowing for 'numerical flexibility' in the labor market. Thus, as Kumar (1995: 52) observes, the shift from Fordist

to post-Fordist mode of production-organization is characterized by the inauguration of

flexible specialization and the dispersal and decentralization of production, replacing mass marketing and mass production; flatter hierarchies and an emphasis on communication rather than command in organizations; vertical and horizontal disintegration, and an increase in subcontracting, franchising, internal marketing within firms, and the hiving-off of functions; rise in the number of flexi-time, part-time, temporary, self-employed and home workers.

Some proponents of the Post-Fordist thesis argue that it is not only in the realm of economy that the 'post-Fordist turn' makes itself perceptible. Rather, it is also the realms of politics, industrial relations, culture and ideology that the principles of post-Fordism permeate the 'structural mode' of the late twentieth-century Western society, so much so that it is possible to talk about the post-Fordist society. Thus, they argue that the changes in politics and industrial relations revolve around

the fragmentation of social classes, the decline of national-based political parties and class voting, and the rise of social movements and 'networks' based on region, race or gender or a single-issue politics...; 'peripheral', sub- and supra-national movements; the decline of mass unions and centralized wage bargaining, a labour force divided into core and periphery; the end of class compromise or corporatism; the break-up of standardized collectivist welfare provision, and the rise of consumer choice and private provision in welfare (Kumar 1995: 52).

Moreover, they claim that the 'post-Fordist' shift in culture and ideology involves

the rise and promotion of individualist modes of thought and behaviour; a culture of entrepreneurialism; the end of universalism and standardization in education, and the rise of modularity and pupil- and parent-choice; fragmentation and pluralism in values and life-styles; post-modernist eclecticism, and populist approaches to culture; privatization in domestic life and leisure pursuits (Ibid.)

Ultimately, in the view of post-Fordist 'societists', the post-Fordist 'mode' of societal structuring is but a rightful "uprooting" of the principles of diversity, differentiation, and fragmentation - initially designated to the post-Fordist pattern of economic and production-organization - and their application to the overall societal structure of the late twentieth-century post-industrial Western society.

Michael Piore and Charles Sabel: The Second Industrial Divide

Piore and Sabel's discussion of the system of flexible specialization as a specific organizational principle of production of the post-Fordist orientation is premised upon positing two underlying principles of 'modern industrial circumstance': on the one hand, the notions of progress and prosperity; on the other, the idea of technological (and, thus, industrial) change(s). Within the framework of their analytical exposition the two principles interact with one another in a manner which makes each a 'necessary complement' to the other: in this setting, progress and prosperity, as the overarching principles of the modern world, animate, within the sphere of industrial development, the processes of change and transformation as the 'continuous respecifiers' of the notion of efficient productive activity as a means of realizing ever greater progress and prosperity; in the process, the respecification(s) of efficient productive activity through the processes of continuous change and transformation within the sphere of industrial development are reformulating the notions of progress and prosperity and, thus, making mandatory the continuation of changes and transformations of industrial production, so as to attain now respecified idea(l)s of progress and prosperity.

Crucial in the 'dialectic' of the notions of progress and prosperity and the processes of change and transformation are the moments of discontinuity in the dynamics of the overall process. In these moments, the particularity of given historical circumstance does not allow for an undisturbed continuation of the relationship of interaction and mutual reinforcement: the established idea(l)s of progress and prosperity cannot be met by the existing formulation of efficient productive activity so that both relational elements need to be respecified if the overall dynamics is to - as it must - proceed, following its general, underlying 'logic'. For Piore and Sabel (1984), these moments of discontinuity constitute *breaching points* in the overall process, or, more to the point, the period of *technological* (or, more generally, *industrial*) *divide*. What a breaching point, or a technological (or industrial) divide is, then, is a moment in which the particularity of given historical circumstance pushes industrial development down a divergent path, so as to consolidate a new vision of efficient productive activity, a new 'industrial trajectory', or a new 'technological paradigm'. As posited by Piore and Sabel (1984: 44), this new technological paradigm

imposes order on the confusing practical activity of the preceding period; and in the process of distinguishing the relevant from the irrelevant in conflicting tendencies, the paradigm creates the preconditions for a new orthodoxy.

In the context of the notion of industrial divide, the 'new orthodoxy' refers to a new mode of organizing efficient industrial production, premised,

evidently, upon the imperative of realizing the idea(l)s of progress and prosperity.

According to Piore and Sabel, the history of industrial development proffers the two instances of respecification of the notion of efficient productive activity - that is, the two moments of technological (and thus industrial) breaching, or divide. The first industrial divide has its historical roots in the nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution and the process of gradually substituting the small-scale craft production with the large-scale manufacture and, subsequently, industrial production. The historical moment in which the first industrial divide crystallizes as a new vision of efficient productive activity, however, corresponds to consolidation of the mass-industrial, Fordist-type of production in the first decades of the twentieth century. Basing itself upon technology of mass production, market stability as a guarantor of the product-specific use of resource-pay-offs, the state as a dominant in creating and stabilizing the mass-production markets, and workers' organization dictated by particular historical experiences, this mass-production industrial activity of the Fordist orientation is to proffer the realization of the idea(l)s of progress and prosperity by delivering general goods (most prominently, automobiles and household durables) to the population at large. As Piore and Sabel (1984: 49) observe,

[m]ass production offered those industries in which it was developed and applied enormous gains in productivity - gains that increased in step with the growth of these industries. Progress along this technological trajectory brought higher profits, higher wages, lower consumer prices, and a whole range of new products.

However, by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s the Fordist style of mass-production was, according to Piore and Sabel, running out of steam and losing credibility as an industrial means to progress and prosperity. In the face of the 1970s general crisis of industrial system (characterized by widespread expressions of discontent and social unrest, raw-material shortages, rapid inflation, rising unemployment, and economic stagnation), the micro- and macro-regulatory mechanisms of corporate enterprise, on the one hand, and Keynesian 'institutional complex'²⁸, on the other, proved ineffective as a means of ensuring stable market-environment

²⁸ By Keynesian 'institutional complex' Piore and Sabel refer to the state-operated system of macro-regulatory control of respective national economy, instituted as a 'supplement' to corporate enterprise as a microregulatory means of stabilizing respective national market. This system encompassed the following general regulatory principles: national wage determination, labor reserve availability, national commitment to universal elementary and secondary education, government investments in the public sector, government-instituted restructuring of economic institutions in accordance with given technological imperative, social-welfare regulation, and restructuring of labor management relations along the lines of industrial unionism.

that would provide for successful performance of the Fordist 'industrial logic'. Further, the difficulty of creating and sustaining stability of a mass-market translated into the difficulty of recreating and reproducing the logic of Fordist mass-market production as a principle to progress and prosperity. Once again, the particularity of historical circumstance disturbed the overall dynamic of the interaction between mass-production and mass-prosperity and progress. Another, second industrial divide was on the horizon.

In view of Piore and Sabel, the gist of the second industrial divide is in the strategic reorientation of industrial productive activity towards more flexible deployment of labor and technology in response to unstable and fluctuating markets²⁹. In this context, the increasing volatility of markets is met with adopting techniques that, on the one hand, reduce the time and money involved in shifting from product to product and, on the other, increase the sophistication and quality of the output. Premised upon craft principles of organizing industrial activity, this post-Fordist model of customized production and flexible specialization is constituted as an economy of multi-skilled workers and craft-community networks - in some cases organized in large corporations; in others, regionally based. As elaborated upon by Piore and Sabel (1984: 265-268), the system of customized, flexible-specialization productive activity is organized around four kinds of 'institutional setting': *regional conglomerations*, composed of a core of more-or-less equal small enterprises bound in a complex web of competition and cooperation, with none of the enterprises permanently dominant and with the arrangements among them defined by a series of relatively short-term contracts; *federated enterprises*, constituted as an enterprise-association defined economically by interlocking personnel and financial agreements, and socially dependent on 'familialism'³⁰ as an organizing principle; and "*solar*" *firms* and *workshop factories*, organized as a collection of workshops with the 'solar-system model' of orbiting suppliers and subcontractors. These four 'organizational forms' of customized, flexible-specialization production are in turn characterized by: *flexibility plus specialization*, framed as the capacity to continually reshape the productive process through the rearrangement of its components, in the case of the former, and as the limit on the set of possible

²⁹ They, however, do not accord 'immanent priority' to this post-Fordist model of flexible-specialization industrial restructuring. As we shall see towards the end of this section (see pages 43-44), they regard the overall dynamics of the respecification of effective productive activity as an open-ended historical process, with flexible specialization as but one of the possible outcomes. Thus, in the context of their work they elaborate upon alternative possibilities of 'international Keynesianism' and a 'hybrid' of flexible specialization and mass production (for details see Chapter Ten of Piore and Sabel 1984).

³⁰ By familialism Piore and Sabel refer to the use of kinship relations as the structuring principle of productive industrial organization. Thus, they define familialism as the form of production that requires "a loose but reliable alliance of medium and small-business firms specializing in the component manufacturing operations" (Piore and Sabel 1984: 34).

arrangements and on the aim of redeployment, in the case of the latter; *limited entry*, framed as a restriction on the quantity of labor entering particular organizational form of flexible production; *encouragement of competition*, framed as both internal and external competitive pressure - the former resulting from competition among firms for a favored position in the commonly acknowledged hierarchy, and the latter resulting from competing communities of flexible specialization; and *limits on competition*, framed as a prohibition to the kinds of competition that distract from permanent innovation (Piore and Sabel 1984: 268-272).

According to Piore and Sabel, the system of flexible-specialization industrial production differs crucially (and thus represents a radical departure) from its 'historical predecessor', the Fordist model of mass-production market-economy. For in the latter

economy is distinct from society, and firms are independent, competitive units. By contrast, within a system of flexible specialization, firms depend on one another for the sharing of skills, technical knowledge, information on opportunities, and definitions of standards. Structure here shades into infrastructure, competition into cooperation, and economy into society (Piore and Sabel 1984: 298).

As such, the system of flexible specialization may, in their view, prove to be the best possible industrial-organizational response to the volatility of the post-1970s increasingly deregulated economic environment. As they observe (1984: 279-280),

the drift and disorganization in international economic policy will continue to drive companies toward a strategy of permanent innovation. National economies that encourage the shift to flexible specialization will have an easier time - and an increasingly commanding place - in the world economy that emerges from the companies' strategic choices.

As to the constitution of customized, flexible-specialization productive activity as a dominant industrial means to progress and prosperity, Piore and Sabel, although clearly sympathetic to the possibility, do not wish to offer any explicit prognosis. For them, the second industrial divide is still (in 1984, when they wrote their work) an open-ended historical process and the possibilities for divergent (and contradictory) outcome(s) are still with us. At their most forthright, they are suggestive and reservedly hopeful. To that effect, they observe:

the spread of flexible specialization suggests that the way out of the crisis requires a shift of technological paradigm and a new system of regulation. If recovery proceeds by this path, then the 1970s and '80s

will be seen in retrospect as a turning point in the history of mechanization: a time when industrial society returned to craft methods of production regarded since the nineteenth century as marginal - and proved them to be essential to prosperity (Piore and Sabel 1984: 252).

The New Times Project: The 'Post-Fordist Condition'

Launched in October 1988 as a series of essays in the journal *Marxism Today* the New Times project had, as its fundamental aim, the task of addressing the social, political, economic and cultural changes taking place in the context of contemporary Western societies. More specifically, its aim was to put forth a critical analysis of the changes in the British society, as they unfolded, in the course of the 1980s, within the purview of the neo-conservative political orientation of Thatcherism. In the process, the crucial question to be addressed was the crisis of the Left and its apparent inadequacy at providing a viable politico-programmatic strategy for dealing with what was perceived to be an epochal shift in the structures of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements of the modern West. Building upon 'critical self-reflections' the further, and fundamental, challenge was to provide constructive guidelines for successful realignment and both theoretical and organizational restructuring of the British Left.

As put forth by the New Times project, the notion of an epochal shift in the structures of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements of contemporary Western societies is encapsulated by the *post-Fordist* metaphor. The metaphor was to signify qualitative changes in the structure of the system of capitalist relations, materializing as a response to the 1970s general 'structural crisis' of the capitalist complex. Premised upon Gramsci's proposition that "[t]he new methods of work [introduced by Fordism]...are inseparable from a specific mode of living and of thinking and feeling (Gramsci in Kumar 1995: 50-1) - that is, that Fordism denotes not only the changes in the economic structure of the early twentieth-century capitalism but, also, the corresponding changes in its overall social, political, and cultural make up - the New Times project's post-Fordist metaphor was built as a catchall construct, employed to refer to a broad set of general transformative changes within the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations. As observed by Stuart Hall,

'[p]ost-Fordism' is a broader term, suggesting a whole new epoch from the era of mass production, with its standardised products, concentrations of capital and its 'Taylorist' forms of work organization and discipline.
[...]

[T]he metaphor of 'post-Fordism'...is modelled on Gramsci's earlier use of the term, 'Fordism', at the turn of the century to connote a whole shift in capitalist civilization (which Gramsci certainly did not reduce to a mere phenomenon of the economic base). 'Post-Fordism' should also be read in a much broader way. Indeed, it could just as easily be taken in the opposite way - as signaling the *constitutive* role which social and cultural relations play in relation to any economic system. Post-Fordism as I understand it is not committed to any prior determining position for the economy. But it does insist...that shifts of this order in economic life must be taken seriously in any analysis of our present circumstances (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 117, 119; original emphasis).

Thus, in the context of the post-Fordist metaphor, the capitalist system is perceived as entering a new epoch, an epoch of 'new times' in its mode of structural arrangements and systemic functioning.

Crucial in the New Times project proposition is an understanding that the post-Fordist changes in the economic structure of capitalism do not, in a mechanical fashion, translate to causally related changes in the structures of social, political, and cultural relations - that, in other words, the post-Fordist respecifications of capitalist economy do not determine the nature of capitalism's social, political, and cultural respecifications. As postulated in *Manifesto for New Times* (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 36),

[the] changes in the industrial and economic organization of capitalism are not determining all the changes which are shaping the new times. International, social and cultural forces are at work independently of changes in production. Post-Fordism is at the economic and industrial core of the new times, but it does not encompass and define all aspects of the new times.

What then is at work, instead of causally deterministic transformative practices that, emanating from the economic sphere, alter the nature of social, political, and cultural arrangements, is the "uprooting" of *underlying principles* of the post-Fordist respecification of capitalist economy and their transposing to the realm of 'new times' social, political, and cultural reformulation. These principles are congruent with the post-Fordist processes of 'de-massifying' and conceptualized as the notions of *fragmentation, diversification, and pluralization*.

Central in the overall process of post-Fordist de-massifying, undertaken around the principles of diversification, pluralization, and fragmentation, is, on the one hand, the transformation from 'structural rigidity' to 'structural fluidity' of social, political, economic, and cultural spheres and, on the other, their collapsing, as it were, into one another. Thus, in the context of the 'post-Fordist condition' proposed by the New Times

project, the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres are not only becoming ever more malleable, but also 'trans-spherical' in their basic structural make up. In this context, economic activity is as much 'socialized', 'politicized' and 'culturalized', as social relations are 'culturalized', 'economized' and 'politicized', as political process is 'socialized', 'culturalized' and 'economized', as cultural forms are 'politicized', 'economized' and 'socialized'.

As delineated by the New Times project, the post-Fordist process of de-massifying the economic structure of the new times capitalism was undertaken along the lines of substituting the mass-industrial productive activity of the Fordist orientation with the customized production of the post-Fordist kind. Most generally, this implied discarding a commitment to large scale and standardized products, a competitive strategy based on cost reduction, authoritarian administrative relations, centralized planning, and rigid organization build around exclusive job descriptions in favor of commitment to scope and customized products, a competitive strategy based on associative cooperation, fundamentally egalitarian relations, decentralized planning, and flexible organization built around multipurpose job designations. In somewhat more specific terms, the post-Fordist process of de-massifying the economic structure of the new times capitalism was congruent with the introduction of a new stage of capitalist production - *flexible specialization*. The latter, according to Murray (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 56-57)

consists of applying computer technology not only to each stage of the production process, from design to retailing, but also to the integration of all stages of the process into a single co-ordinated system. As a result, the economies of scale of mass production can now be achieved on much smaller runs, whether small batch engineering products, or clothes, shoes, furniture and even books. Instead of Fordism's specialised machinery producing standardised products, we now have flexible, all-purpose machinery producing a variety of products. Computers have been applied to design, cutting down the waste of materials, and of stock control. Distribution has been revolutionised, as has the link between sales, production and innovation.

Thus, the structural fluidity of the economic sphere, in the form of increased fragmentation, diversification, and pluralization of the economic process, was made possible by, on the one hand, incorporating information technology and microelectronics in all crucial aspects of the overall production process and, on the other, shifting concomitantly towards the proliferation of models and styles of production and, in turn, increased product differentiation.

In the realm of political processes, the principles of fragmentation, diversification, and pluralization were instituted through the emergence of

social movements as an alternative form of political mobilization and the formulation of *life politics* as an alternative mode of framing political issues. Central to their shaping was the process of transforming the state's role from the principal and immediate deliverer of political course to, increasingly, being but one of many participants in the overall course of political negotiation, and, relatedly, a relative decline in the dominance of the political party as the only legitimate means of political organization. This process of 'decentering' the state and the party as the dominant forms of political discourse brought about the emergence of alternative, and increasingly more important, forms of political constitution. Thus, in opposition to the Fordist-type mass political party characterized by discipline, bureaucracy and hierarchy, 'introvertness', and a pyramid of political management, there emerged the social movement as a post-Fordist type of political mobilization characterized by flexibility, initiative and maneuverability, 'extrovertness', and network integration, "policephalous or many-headed, without fixed rules, bound together horizontally and by common beliefs" (Mulgan in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 355). Elaborating upon the character of the social movement Benton observes (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 343):

[u]nlike the party, harnessed to the needs of the state, the movement...rejected class as a determinant of individual political choice. It sought to eliminate the gap between personal feeling and public action.... The movement rejected institutions for itself, as these would tend to freeze political positions and embed conflicts to win control. It upheld direct action both as a form of self-expression and as more effective than formal political procedures. The movement was oriented towards action, but changing culture and attitudes were goals as legitimate as law reform. Here its modernism lay in its rejection of the idea that there is a single oppressed people or a single source of authority to be undermined or of power to be captured.

To this, *Manifesto for the New Times* adds:

[t]he social movements are extremely diverse in form, objective and duration: some are relatively issue-based, others are essentially about social and personal identity. But they share some central characteristics which mean they occupy an increasingly important place in the division of labour in progressive politics. They challenge capitalism's separation of production from its consequences and the sphere of reproduction (by which is meant the reproduction of daily life, of the conditions of production itself, and of the environment)....

They deploy flexible forms of organization, which allow people greater choice about how to become involved in politics. They do not constrain politics to a single area or a single sense of identity.... Most combine a social philosophy with a personal politics....

As well as carrying visions of a transformed society they are all deeply practical. All involve people in direct challenges to power in the state, and in civil society. They are realistic about the process of political change....

The social movements are thoroughly modern movements. They are a response to new aspirations and problems. They mobilise new constituencies in struggle. They deploy modern forms of communication and organisation. They are relatively non-hierarchical, relying on horizontal, flexible, networking forms of organisation. They are in touch with society because they live and breathe within society, rather than pacing the musty corridors of narrow institutional power (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 364-365).

Along with the social movement as an alternative form of political mobilization oriented towards immediacy of practical political action and representation of new political identities, there emerged a new and corresponding form of political discourse, framed around the notion of life politics - that is, the politics of real life, the politics of social issues as people confront them in the process of continual political negotiation. In line with the character of social movements, life politics is thus characterized by its fundamental orientation towards practicality of immediate political action, formulated around specific political concerns, and representation and participation of a plurality of political agency. In the context of life politics, then,

[p]olitics is less and less confined to a distinct realm of parties, resolutions, manifestos and elections. The agents of political change have become more diverse and complex - unions, students, women, campaigners over the environment, peace and aid (*Manifesto for New Times* in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 449).

As put forth by the New Times project, the post-Fordist de-massifying of the new times capitalism's sphere of social relations is undertaken through the transformation of the processes of social organization and control from what Mulgan (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 347) denotes as 'strong' to 'weak' types. Thus he observes the following (Mulgan in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 348):

Fordism was in many ways the apotheosis of faith in structure and strong power control. Within its organizations authority derives from position rather than from knowledge or ability. Formal rules determine how decisions are to be made and responsibility allocated. Structured as a pyramid, the organization depends on vertical lines of authority and accountability. Control absorbs a lot of time and energy. Most communication is vertical, between superiors and subordinates, rather than horizontal. It is built around the

bureaucracy, which developed in its modern form in the 19th century and was modelled on the armies' strong power command-and control structure....

In contrast to the strong power structures of social organization and control characteristic of the Fordist era, however,

[t]he weak power structures of the new times are very different. They tend to be decentralised, without a single point of leadership; communication is horizontal; structures are cellular rather than pyramid-like, a shifting mosaic rather than the kind of structure that can be drawn as a diagram. The units and cells tend to deregulate themselves, rather than being governed by rules and commands that flow downwards. Accountability can flow in more than one direction at once. Where the strong power structure is concerned with predictability, the best weak power structures thrive on fluidity, change and the creative use of chaos. Above all energies are directed outwards rather than inwards to sustaining and reproducing a fixed structure (Ibid.).

Here, as with the process of de-massifying the structures of economic activity and political process of the new times capitalism, the central aim is to provide for the structural fluidity of the processes of social organization and control by means of their fragmentation, diversification, and pluralization, so as to make them congruent with fragmented, diversified, and pluralized processes of economic, political, and cultural arrangements.

Finally, the process of de-massifying the cultural sphere of the new times capitalism is characterized by what is denoted as a *revolution of the subject* - that is, by the rise of new sources of cultural identity and attachment, concretized through pluralization, diversification, and fragmentation of individual and collective cultural subjectivity and, thus, 'decentering' of the notion of fixed and permanent subject. As Mort observes (in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 169),

[w]e do not often get the reassurance of a coherent subjectivity these days - politically or culturally. We are not in any simple sense 'black' or 'gay' or 'upwardly mobile'. Rather we carry a bewildering range of different, and at times conflicting, identities around with us in our heads at the same time. There is a continual smudging of personas and lifestyles, depending where we are...and the spaces we are moving between. It is the speed, the fluidity with which these identities mingle and overlap which makes any notion of fixed subjects seem more and more anachronistic - distinctly early 20th century.

Thus, in the context of transformations of individual and collective cultural subjectivity the notion of fixed subject is relegated to the era of organized forms of capitalist cultural arrangements of the Fordist orientation whereas the idea of 'decentered' cultural identity - be it individual or collective - is associated with the post-Fordist condition of fragmentation, pluralization, and diversification. As postulated by the New Times project, the respecification of the new times capitalism's forms of cultural identity along the principles of fragmentation, pluralization, and diversification makes it impossible to

[any] longer conceive of 'the individual' in terms of a whole, centered, stable and completed Ego or autonomous, rational 'self'. The 'self' is conceptualised as more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple 'selves' or identities in relation to the different social worlds we inhabit, something with a history. 'produced', in process. The 'subject' is differently placed or *positioned* by different discourses and practices (Hall in Hall and Jacques (eds.) 1989: 120, original emphasis).

The Post-Modernist Thesis: An Overview

As previously noted, an explication of the emergence of modern industrial society is intimately connected with an understanding of that period in history known as modernity. Fundamentally, what modernity stood for was a rather complex set of intellectual, social, and political changes that brought into being the modern world and, as such, embodied the totality of new attitudes expressed at both personal and societal level. The "bedrock" of these, as we have seen, was a sharp break with the past and a decisive orientation towards the future.

While, in general terms, modernity refers to the economic, technological, political and, in many crucial respects, intellectual creations of the Western world in the period from the eighteenth century on, *modernism* stands for a cultural movement that begins in the late nineteenth century and, in many important respects, represents a critical reaction against some of the dominant themes of modernity. In the form of passionate denial and rejection, modernism challenges the main themes of modernity - 'science', 'reason', 'progress', 'industrialism' - in favor of sentiment, intuition, and the free play of imagination. As such, it represents a cultural movement within modernity, or as, Kumar (1995: 85) posits it, 'cultural modernity' that rejects outrightly 'bourgeois' modernity and its "consuming negative passion".

Now whereas within the framework of the idea of modernity it is possible to distinguish between *modernity*, as largely political and ideological form of the modern epoch, and *modernism*, as largely cultural or aesthetic

concept of modernity, the same cannot be made for the idea of *post-modernity* for both *post-modernity* and *post-modernism* are used interchangeably (Kumar 1995: 101). This "refusal" to use 'post-modernity' and 'post-modernism' as points of reference for demarcating the different aspects (and realms) of the social is indicative of one of the most important (if not *the* most important) aspects of the idea of post-modernity - namely, the proposition that within the framework of the concept of post-modernity the dividing lines between different spheres of society - politics, economics, social, and cultural - are broken down and the realms collapsed into each other, however, in a manner which leaves the pluralism and diversity of contemporary society not ordered and integrated according to any discernible principle. Thus, the boundaries between the realms are dissolved so that there is no longer any controlling and directing force to give the society its shape and meaning, but only a more or less random, directionless flux across all sectors of society. Ultimately, the dissolution of boundaries leads not to a 'neo-primitivist' wholeness, but to a post-modern condition of fragmentation.

The emphasis on fragmentation, pluralism, and individualism as the central categories of the post-modern paradigm emerged firstly in the sphere of culture - specifically, architecture:

[a]rchitecture is taken by many theorists to represent post-modernism...because it displays post-modernist features most palpably.

[T]he era of architectural and urban post-modernism...is characterized by that eclecticism and pluralism, that often playful and ironic jumbling and fusing of traditions, that many take as typical of post-modernism in general. Often there is an air of theatricity or spectacle; the city is treated as a stage, a place for enjoyment and the exercise of imagination as much as a utilitarian system of production and consumption. It is a site of fantasy; it embodies 'not only function but fiction' (Kumar 1995: 106).

Thus, the 'architectural modernism' was translated into 'cultural post-modernism' that, fundamentally, came to represent the "eclectic mixture of any tradition with that of immediate past" (Kumar 1995: 105).

Originating largely in the cultural sphere, the concept of post-modernity has spread to encompass more and more areas of society. As proposed by the post-modern paradigm, today we refer not only to post-modern painting, architecture, literature and cinema, but also to post-modern philosophy, post-modern politics, the post-modern economy, the post-modern family, even the post-modern person. In the view of post-modernists, all of this is suggestive of the fact that we live not only in the post-modern culture, but in the post-modern society or, as some of them would have it, the 'post-modern age'.

The complexities related to the specifics of the post-modernist proposition are intrinsically connected to ambiguities surrounding the term post-modernity. Whereas, in most general terms, post-modernity for the most part refers to either the movement to a new state of things, a sense of a new beginning, the condition of 'reflectiveness', and a somewhat melancholy sense of an ending, in a somewhat more specific connotation the concept of post-modernity (and thus the post-modernist thesis as such) "engenders" five different categorical pronouncements: post-modernism as a response primarily to cultural modernism; post-modernity as the cultural force of capitalism in its more developed stages; post-modernity as a comprehensive category of culture and society; post-modernity as a 'reflexive' modernity; and post-modernity as a new culture and civilization (Kumar 1995: 66-67). Proponents of the first position argue that post-modernism represents an attempt to break down modernist distinction between 'high' and 'low' culture, 'élite' and 'mass' art. In their view, in place of the autocratic imposition of a monolithic taste, post-modernism strives for the acceptance of a diversity of 'taste cultures' whose needs it tries to meet by offering a plurality of styles. The second position argues that post-modernity is the cultural dominant of the logic of *late, disorganized* capitalism. Accordingly, proponents of this position claim that just as realism in culture corresponds to market capitalism, and modernism to monopoly capitalism or imperialism, so post-modernity corresponds to late or multinational capitalism. Thus, they regard post-modernity as being not the cultural dominant of a wholly new social order but, ultimately, as only the reflex and concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism itself. Advocates of the third position claim that post-modernism cannot be relegated to the cultural sphere alone but that it ought to necessarily be related to the spheres of social, economic, and political relations, with which it interrelates and interacts. Thus, in the context of this position, post-modernity is not regarded as either a cultural movement or the cultural logic of capitalism at the latest historical juncture but, more broadly, as an overall condition of the system of current capitalist social, political, economic, *and* cultural relations. The forth post-modernist proposition sees post-modernity as a 'reflexive' modernity. Its proponents think of post-modernity as a way of modernizing, or 'radicalizing', modernity so as for the latter to be able to proceed in the condition of 'permanent reflexivity'. For them, the 'post' of post-modernity refers not so much to a new period in history coming after modernity as to a new phase of modernity possible after 'simple' modernity run out of its course. Accordingly, post-modernity denotes the point at which modernity takes on its 'reflexive' garb and reinvents itself, as it were, in a manner conducive to the condition of permanent risks and hazards. Finally, the fifth position stipulates that post-modernity stands for an emerging new culture and civilization, one that goes beyond modernity. The claim here is that the fundamental categories of post-

modern condition - fragmentation, pluralism, and individualism - are permeating all spheres of our daily existence to the point that we can now think in terms of the post-modern world. This post-modern world is one in which is impossible to find a center, or any point of perspective from which it is possible to view the world steadily and to view it whole; a world of eternal presentness, without origin or destination, past or future; a world in which all that presents itself are the temporary, shifting and local forms of knowledge and experience; a world where there are no 'deep structures', no 'secrets' or 'final causes', but only what appears on the surface, what is known and immediate.

Charles Jencks: Post-modernism as a Response to Cultural Modernism

The treatment of post-modernism proffered by Jencks is the one that looks at post-modernist developments from the standpoint of historically constituted cultural movement(s)³¹, as opposed to particular socio-historical condition. As he posits, the post-modern cultural movement in its contemporary guise took shape in the course of the 1960s as an opposition to hegemonic and monolithic tendencies of the modernist cultural orientation. Its central task was, as he puts it, 'a war on totality' and a combat against the heartlessness of alienating practices of cultural modernism. However, the struggle of the post-modernist movement was not based on outright anti-modern sentiments; rather, it was founded on desire to restructure, and through restructuring transcend, the cultural legacy of modernism. In this context then,

[p]ost-modernism means the end of a single word view and, by extension, 'a war on totality', a resistance to single explanations, a respect for difference, and a celebration of the regional, local and particular. Yet in its suffix 'modern', it still carries the burden of a process which is international and in some senses universal. In this sense it has a permanent tension and is always hybrid, mixed, ambiguous, or what I have called 'doubly-coded'.

³¹ As Jencks observes in "The Post-Modern Agenda" (1992), the diversity of cultural developments under the heading of post-modernism makes it rather difficult to treat post-modernist developments in the realm of culture under the umbrella concept of a post-modernist movement. In his view, the post-modernist orientations in different cultural fields developed around quite diverging, and, at times, rather opposing, conceptual and programmatic premises so that proper treatment of the post-modern, as expressed in culture, requires dealing with particular cultural field - be it literature, music, architecture, social thought etc.. An architect himself, Jencks is primarily concerned with the post-modern in architecture; however, he is sensitive to post-modern developments in other spheres of cultural production. Thus, the generalities that he takes as representative of the cultural movement of post-modernism in general (presented in the section above) are extrapolated as a result of his comparative study of the history of various post-modernist cultural movements. The emphasis, however, is on architecture for it is in this sphere of cultural production that, in Jencks' view, the post-modern developments evidenced themselves firstly and, perhaps, most saliently.

Post-Modernism means the continuation of Modernism and its transcendence, a double activity that acknowledges our complex relationship to the preceding paradigm.... [T]his cultural movement is not, like traditional culture, anti-modern[:]. Post-Modernism as a cultural movement, or agenda, does not seek to turn the clock back, is not a Luddite reaction, but rather a restructuring of modernist assumptions with something larger, fuller, more true. (Jencks 1992: 11, original emphasis).

This post-modernist structural transformation of the cultural field was to be undertaken through *sublation* - a Hegelian form of dialectical resolution of contraries. As Jencks observes (1992: 13), "the Hegelian notion of sublation captures part of the double process involved, of destroying *and* preserving that which has gone before, in a new synthesis on a higher level" (original emphasis).

On the practical front, overcoming the elitism of the modernist cultural condition is to be undertaken through furthering cultural pluralism by means of eclectic dramatization of urban reality and, thus, creation of a 'cultural field of difference' that generates complexified and hybridized meanings and, through their complexification and hybridization, acknowledges cultural heterogeneity. As Jencks (1992: 12-13) puts it,

the agenda of post-modern architects - and by extension post-modern writers, urbanists and artists - is to challenge monolithic elitism, to bridge the gaps that divide high and low cultures, elite and mass, specialist and non-professional, or most generally put - one discourse and interpretive community from another.... [In this context], the different ways of life can be confronted, enjoyed, juxtaposed represented and dramatised, so that different cultures acknowledge each other's legitimacy. The motives are equally political and aesthetic. Double coding, to put it abstractly, is a strategy of affirming and denying the existing power structures at the same time, inscribing and challenging differing tastes and opposite forms of discourse. This double-voiced discourse has its own peculiar laws and beauties and it constitutes the fundamental agenda of the post-modern movement.

Thus, probing the one-taste cultural paradigm of modernism by means of using tactics of eclecticism and creating an alternative, more public cultural language by incorporating the spectrum of cultural tastes is, in Jencks' view, the ultimate task of, and a fundamental challenge to, the cultural movement of post-modernism. Equally, it is what the underlying pattern of the cultural post-modern resolves itself into. Both are, according to Jencks, animated by the plurality of world cultures, as worked out through the idea of a 'world village'.

Frederic Jameson: Post-modernity as the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism

Differently from Jencks, who treats post-modernism in terms of specific, historically constituted cultural movement, Jameson provides an analysis of the post-modern as the specific cultural logic characteristic of the system of capitalist relations at the current historical juncture. Thus his contribution to the post-modern debate is to be found in establishing connections between the post-modern 'mode' of cultural production and the latest phase in respecification of the underlying logic of capitalism in general - "operationalized" under the heading of *late capitalism*. For Jameson, then, post-modernism is to be regarded as "the reflex and the concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism itself" (1991: xi).

The 'systemic modification of capitalism itself' is understood by Jameson as the transformation of an older monopoly capitalism into a 'new multinational and high-tech mutation'. Besides the transnational forms of business, this new system of capitalist relations is characterized by

the new international division of labor, a vertiginous new dynamic in international banking and the stock exchanges (including the enormous Second and Third World debt), new forms of media interrelationship (very much including transportation systems such as containerization), computers and automation, the flight of production to advanced Third World areas, along with all the more familiar social consequences, including the crisis of traditional labor, the emergence of yuppies, and gentrification of a now-global scale (1991: xix).

As such, then, late capitalism, as regarded by Jameson, stands for a new, globally constituted phase in the overall developmental process of capitalism in general.

Now, as Jameson argues, each historical respecification of the system of capitalist relations necessarily implies the respecification of its cultural sphere - that is, the sphere of its cultural production. Thus, Jameson identifies *realism*, *modernism*, and *post-modernism* as the three historically-constituted respecifications of the sphere of capitalist cultural production. As he posits, these are the 'cultural correlatives' of the three historically-constituted respecifications of the capitalist system as such - *industrial*, *monopoly*, and *late capitalism* respectively. In that regard, then, they stand for the three specific forms of cultural logic characteristic of the three respective historical modes of capitalist development.

The notion of 'cultural logic' is understood by Jameson in terms of particular 'mode of cultural production' at work within the context of particular form of capitalist relations. The cultural production is in turn specified as aesthetic production - that is, production of 'aesthetic value' - that

has been integrated into commodity production in general and given specific functional place within the overall mode of production characteristic of a given form of capitalist relations. In the context of late capitalism, of which post-modernism is the specific cultural logic, the particular mode of cultural production, this means that

the frantic economic urgency of producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothes to airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasingly essential structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimentation. Such economic necessities then find recognition in the institutional support of all kinds available for the newer art, from foundations and grants to museums and other forms of patronage (Jameson 1984: 56)

In other words, post-modernism as the cultural logic, the specific mode of cultural production, a new systemic cultural norm, of late capitalism translates into prioritizing the post-modernist cultural expressions within the framework of particular mode of production operating in the context of global multinational capitalism, all to the end of capital accumulation. In this context, the forms of post-modernist cultural expressions become reflective of 'systemic epitomes' of late capitalism. Here is Jameson on the *nouveau roman* as a literary form of post-modernism (1991: 140):

in the *nouveau roman*, reading undergoes a remarkable specialization and, very much like older handicraft activity at the onset of the industrial revolution, is dissociated into a variety of distinct processes according to the general law of the division of labor. This internal differentiation, this becoming autonomous of older combined branches of the productive process, then knows a second qualitative leap with Taylorization; that is to say, the planned analytic separation of the various production moments into independent units. That older, but scarcely traditional, activity called reading can now be seen to have been a process of this kind, susceptible to a similar historical development.

Evidently, what Jameson is referring to are 'partialization' and increased diversification, at work both within the *nouveau roman* as a post-modernist literary expression and the division of labor characteristic of the late capitalist mode of production.

The crucial difference between modernism as the cultural logic of monopoly capitalism and post-modernism as a new systemic cultural norm of late capitalism has to do with differential conceptualization of the two, in turn predicated upon their disparate functional place within the respective structures of capitalist relations. As proposed by Jameson, whereas in the context of monopoly capitalism modernism was constituted as a *cultural*

hegemony, post-modernism of late capitalism shaped itself as a *cultural dominant* of late capitalism. Specifically, this implies that modernism affirmed itself as the cultural logic of monopoly capitalism in the condition of its coexistence with other resistant and heterogeneous cultural forms that needed to be subdued or incorporated within the modernist corpus, whereas postmodernism defined itself in the absence of oppositional cultural tendencies. The presence or absence of these heterogeneous and oppositional cultural tendencies, and thus differential assertions of modernism and post-modernism as the two forms of capitalist cultural logic, were, in turn, reflections of qualitatively different historical contexts - specifically, the contexts of creating a sense of the new epoch in human history and of merely respecifying its contours. As argued by Jameson (1991: 310),

if modernization is something that happens to the base, and modernism the form the superstructure takes in reaction to that ambivalent development, then perhaps modernity characterizes the attempt to make something coherent out of their relationship. Modernity would then in that case describe the way "modern" people feel about themselves; the world would seem to have something to do with the products (either cultural or industrial) but with the producers and the consumers, and how they feel either producing the products or living among them. This modern feeling now seems to consist in the conviction that we ourselves are somehow, that a new age is beginning, that everything is possible and nothing can be the same again; nor do we want anything to be the same again, we want to "make it new," get rid of all those old objects, values, mentalities, and ways of doing things, and to be somehow transfigured.

In other words, what Jameson is proposing is that the cultural logic of modernism developed as essentially an anti-modern sentiment, in opposition to the capitalist process of modernization (broadly understood as technological progress in the largest sense), and that both are particular historical manifestations of the overall capitalist project of modernity which sought to create a sense of rupture with the past and beginning of a new epoch in history. In short, the cultural logic of modernism, Jameson posits, affirmed itself in the context of a historical process of creating a new, capitalist system of social relations.

The historical context within which post-modernity defined itself, however, is radically different from the previous one. The crucial difference, according to Jameson, is that there is no sense of entering a new epoch in human history, no feeling of rupture with the past. As Jameson puts it (1991: 310), "[w]e certainly don't feel ourselves living among dusty, traditional, boring, ancient things and ideas." Instead, there is a sense of advancement in the process of capitalist modernization and, concomitantly, a sense of renewal

of cultural production, 'somehow tensed up and frozen, locked like cramped muscles, at the latter end of the modernist era'. In Jameson's view, this renewal in cultural production is but a *revival* of anti-modern sentiments of cultural modernism under the heading of post-modernism, now co-opted for accumulative ends of the late capitalism's mode of production and made its central functional requisite. As he frames it:

when modernism...finally did come to power, it had already outlived itself, and what resulted from this posthumous victory was called postmodernism instead (1991: 318).

In this context then Jameson regards cultural modernism as the "experience and the result of *incomplete* modernization" and argues that

the postmodern begins to make its appearance wherever modernization process has no longer his archaic features and obstacles to overcome and has triumphantly implanted its own autonomous logic (for which, of course, at that point the word *modernization* becomes a misnomer, since everything is already "modern") (1991: 366, original emphasis).

In other words, the post-modern for Jameson is the modern (striving to be) "universalized".

Ultimately, what emerges from Jameson's analysis of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism is the proposition that

[t]he postmodern may well...be little more than a transitional period between two stages of capitalism, in which the earlier forms of the economic are in the process of being restructured on a global scale, including the older forms of labor and its traditional organizational institutions and concepts (1991: 417).

To this, he adds:

That a new international proletariat (taking forms we cannot yet imagine) will reemerge from this convulsive upheaval it needs no prophet to predict: we ourselves are still in the trough, however, and no one can say how long we still stay here (Ibid.).

David Harvey: Post-modernity as a Comprehensive Category of Culture and Society

The crux of Harvey's treatment of post-modernity as a comprehensive category of culture and society is contained in the following argument (Harvey 1989: vii):

There has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972.

The sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new dominant ways in which we experience space and time.

While simultaneity in the shifting dimensions of time and space is no proof of necessary or causal connection, strong a priori grounds can be adduced from the proposition that there is some kind of necessary relation between the rise of postmodernist cultural forms, the emergence of more flexible modes of capital accumulation, and a new round of 'time-space compression' in the organization of capitalism.

But these changes, when set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface appearance rather than as signs of the emergence of some entirely new postcapitalist or even postindustrial society.

It is within this argument that Harvey develops his analysis of the condition of post-modernity as not simply the cultural logic of late capitalism but as, in his view, necessarily a historical condition characteristic of the contemporary human circumstance.

The analytical point of departure of Harvey's analysis is a general agreement with the proponents of the Post-Fordist thesis about a shift in the system of capitalist relations away from its Fordist mode of organization, understood by Harvey not simply as a particular system of production-relations but - in line with the New Time project - as an overall condition of the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Viewed through the categories of, on the one hand, *regime of accumulation*³² and, on the other, its associated mode of *social and political regulation*³³ the shift in the system of capitalism's social, political, economic, and cultural practices is framed as a transition from the Fordist regime of standardized accumulation and Keynesian mode of social and political regulation to a regime of flexible accumulation and neo-conservative mode of social and political (de?)regulation. Properly regarded, this shift, Harvey suggests, is but an attempt of capitalism to combat its periodic crises of social underconsumption and - concomitantly - capital overaccumulation.

³² "Appropriating" the language of the 'regulation school' Harvey (1989: 121) denotes a regime of accumulation as "the stabilization over a long period of the allocation of the net product between consumption and accumulation [that] implies some correspondence between the transformation of both the conditions of production and the conditions of reproduction of wage earners."

³³ By social and political regulation Harvey assumes a body of interiorized rules and social processes that enables for "a materialization of the regime of accumulation taking the form of norms, habits, laws, regulating networks and so on that ensure the unity of the process, i.e. the appropriate consistency of individual behaviours with the schema of reproduction" (Harvey 1989: 121-122).

In Harvey's view, what was notable about the 1970s political-economic transformations was parallel transforming of cultural and intellectual life and its related forms of cultural and intellectual thought. As he points out, suffused with a sense of ephemerality and chaos, and characterized broadly by fiction, fragmentation, collage, and eclecticism, these changing cultural and intellectual practices and modes of thinking came to constitute the foundation of what is generally known as the post-modernist turn.

Now symptomatic of post-modernist developments is their admitted 'disembeddedness' from the spheres of (to some extent) social, (and especially) political, and economic practices and their confinement to the realm of culture; however, as Harvey goes on to argue, the post-modernist tendencies in the realm of culture cannot be devoid of the corresponding social, political, and economic contexts. Hence, he observes:

I think it important to accept the proposition that the cultural evolution which has taken place since the early 1960s, and which asserted itself as hegemonic in the early 1970s, had not occurred in a social, economic, or political vacuum.... Whatever else we do with the concept, we should not read postmodernism as some autonomous artistic current. Its rootedness in daily life is one of its most patently transparent features (Harvey 1992: 315).

Accordingly, Harvey suggests that a proper understanding of post-modernism demands its 'disembeddedness' from the exclusivity of the cultural realm and, granting all of its cultural and intellectual implications, its incorporation into the overall logic of the system of capitalist social, political, and economic relations. In this way, he argues, post-modernism is to be grasped not only as a series of specific cultural and intellectual transformative developments but, more broadly (and, in Harvey's view, more importantly), as a particular relational dynamic in the complex of social, political, economic, and cultural practices. Expressed concretely, this implies the proposition that

[p]ostmodernism also ought to be looked as mimetic of the social, economic, and political practices in society. But since it is mimetic of different facets of those practices it appears in very different guises.

[...]

[However,] it is just as surely dangerous to presuppose that postmodernism is solely mimetic rather than an aesthetic intervention in politics, economy, and social life in its own right. The strong injection of fiction as well as function into common sensibility, for example, must have consequences, perhaps unforeseen, for social action.... [Thus, o]nly in these very broad terms of the conjoining of mimesis and aesthetic intervention can the broad range of postmodernism make sense (Harvey 1989: 113-115).

Ultimately, then, Harvey's analysis treats post-modernism and all of its associated qualifications not only (and simply) in terms of particular cultural and intellectual innovations (important as they are) in the context of the shift from a regime of standardized accumulation to a regime of flexible accumulation but also, and more crucially, in terms of specific socio-cultural relations (that is, an interplay of social, political, economic, and cultural processes) in the context of particular of historical condition. Hence, the condition of post-modernity rather than cultural post-modernism or post-modernity.

Overarching Harvey's proposition for the treatment of post-modernity as a comprehensive category of culture and society, that is, as a particular historical condition, is the notion of *time-space compression*, defined as a set of "processes that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how we represent the world to ourselves." (Harvey 1989: 240). Expressed concretely, time-space compression refers to speed-up in the pace of life, through 'annihilation' (or 'conquest') of space through time, with the consequence of spatial and temporal barriers of the world collapsing inwardly. As such, Harvey argues, the notion of time-space compression is in direct relation to capitalism's attempt at combating its periodic crises of social underconsumption and capital overaccumulation through the process of absorbing overaccumulation through temporal and spatial displacement - the former implying either "a switch of resources from meeting current needs to exploring future uses, or an acceleration in turnover time...so that [current] speed-up...absorbs [past] excess"; and the latter implying geographical expansion in the form of "the production of new spaces within which capitalist production..., the growth of trade and direct investment, and the exploration of new possibilities for the exploitation of labour power [can proceed]" (Harvey 1989: 181-183). These, in turn, are the 'necessary consequences' of the logic of operation of the capitalist system of social, political, and cultural relations, based upon the imperatives of orientation towards growth, exploitation of living labor as the basis of growth, and technological and organizational dynamism as a means of continuous profit realization (Harvey 1989: 180).

When placed in the context of the underlying logic of capitalism in general, on the one hand, and the processes of time-space compression, on the other, the condition of post-modernity, then, is viewed by Harvey as the latest in a series of historical attempts at overcoming capitalism's periodic structural crises: as such, the condition of post-modernity, with all of its attributes of general emphasis upon ephemerality, collage, fragmentation and dispersal, and of particular stress upon the regime of flexible accumulation and neo-conservative social and political accumulation, is, as he would have it, a 'temporary fix' and not a revolutionary transformation of the system of

capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Evidently, as Harvey observes, that is not to say that there is nothing new about the condition of post-modernity; however, the novelties introduced within the framework of post-modernist turn are, for the most part, respecifications of mainly old elements within the overall logic of capital accumulation.

Ulrich Beck: Post-modernity as 'Reflexive' Modernity

In the context of Ulrich Beck's analysis of the conditions of contemporary human circumstance, the most productive way to get at an understanding of changes taking place within the historical process of social development is through the notion of *reflexive modernization*. As he puts it, reflexive modernization stands for modernization of the process of modernization or, somewhat differently, for the process of 'radicalization' of modernity through the medium of 'reflexive' individualized social action.

According to Beck, the modern epoch of human history is, more than anything else, characterized by the process of modernization in the context of which socio-economic development, "institutionalized" through its socio-organizational correlative of industrial society, is premised upon the notion of permanent change, in turn fueled by the idea(l)s of progress and socio-economic prosperity. As he puts it, the process of modernization had (at least in the context of the Western world) indeed generated overall prosperity and general progress for the great majority; however, concomitantly with generating social wealth, industrial modernization has brought about, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, the 'unintended consequence' of social risks³⁴ and hazards (in the form of, most prominently, environmental degradation and nuclear radioactivity). These, in turn, have put in question the basis and fundamental categorical principles of the process of industrial modernization as such and, hence, made evident the possibility of its 'creative (self)destruction'. The possibility of ending an epoch of industrial modernization is perceived by Beck through the prism of reflexive modernity as a categorical delineation of the process of transformation of the organizational basis of industrial society and its reconstitution (or 'restructuration') along the lines of a new form of social organization. As he elaborates (1994a):

³⁴ With regards to the notion and specificity of social risk Beck observes the following:

Human dramas - plagues, famines and natural disasters, the looming power of gods and demons - ...differ essentially from 'risks' in my sense since they are not based on decisions, or more specifically, decisions that focus on techno-economic advantages and opportunities and accept hazards as simply the dark side of progress. This is my first point: risks presume industrial, that is techno-economic decisions and considerations of utility.... They differ from pre-industrial natural disasters by their origin in decision making, which is of course never conducted by individuals but by entire organizations and political groups (1992a: 98).

'Reflexive modernization' means the possibility of a creative (self-)destruction for an entire epoch: that of industrial society. The 'subject' of this creative destruction is not the revolution, not the crisis, but the victory of Western modernization.

[...]

If simple (or orthodox) modernization means, at bottom, first the disembedding and second the re-embedding of traditional social forms of industrial social forms, then reflexive modernization means first the disembedding and second the re-embedding of industrial social forms by another modernity.

Thus, by virtue of its inherent dynamism, modern society is undercutting its formations of class, stratum, occupation, sex roles, nuclear family, plant, business sectors and of course also the prerequisites and continuing forms of natural techno-economic progress. This new stage, in which progress can turn into self-destruction, in which one kind of modernization undercuts and changes another, is what I call the stage of reflexive modernization.

[...]

Reflexive modernization, then, is supposed to mean that a change of industrial society which occurs surreptitiously and unplanned in the wake of normal, autonomized modernization and with an unchanged, intact political and economic order implies the following: a *radicalization* of modernity, which breaks up the premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another modernity (2-3, original emphasis).

'Another modernity', then, is assumed to take form of what Beck terms as reflexive modernization, the socio-organizational correlative of which corresponds to the notion of *risk society*.

As argued by Beck, in its basic (and yet fundamental) organizational and structural make up risk society differs categorically from its 'historical predecessor' - modern industrial society. As he puts it (1989, 1992b), industrial society, as the unequal society, is predicated upon the counterideal of equality; risk society, on the other hand, is, as the unsafe society, predicated upon the counter ideal of safety. In this context, the motive force for class society can be expressed in the phrase 'I am hungry'; that of the risk society in the phrase 'I am scared'. Thus, in place of the 'commonality of need', operating within the framework of industrial society, there is the 'commonality of fear', at work in the context of risk society. Ultimately, Beck argues, the paradigm of the industrial (or class) society revolves around the question: 'How socially produced wealth can be distributed unequally but nevertheless "legitimately" in society?'; that of risk society around the question: 'How can risks and dangers, systematically produced in the process of advanced industrial modernization, be prevented, made harmless, dramatized and directed, channeled away?'.

This fundamental question in the context of the paradigm of risk society is, in Beck's view, crucially related to the nature of risks and dangers, on the one hand, and, consequentially, to the change in the logic of distribution in the context of risk society, on the other. With regards to the first aspect Beck observes that risks and hazards released in the most advanced stage of industrial modernization represent "a globalizing tendency, which encroaches on the spheres of production and reproduction while also crossing national boundaries" (1989: 88); as such, they pose a potential global threat which is supra-national (or trans-national) and not class-specific. Moreover, he posits, risks and dangers are effectively and functionally 'egalitarian' and 'democratic': they

cut across traditional institutional boundaries and established theoretical categories. They cut across the boundaries of differentiation between theory and praxis, across disciplines and areas of specialized competence, institutional responsibility, the differentiation between value and fact (and hence of ethics, the human and natural sciences) and the apparently institutionally separated areas of politics, the public sphere, knowledge and economy (1989: 97).

In other words, risks and hazards generated through industrial modernization affect everyone and everything and, in the process, 'de-differentiate', as it were, the realms of their impact.

The qualities of 'globality' and 'de-differentiation' of risks and hazards exact, according to Beck, the change in the logic of distribution within risk society, manifested as a tendential shift from the distribution of wealth to the distribution of risks. As he observes:

[i]n the advanced modern period the social production of wealth goes hand in hand with the social production of risk. Correspondingly, the problems and conflicts of distribution in the "shortage society" ... will be overlaid by the problems and conflicts which arise from the production, definition and distribution of scientifically and technically produced risks (1989: 86).

At the current historical juncture, Beck argues, humanity is in a transitional phase, a phase in which the problems and conflicts arising from the production of social wealth are not yet overlaid by the problems of risk distribution and management. Rather, the two tendencies are at the point of "fighting out" their relative dominance in the realm of social relevance. As he observes (1989: 87),

[w]e are living in the period of transition in which the problems of distribution of wealth and of risks overlap each other. The dynamics

of conflict and the types of problems of the advanced modern period can no longer be understood through the categories of distribution of wealth, nor can they yet be understood through the categories of distribution of risk.

Now, as argued by Beck, the crucial consequences of 'reflexive' modernization, as enacted through the socio-organizational 'mode' of risk society, are manifested as the processes of *individualization* and *sub-politicization*. In his view, the emergence of both is crucially related to what he calls the *confusion of centuries*. By this, Beck means to denote a discrepancy between the forms of organizational and structural norms and practices devised to keep in check risk and hazards of industrial modernization and the nature of risks and hazards as such. As he notes (1992a: 103):

[t]he organized responsibility is based fundamentally on a confusion of centuries. The hazards to which we are exposed date from a different century than the promises of security which attempt to subdue them.... At the threshold of the twenty-first century, the challenges of the age of atomic, genetic and chemical technology are being handled with concepts and recipes that are derived from early industrial society of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.

Expressed in concrete, the notion of 'confusion of centuries' is evidenced as 'incommensurability' between the techno-bureaucratic nature of norms and practices, formulated to perform in the nation-state (or, industrial-state) context, and fundamentally trans-national tendencies of globality and de-differentiation of industrial risks and dangers.

According to Beck, the resultant of 'confusion of centuries', concretized as the inability for effective management of risks and dangers of industrial modernization, is a challenge to the historical preeminence of existing political and scientific mechanisms, whereby "the monopoly of scientists and engineers in the diagnosis of hazards is challenged by the crisis in their dealings with the hazards they produce" and "the exposure of scientific uncertainty is [translated to] the liberation of politics, law and the public sphere from the patronization by technocracy" (1989: 109). Consequentially, the challenge to existing political and scientific normative and institutional mechanisms is transposed as 'individualization' or, as Beck denotes it, the process of disintegration of the certainties of industrial society and the compulsion to find and invent new certainties and interdependencies for oneself:

'Individualization' means, first, the disembedding and, second, the re-embedding of industrial society ways of life by new ones, in which the individuals must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves. Thus the name 'individualization'.

Disembedding and re-embedding...do not occur by chance, nor individually, nor voluntarily, nor through diverse types of historical conditions, but rather all at once and under the general conditions of the welfare state in developed industrial labour society, as they have developed since the 1960s in many Western industrial countries (1992a: 13).

The processes of 'disembedding' and re-embedding' the certainties of industrial society create, according to Beck, a 'reflexive condition' - that is, a social context within which "one must permanently decide, without any claim to definitive solutions"; a framework within which "living and acting in uncertainty becomes a kind of basic experience" (Beck 1994a: 12). The 'reflexive condition', hence, demands from individuals to become (by necessity or choice, or by the necessity of choice or the choice of necessity) more active participants in the processes of 'permanency of social restructuration' and, by implication, makes, in Beck's view, for creating 'alert' social subjects (or agency).

According to Beck, it is through 'sub-politicization' - that is, through the emergence of a particular kind of risk society politics - that the activity of social subject (or agency) can be evidenced best. In the context of his analysis, sub-politicization refers to, as it were, broadening of political fronts so as to include non-traditional political agendas and bodies. In this context, sub-politicization implies the democratization of political processes through the substitution of official politics of simple, rule-directed political course with sub-politics as 'reflexive', rule-altering political discourse. As such, Beck posits, sub-politicization can be thought of in terms of (re)inventing the political. As he puts it (1994a: 38),

[i]nventing the political means creative and self-creative politics which does not cultivate and renew old hostilities, nor draw and intensify the means of its power from them; instead it designs and forges new content, forms and coalition. What is meant is a renaissance of the political which 'posits itself', to borrow an image from Fichte. That is to say, it develops its activity from activity, pulling itself by its own bootstraps out of the swamp of routine.

Thus sub-politics as the reflexive, rule-altering political discourse is concretized in 'life politics' as the particular form of political negotiation in the context of which the multiplicity of political agents continuously reshapes the course of political action according to the dictate of immediate practical necessity. As Beck elaborates (1994a: 22-23, original emphasis),

[s]ub-politics is distinguished from 'politics' first, in that, agents *outside* the political or corporatist system are allowed to appear on the stage of social design..., and second, in that not only social and

collective agents but individuals as well compete with the latter and each other for the emerging shaping power of the political.

[...]

Sub-politics, then, means shaping society *form below*.... In the wake of subpoliticization, there are growing opportunities to have a voice and a share in the arrangement of society for groups hitherto uninvolved in the substantive technification and industrialization process: citizens, the public sphere, social movements, expert groups, working people on site; there are even opportunities for courageous individuals to 'move mountains' in the nerve centres of development. Politicization thus implies a decrease of the central rule approach; it means that processes which had heretofore always run friction-free fizzle out in the resistance of contradictory objectives.

The political medium of sub-politics is concretized as *negotiation forums* - that is, as the intersystemic political institutions of political negotiation and mediation through the process of 'public discursivity of experience'. As Beck suggests (1994a: 29-30), the centrality of negotiation forums in the context of reflexive, rule-altering political course manifests itself in the following developments: *demonopolization of expertise, informalization of jurisdiction, opening of the structure of decision-making, creation of a partial publicity, and self-legislation and self-obligation*. These imply, firstly that the political process is devoid of the notion that competency and decision-making authority is preeminently relegated to specialized administrators and experts; secondly, that the possibility of participation is not closed off to 'non-specialists' but is broadened according to social standards or relevance; thirdly, that, accordingly, the decision making process is vested in all participants of the political process; fourthly, that the process of political negotiation takes form of a public dialogue between the multiplicity of political agents, and, finally, that the political process as such is not to be imposed upon the agents, but agreed on and sanctioned. In the context of sub-politics as a form of restructuring the political along the lines of democratic political discourse, then,

[n]egotiation forums are certainly not consensus production machines with a guarantee of success. They can abolish neither conflict nor the uncontrolled dangers of industrial production. They can, however, urge prevention and precaution and work towards a symmetry of unavoidable sacrifices. And they can practice and integrate ambivalences, as well as revealing winners and losers, making them public and improving the preconditions for political action (Beck 1994a: 30).

In the context of Beck's reflexivity theory of modernity³⁵, then, the notion of reflexive modernization stands for the interrogation, challenge and redefinition of the fundamental categories of industrial modernity. It is through risk society, as the socio-organizational correlative of the condition of reflexive modernity, that the 'reexamination' of industrial modernity, premised upon the processes of disembedding and re-embedding of its social forms through the practices of individualization and sub-politicization, takes shape; and it is to the end of modernizing (or 'radicalizing') modernization - that is, making it viable in the condition of 'permanent reflexivity' - that reflexive modernity asserts itself as the dominant social force of the 'post-modern-industrial human circumstance'. In the words of Ulrich Beck,

the transition from the industrial to the risk period of modernity occurs undesired, unseen and compulsively in the wake of the autonomized dynamism of modernization, following the pattern of latent side effects. One can virtually say that the constellations of risk society are produced because the certitudes of industrial society (the consensus for progress or the abstraction of ecological effects and hazards) dominate the thought and action of people and institutions in industrial society. Risk society is not an option that one can choose or reject in the course of political disputes. It arises in the continuity of autonomized modernization processes which are blind and deaf to their own effects and threats. Cumulatively and latently, the latter produce threats which call into question and eventually destroy the foundations of industrial society (Beck 1994a: 5-6).

Martin Albrow: Post-modernity as a New Culture and Civilization

³⁵ As argued by Beck, there is a fundamental difference between his *reflexive* theory of modernity and what he terms as the *reflection* theory of modernity, proposed by Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash. The difference, according to Beck, is contained in the following:

The classical premise of the reflection theory of modernity can be simplified down to the initially stated thesis: the more societies are modernized, the more agents (subjects) acquire the ability to reflect on the social conditions of their existence and to change them in that way. In contrast to that, the fundamental thesis of the reflexivity theory of modernity, crudely simplified, runs like this: the further the modernization of modern societies proceeds, the more the foundations of industrial society are dissolved, consumed, changed and threatened. The contrast lies in the fact that this can quite well take place without reflection, beyond knowledge and consciousness (Beck 1994b: 176).

Thus, he observes,

[w]hile simple modernization ultimately locates the motor of social transformation in categories of instrumental rationality (reflection), 'reflexive' modernization conceives of the motive force of social change in categories of the side effect (reflexivity). What is not seen, not reflected upon, but externalized instead adds to the structural rupture which separates industrial society from risk society, which separates it from the 'new' modernities of the present and future (Beck 1994b: 183).

The analytical hypothesis presented by Albrow (1996) is the one of fundamental discontinuity in the overall historical process of human development, evidenced as the transition from what he denotes as the Modern Age to a new epoch of Global Age. Centrally, the notion of historical discontinuity has to do with the proposition that the Global Age represents not a transformative culmination of the processes at work within the Modern Age but, rather, a radical cultural and, as it were, civilizational departure from the fundamentals of the modern epoch and, thus, a 'restructuration' of social, political, cultural, and economic relations along the lines of the global point of reference. Metaphorically, then, the Global Age, in Albrow's view, stands neither for the last lines, or the culmination of episodes, in the Modern Age chapter of the Book of Humanity, but for completely new and crucially different chapter of that book.

According to Albrow, the epoch of Modern Age is to be located within the historical period of the end of the fifteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century. Its beginning and end are marked by what he denotes as *configurational events* - that is, 'historical events that shape the developing profile of an era by determining the concrete relationships between different historical actors and the directions which human endeavors are to take' (1996: 22). Thus, as Albrow posits, the Modern Age begins with the 'discovery' of America in 1492 and ends with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. In his interpretation, the underpinning idea - or the 'axial principle' - of the entire epoch stands coterminous with the notion of the expansion of human control so as to take in the whole world.

Now the realization of the epoch's underlying principle of the expansion of human control was, in Albrow's view, crucially related to the project of modernity, which had to do with attempts to transform the everyday world according to the rules of logic and science - that is, by extending the principles of rationality into the spheres of social life and organization. Premised upon the processes of *extension*³⁶, *intensification*³⁷, and *pluralization*³⁸, the expansion of the principles of rationality into the spheres of social life and organization culminated in what Albrow (1996: 30) denotes as the Modern Project - that is, 'a concerted coordination of a multitude of human activities around the purpose of expending rationality, to the end of furthering human control of social life'. Within this framework, Albrow observes,

³⁶ 'Extension' is qualified by Albrow as 'the application of an idea to new areas and the multiplication of instances of those applications'.

³⁷ For Albrow, 'intensification' is taken to mean 'the analysis and elaboration of an idea, the search for foundations and implications, the search for internal contradictions or affiliations with other ideas'.

³⁸ Albrow denotes 'pluralization' as 'an intensive elaboration that leads to finer distinctions around which differing views can crystallize or, alternatively, the increase in extent to which an idea is applied'.

[m]odernity is then a nexus of ideas and power sited in institutions in which the new, the up to date, is associated with expansion of rationality. Ideas, power, institutions all expand in the modern period through new territory and new experience. Expansion offers shares in these goods to individuals and collectivities. The interweaving of these profiling factors through the Modern Age as a whole is complex and not reducible to a formula. The relative weight of each on the others is determined not by their intrinsic characteristics but by the salience they acquire over time as a result of their relations with what was outside them (1996: 26).

As posited by Albrow, the institutional setting for the realization of the Modern Project was provided by the capitalist nation-state: it was within the organizational and systemic structures of the nation-state that the furthering of human control of social life through the extension of the principles of rationality was to be implemented, coordinated, and made functional. Evidently, crucial to this was the development of social, political, economic, and cultural spheres of the nation-state which, themselves 'structured' upon the principles of rationality, provided ideal 'socio-organizational milieu', as it were, for the implementation of the Modern Project. Thus, it was in the context of the nation-state as the principal historical agent and the central socio-organizational framework of the project of modernity that the Modern Age epoch, ultimately, took its recognizable garb.

The crisis of the Modern Age (and its ultimate demise), Albrow argues, comes at the point in which its principal historical agent, the nation-state, loses its hold over the project of modernity - that is, at the historical juncture when the extension of rationality to the end of furthering human control over the organization of social life finds its limits in the globe. Thus, he observes,

[t]he real break, rapture with the modern, shift to a new epoch, comes...when the social takes on a meaning outside the frame of reference set by the nation-state. This happens when the state is no longer able to control new forms of social organization. Only when the state has to bow to the autonomy of the social has the Modern Age run its course. [That can happen, in turn,] only when the project loses its hold on the organization of everyday life and the daily practices of ordinary people (Albrow 1996: 58).

Instead of the nation-state as the principal agent of the Modern Project, Albrow argues, there appear multiple centers of influence, organization, and power - such as the corporate organization, the market, science, culture, the social - that effectively shape the course of social life and push it, irrespectively of the nation-state's 'organizational trajectory', in a direction of global frame of reference. Thus, it is at the moment of the disorientation of the nation-state as the dominant agency of the Modern Project, at the point of

effective fragmentation of modernity, that the Modern Age epoch enters the period of decline, and a new epoch of the Global Age begins to shape its contours.

According to Albrow, an inauguration of the Global Age marks "the end of expansion and the beginning of survival with the justice" (1996: 68). Within the framework of the Global Age, then, the globe, instead of the nation-state, becomes a social point of reference, a marker of the frontier of social life (Put differently, the Global Age carries with it a recognition on the part of human agency that social life is inevitably shaped, and takes place, in the global context so that the mode of organizing social life based on expansion is supplanted by the one premised upon living within the confines of the finitude of the world). In this context, Albrow observes,

[h]uman beings make their own history but not under circumstances of their own choosing, and the finitude of the earth is one of those circumstances which has become a central concern at the juncture where it appears as a limit to human activities. The sheer accident in human terms that the world is a globe, with a certain surface of land and sea, with a definite distribution of natural resources, is not the culmination of a process; rather it arrests anything that might have been a process. Globalization, far from being the end to which human beings have aspired, is the termination of modern ways of organizing life which they took for granted. The global shift is a transformation, not a culmination (1996: 100).

As Albrow posits, the transformation towards the global brings about the shift from the orientations of the Modern Age to the normatives of the Global Age: from *modernism* to *globalism*, from *modernity* to *globality*, from *modernization* to *globalization*. Thus, in the manner of modernism which, in Albrow's interpretation, attended to the core values of the Modern Age, globalism of the Global Age refers to the commitment to values which focus on the condition of the globe and the well-being of people in relation to it. As Albrow suggests,

[g]lobalism can be spoken of in the context where human beings assume obligations towards the world as a whole, where they espouse values which take the globe as their frame of reference point (1996: 83, original emphasis).

Contextualized within the Global Age proposition, Albrow proceeds, the notion of globality stands for the 'objectification' of the outcomes of human interaction with the world. As such (analogous to modernity which stood as the 'hallmark' of the Modern Age), it refers to the 'total set' of inscriptions' of, or references to, the global - itself

a space reference, the product of the location of the earth in space, a material celebration of the natural environment on which human beings depend, the evocation of the concrete wholeness or completeness of existence, embracing humanity rather than dividing it (Albrow 1996: 83).

Finally, globalization, like modernization which symbolized the processes of transforming the world according to the dictates of the Modern Age, conveys a widespread sense of transformation of the world along the lines of the global point of reference. The noted difference between modernization and globalization as the markers of the transformative processes characteristic of their respective epochs, however, lies, according to Albrow, in the fact that, differently from modernization which had its clearly stated 'programmatic objective', there is no inherent logic to globalization that suggests the prevalence of a particular outcome or the perpetual advancement of transformative processes at work: unlike modernization, which was imbued with a 'teleological predisposition', globalization, in Albrow's view, is characterized by an open-endedness. As he elaborates (1996: 95):

Globalization then is the term which becomes prevalent in a transitional period in history, not a single overall process of change. It characterizes the beginning of the Global Age simply because the weight of reference to globality displaces modernity from prior position in characterizing the configuration, but it has no inherent direction or necessary end-point. In this respect it is unlike modernity. As we have argued, the end-point of modernity is when it arrives at the exhaustion of the modern project; but globality is not a project.

The difference in emphasis is profound. Not only is globalization not just a continuation of modernization: it isn't a lawlike process either.... In the former case we appeal to a scientific law-governed sequence of change. In the latter case we are concerned with aggregate effects, with individual responses to contingent changes in environment and milieu, and with the communication of these responses in social interaction. In these we can see the configuration of a unique historical period.

If we use 'globalization' to refer to the aggregate of historical changes over a determinate period of history, this is quite different from referring to some developmental logic. In this sense we address a phenomenon equivalent to the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment or the Age of Imperialism. All those countless instances in which the global is taken into everyday life, where national economies merge with a global economy, where satellites provide news on the world worldwide, where protests erupt in one part of the world about conditions in another - putting them all together and recognizing the way in which the one reinforces the

other we can see a transformation which is of our time and unique. It may not penetrate absolutely every aspect of social life, but its scope and pervasiveness is sufficient for us to say that it both represents the specificity and dominates our experience of our time.

Thus, in the context of Albrow's argument, the Global Age stands as a metaphor for a new, 'post-modern' cultural and civilizational condition in which the globe becomes the material reference point for the plurality of individual and collective agency, in which there is no dominant frame of meaning, no axial principle underlying institutions and practices and determining structures, and no homogenization of social, political, economic, and cultural practices. As such, the Global Age is an announcement of a new era, an era in which globally constituted social, political, economic, and cultural practices are shaped by the processes of 'discursive negotiation' and 'communicative action' engaged in by their both individual and collective social agents. Ultimately, it is, as Albrow puts it (1996: 106), "the arrival of a new configuration of both human activities and conditions of existence."

The Theories of the Post-Industrial Society: Preliminary Lines of Evaluation and Critique

As the three variants of the post-industrial society thesis, the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernity are all well attuned to the novelties of the present - be it specified as informationalism, post-Fordism, or post-modernism. They all attend to quite significant changes in the nature of social, political, economic, and cultural (both functional and structural, as it were) developments and reorientations at the current stage in history, and, in this context, offer rather valuable insights into the nature of 'contemporary human circumstance'. As such, all three are quite important in an attempt to come to terms with what might be, admittedly somewhat dramatically, denoted as 'the future unfolding in the present'. As we have seen, they all have some ideas as to the nature (and, in some cases, the course) of that unfolding.

However, where all three of them (taken generally, as the three propositions of the same - namely, the post-industrial - thesis) fall short in their attempt to account veritably for the transformation of the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself* - that is, to fully theorize globalization in its conceptual dimension - is at the point of limiting the focus of their analysis to the Western world (as, presumably, the locus and authority of change), on the one hand, and of recognizing insufficiently a deeper structural dimension of the developments they elaborate upon, on the other. Briefly, the first limitation makes for the impression that globalization is, somehow, something that shaped itself in the most advanced (whatever this 'advanced' is meant to suggest) parts of the world and then extended itself world-wide,

or that, alternatively, it is something that occurs globally, however only in the context of the Western world. In either case, the non-Western world appears not to be a matter of particular analytical concern. The second limitation relegates analyses of the current developments proposed by the theories of the information society, post-Fordism, and post-modernism to the sphere of 'surface appearances' and thus prevents them (again, with notable exceptions) to probe deeper into the realm of 'essential relations' and consider them in terms of structural modifications of the system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations within which they stand 'embedded'. In the context of the first limitation, then, globalization appears as if a new round of modernization getting global or, alternatively, as a globalizing of the West (or the Western globalization); in the context of the second proposition, globalization is, almost as by default, taken to mean a new stage in the human history, a radically new constitution of social life in all of its aspects. The question, however, remains: 'Is that really all that there is to globalization?'. Or to put it more poignantly: 'Is that at all what globalization really is?'.

These preliminary lines of evaluation and critique are to be dealt with in full in the concluding chapter. To anticipate, the task at hand now is to explore the possibility of constructing more productive a framework for dealing with the problematic of globalization, both as the substantive and the conceptual phenomenon. To that end, Chapter Three and Chapter Four consider Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Roland Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory as potential sources of the guidelines (or, the sources of potential guidelines, whichever is preferred), as it were, for constructing such a framework.

Chapter Three



IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN'S WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: The Theory of Globalization as a Substantive Phenomenon

Sociology of the Global: On the Prospects and Possibilities Thereof

THE NOTION UNDERLYING the lines of evaluation and critique put forth in a preliminary form at the end of Chapter Two is the one of the crisis of sociology. In its crucial respects, the notion of crisis is related intimately to the fact that, as a discipline whose focal point of interest lies in examining social life in all of its aspects and manifestations, sociology finds itself precariously malequipped to take on the challenge of conceptually and analytically 'dissecting' social life as manifested globally. This inadequacy of the discipline of sociology at being able to deal appropriately with a global dimension of social life translates into a loss of disciplinary credibility and relevance and thus opens up the possibility for a condition that places sociology on rather slippery and dangerous scholastic terrain. In turn, the condition which relegates to sociology a position of increasingly greater marginality with regards to a claim at being a (or *the*) discipline of social life forces it to reexamine the foundations of its conceptual and analytical apparatus and, in a state of 'self-critical reflection' upon its purported inadequacy, reinvent itself, as it were, along the lines of a demand for taking in the global.

The crisis of sociology, as evidenced in the challenge for an adequate conceptual and analytical treatment of the global, has its roots in the history of the discipline's course of development and formulation. Concretely, it has to do with the fact that the discipline of sociology took its shape at the point in time when social life in all of its aspects and manifestations was crucially confined to a particular 'socio-organizational setting' - that of the nation-state. It is, thus, in the context of expressions of social life as manifested through the socio-organizational milieu of the nation-state that there emerged a need for a discipline that would reflect upon its main attributes, facets, and implications and, in a manner of disciplinary authority, offer a diagnosis of its welfare or,

alternatively, malaise. Consequentially, it is in the context of, as it were, nation-state-bound social life that the conceptual and analytical apparatus of sociology, as well as the discipline itself, were firstly formulated and refined, and that a systematic examination of social life was initially undertaken. Ultimately, the particularity of historical circumstance, then, made it possible for sociology to develop and establish itself as a discipline of social life - but social life as exhibited in the context of the nation-state. Given the fact that the nation-state was the only context within which social life was constituted and, correspondingly, within which it was examined by the discipline of sociology, the specificity of the sociological conceptual and analytical apparatus, as well as the adequacy of the discipline as such, never posed itself as a problem. However, the advent of the global and an ever increasing constitution of social life outside the parameters of the nation-state made the assumption of the preeminent adequacy of sociology as a discipline of (and about) social life rather questionable. Consequentially, it also gave legitimate credibility to the claim about the crisis of sociology.

Regrettably, sociology's responses to the challenge of the crisis have (at least so far) been inadequately constructed, marginalized and, in some cases, outright neglected. With notable exceptions, responses have gravitated towards either the restructuring of sociology along the lines of a 'narrative turn', or the attempts to deal with the global, as the new form of social reality, by using the old conceptual and analytical apparatus (Beck's notion of *confusion of centuries* appears rather appropriate here). Thus the discipline of sociology found solace in embracing semiotic description as a new form of "reinventing itself" (whereby any intention at offering serious analytical (meaning critical, understood in the broadest possible sense) and, dare it be said, prescriptive diagnosis of the contemporary human condition had been marginalized and supplanted by the proliferation of a descriptive narrative as a pseudo-literary form of sociological discourse (or, is it, discursiveness)) or, alternatively, endeavored to grasp a new global reality with all of its complexities through the categories of the 'national-societal', in which case it either fell short of, or (less often, for it would imply that the sociological conceptual and analytical apparatus has no relevance whatsoever any more - which is certainly not the case) completely failed at, offering an adequate sociological treatment of problem(atic)s in question. Looking at the new through the prism of the old (or through the old prism), thus, sociology was able to account for what appeared as the semblance of the known; discarding the prism altogether, it deprived itself of a sense of orientation and embraced the mantra of 'parole'.

What then are the possibilities for sociology to reinvent itself? Or is it, in the light of sociology's responses to the challenge of the crisis, even possible for sociology to reinvent itself? In brief, reinventing itself is not any more (if it ever was to begin with) a matter of choice for sociology; it is a

necessity and a matter of utmost urgency. For if sociology is to continue to claim any relevance as a (or the) discipline of social life, if it is to avoid the threat of being relegated to the social scientific museum of paleontology, it *must*, as it were, re-tune itself, it *must* update its conceptual and analytical apparatus, and it *must* make itself sensitive to the global. Otherwise, its future is no future at all, but a journey to the proverbial dustbin of history. Again, reinventing itself is not a matter of choice for sociology; it is a matter of urgent necessity.

If sociology indeed must reinvent itself are there then any guidelines on the horizon? Are there, in other words, any developments within sociology itself capable of suggesting a course of reinvention, offering a way out of the 'sociological stalemate'? My answer to these question is: 'Yes, there are'. One of them is Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis. The other is Roland Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory. Both of them, implicitly or explicitly, offer productive propositions for overcoming the 'predicament of sociology' and for the realignment of the discipline along the trajectories of the global - both as a substantive and a conceptual category. Specifically, Wallerstein's world-systems analysis presents an alternative socio-historical framework within which globalization in its substantive dimension has a potential of being grasped, and thus of being dealt with, more adequately and more comprehensively. Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory puts forth an alternative analytical frame of reference and suggests the ways in which its dynamic can be properly historicized and apprehended both categorically and analytically. As such, it provides constructive grounds for theorizing globalization as the conceptual category. Together, the two are opening up the possibility for, as it were, the renaissance of sociology in light of the need for taking in the global and, through its renaissance, for the prospect of rising to the challenge of the crisis. In doing so, they are effectively paving the path towards a sociology of the global.

The proposition that Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory are, in a sense, offering a direction for the realignment of the sociological discipline need not translate as a recommendation that all of their claims are necessarily correct or that the theories as such need to be accepted at their face value. Rather, it ought to be understood as a suggestion that the *principles* upon which they build their respective claims and findings provide fertile grounds, as it were, for envisioning the prospects and possibilities for a sociology of the global. In this context, allowing for elaborating upon the specifics of their respective claims and findings so as to arrive at the point of grasping their underlying principles is the minimum needed and the minimum asked for.

Immanuel Wallerstein: The Concept of World-System

Emerging in the 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems analysis was formulated as a critique of existing dominant views about a mode of inquiry employed within the framework of various social sciences, particularly the modernization and development theories which dominated social science worldwide during the 1960s. As Wallerstein himself was to observe (1987: 309),

'[w]orld-systems analysis' is not a theory about the social world, or about part of it. It is a protest against the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century. This mode of inquiry has come to be a set of often-unquestioned *a priori* assumptions. World-systems analysis maintains that this mode of social scientific inquiry, practiced worldwide, has had the effect of closing off rather than opening up many of the most important or the most interesting questions. In wearing the blinkers which the nineteenth century constructed, we are unable to perform the social task we wish to perform and that the rest of the world wishes to perform, which is to present rationally the real historical alternatives that lie before us. World-systems analysis was born as moral, and in its broadest sense, political protest. However, it is on the basis of scientific claims, that is, on the basis of claims related to the possibilities of systematic knowledge about social reality, that world-systems analysis challenges prevailing mode of inquiry.

Crucially, the protest against, and the challenge to, the dominant mode of social scientific inquiry put forth by world-systems analysis revolves around five points of contention (So 1990: 173-180): (1) the academic division of intellectual labor, (2) the arbitrary separation between history and social sciences; (3) the state/society dichotomy as a unit of analysis; (4) the definition of capitalism; and (5) the notion of historical progress.

On the first point, Wallerstein challenges existence of multiplicity of social science disciplines - each with its own structure, spheres of interests, and research objectives - by questioning the 'naturalness' of such a social scientific division of intellectual labor. He argues that these divisions are derived from the nineteenth century dominant liberal ideology which drew lines between the such categories as 'primitive'/'civilized', 'rational'/'irrational', 'political'/'economic', and assigned them each - as objects of inquiry - to one of existing social scientific disciplines. This, according to Wallerstein, is an untenable proposition for these artificially created disciplinary boundaries stand as a barrier to further human knowledge rather than a stimulus to its creation. In his view, the various disciplines of social science are but a single one. As he puts it (Wallerstein 1987: 312-313, original emphasis):

The question before us today is whether there are any criteria which can be used to assert in a relatively clear and defensible way boundaries between the four presumed disciplines of anthropology, economics, political science and sociology. World-systems analysis responds with an unequivocal 'no' to this question. All the presumed criteria - level of analysis, subject-matter, methods, theoretical assumptions - either are no longer true in practice or, if sustained, are barriers to further knowledge rather than stimuli to its creation.

Or, to put another way, the differences between permissible topics, methods, theories or theorizing *within* any of the so-called 'disciplines' are far greater than the differences *among* them. This means in practice that the overlap is substantial and, in terms of the historical evolution of all these fields, is increasing all the time. The time has come to cut through this intellectual morass by saying that these four disciplines are but a single one....

[Thus, t]he argument of world-systems analysis is straightforward. The three presumed areas of collective human action - the economic, the political and the social or sociocultural - are not autonomous arenas of social action. They do not have separate 'logics'.... We are arguing that there is a single 'set of rules' or a single 'set of constraints' within which these various structures operate.

Wallerstein also questions the distinction between ideographic and nomothetic modes of analysis, in the context of which the former has been associated with history and the latter with social science. He argues that just as any particularity is discernible only in non-particular (that is, universal) categories, so any universalization implies invoking the language of particular categories. Probing the argument, he contextualizes the problem(atic) by posing the questions: 'Is there a meaningful difference between sequence and universe, between history and social science?; Are they two activities or one?'. To these he answers by stating the following:

Synchrony is akin to a geometric dimension. One can describe it logically, but it can be drawn only falsely on paper. In geometry, a point, a line or a plane can be drawn only in three (or four) dimensions. So it is in 'social science'. Synchrony is a conceptual limit, not a socially usable category. All description has time, and the only question is how wide a band is immediately relevant. Similarly, unique sequence is only describable in non-unique categories. All conceptual language presumes comparison among universes. Just as we cannot literally 'draw' a point, so we cannot literally 'describe' a unique 'event'. The drawing, the description, has thickness of complex generalization (Wallerstein 1987: 314).

Consequently, he opposes the separation between an ideographic historical and a nomothetic social scientific mode of analysis, and argues that "[t]here is

neither historian nor social scientist, but only a historical social scientist who analyses the general laws of particular systems and the particular sequences through which these systems have gone" (Wallerstein 1987: 315).

With respect to the state/society dichotomy as a unit of analysis, Wallerstein argues that proper inquiry of social change cannot be relegated to the sphere of the social, in the context of which the state and society are posited as the opposite conceptual poles. In his view (Wallerstein 1987: 315-316), the state/society dichotomy had its origins in the nineteenth century institutional emergence of modern social science and the attempt to intellectually apprehend changes taking place in the realm of social life. As such, it was a specific, historically derived mode of positing social reality that corresponded to the agenda or reconciling, as it were, political power ('the state') and social processes ('society') to the end of managing the course(s) of social change. However, Wallerstein observes, the complexification of the historical manifestations of social life, on the one hand, and the universalization of the state/society dichotomy as *the* unit of analysis within social science, on the other, made for the discrepancy between the two, so that

as the time went on, more and more 'anomalies' [of social life] seemed to be unexplained within this framework [of the state/society dichotomy], and more and more lacunae (of uninvestigated zones of human activity) seemed to emerge (Wallerstein 1987: 316).

In other words, it became evident that the social framework within which the state and society were taken as the only analytical points of reference in analyzing social processes was becoming increasingly inadequate for the task of observing the process of social change. In this context, Wallerstein argues for the substitution of the state/society dichotomy with the *historical system* as the only proper basis for analyzing and explaining major macro-social trends. In his view, any investigation of the nature of social and political phenomena must attempt to understand and explain phenomena in relation to the given social 'totality' within which these stand 'embedded'. For him, neither the state or society can be taken, or understood, in isolation because both exist and interact with one another within a complex configuration of political, economic, social and spatial relations, properly captured in the concept of historical system. Therefore, Wallerstein suggests, it is only by making the historical system the fundamental unit of social inquiry, by making it the focal point of social scientific investigation, that meaningful analysis of social, political, economic and cultural processes at work, and thus a meaningful account of social change, can be undertaken.

Further, Wallerstein challenges the classical definition of capitalism which denotes the phenomenon as a "system based on competition between free producers using free labor with free commodities, 'free' meaning its availability for sale and purchase on a market" (Wallerstein 1987: 318). He

argues that in the modern world this kind of capitalism is a minority situation, especially so if the unit of analysis is the world-economy. Thus, he observes that the system of global capitalist economic relations is characterized by the partialization and dichotomization of the classical capitalist category 'free', in the context of which the notions of 'wage' and 'non-wage', 'commodified' and 'non-commodified', and 'alienable' and 'non-alienable' (co)exist side by side and engage in constant and active interplay. In this context, then, Wallerstein argues that it is by allowing for both the 'free' and the 'non-free', rather than preferring the former to the neglect of the latter, that capitalism, as manifested in the context of global systemic economic relations, can be grasped more adequately. As he puts it (Wallerstein 1987: 320):

World-systems analysis argues that the capitalist world-economy is a particular historical system. Therefore if we want to ascertain the norms, that is, the mode of functioning of this concrete system, the optimal way is to look at the historical evolution of this system. If we find, as we do, that the system seems to contain wide areas of wage and non-wage labour, wide areas of commodified and non-commodified goods and wide areas of alienable and non-alienable forms of property and capital, then we should at the very least wonder whether this 'combination' or mixture of the so called free and the non-free is not itself the defining feature of capitalism.

Lastly, Wallerstein questions the notion of human history as being inevitably progressive. He claims that this accepted (and often posited as a linear) inevitability is highly dubious a proposition, and - in its stead - suggests the possibility of an open-ended, non-deterministic, and variable historical change:

World-systems analysis wants to remove the idea of progress from the status of a trajectory and open it up as an analytical variable. There may have been better and there may have been worse historical systems (and we can debate the criteria by which to judge). It is not at all certain that there has been a linear trend - upward, downward or straightforward. Perhaps the trend line is uneven, or perhaps indeterminate (Wallerstein 1987: 322).

Ultimately, then, it is in the light of the above challenges to the existing mode of social scientific inquiry that Wallerstein formulates his world-systems analysis as a supra-disciplinary, historically informed mode of analysis, premised upon three defining characteristics (Wallerstein 1990b: 288): (1) a *world-system* as the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of social or societal behavior; (2) the *longue durée* as a temporal unit of analysis;

and (3) a certain view of one particular world-system, the capitalist world-economy.

The most important qualification of the first defining characteristic of world-systems analysis is denial that the nation-state represents in any sense a relatively autonomous "society" that develops over time, and thus an appropriate primary unit for the study of social or societal behavior. The formation of the nation-state, and thus study of its behavior as manifested through specific social, political, economic and cultural practices, can, Wallerstein argues, be understood adequately *only* if contextualized within larger historical structural framework of the world-system. Hence, he insists on the latter (as the particular historically constituted system social, political, economic, and cultural relations) as the only analytically sound unit of social scientific inquiry.³⁹

Further, Wallerstein argues that it is only through analyzing historical change as it unfolds in the context of historically meaningful temporality that given social, political, economic, and cultural processes, and thus historical change as such, can be submitted to proper analytical scrutiny. Thus he draws upon the notion of *longue durée* - long duration - as "the temporal correlate of the spatial quality of 'world-system'" (Wallerstein 1990b: 288). In Wallerstein's view, this concept, originally developed by the French Annales School, properly captures the 'historicity' of world systems - that is, the process of their 'structural respecifications' as observed through their, as it were, beginnings, lives, and ends. As he observes:

This stance makes clear that structures are not "immobile". It insists, in addition, that there are "transitions" from one historical system to its successor or successors. It is this pair, the space of a "world" and the time of a "long duration", that combine to form any particular historical world-system (Wallerstein 1990b: 288).

³⁹ For Wallerstein (1974: 15-16; 1984a: 163-165) there have been known three known forms of varieties of historical systems: *mini-systems*, *world-empires*, and *world-economies* (In 1984a, however, Wallerstein makes mention of *socialist world-government* as the fourth form of the historical system. In his view, apparently, this form of the historical system is yet to be realized). The mini-systems refer to historical structures small in space, relatively brief in time, and highly homogenous in terms of cultural and governing patterns. Their basic logic is one of reciprocity in exchange. The world-empires are vast political structures and encompass wide variety of cultural patterns. Their basic logic is the extraction of tribute from locally self-administered producers that is passed upward to the center and redistributed to a network of administrating officials. (Here, the Ottoman empire is a relevant example of the world-empire). The world-economies denote vast chains of integrated production structures dissected by multiple political structures. Their basic logic is the unequal distribution of accumulated surplus in favor of those able to achieve various kinds of temporary monopolies in the market networks. In Wallerstein's view, the only world-economy evidenced so far has been that of capitalism. Thus, he posits the capitalist world-economy as a particular, contemporary manifestation of one of the forms of the historical system. Hence capitalist world-system.

With respect to the third element, Wallerstein observes that the analytical focus of world-systems analysis lies in investigating particular kind of world-system - the capitalist world-economy. In his view, (1990b: 288-289) its specificity is evidenced in the following characteristics: the ceaseless accumulation of capital as its driving force; an axial division of labor in which there is a core-periphery tension, such that there is some form of spatially-defined unequal exchange; the structural existence of a semi-peripheral zone; the large and continuing role of non-wage labor alongside of wage labor; the correspondence of the boundaries of the capitalist world-economy to that of an interstate system comprised of sovereign states; the existence of hegemonic states, with each, however, having a relatively brief period of uncontested hegemony; the non-primordial character of states, ethnic groups, and households, all of which are constantly created and recreated; the fundamental importance of racism and sexism as organizing principles of the system; the emergence of anti-systemic movements that simultaneously undermine and reinforce the system; and a pattern of both cyclical rhythms and secular trends that incarnates the inherent contradictions of the system and which accounts for the systemic crisis. As Wallerstein concludes, it is within this kind of 'structural framework' of the capitalist-world economy that world-system analysis formulates its particular investigative interests.

In sum, then, Wallerstein's world-systems analysis stands for a particular mode of socio-historical inquiry that treats the whole world as a unit of analysis, adopts historical methodology that perceives reality as a state of flux, and, correspondingly, abandons a deterministic point of view with respect to the direction of historical change.

World-Systems Analysis: Capitalist World-Economy as a Global System

As established above, the fundamental unit of analysis of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is the whole world - or, in somewhat more "technical" terms, the world-system. Specifically, it is the capitalist world-system as the particular historical configuration that is the focus of world-systems analysis's investigative concerns. As defined by Wallerstein (1983a: 18-19), the capitalist world-system in its historical dimension is

that concrete, time-bonded, space-bounded integrated locus of productive activities within which the endless accumulation of capital has been the economic objective or 'law' that has governed or prevailed in fundamental economic activity. It is that social system in which those who have operated by such rules have had such great impact on the whole as to create conditions wherein the others have been forced to conform to the patterns or to suffer the consequences. It is that social system in which the scope of these rules (the law of value) has grown ever wider, the enforcers of these rules ever more

intransigent, even while social opposition to these rules has grown ever louder and more organized.

In this context, then, both the investigative concerns of world-systems analysis and its *empirical claims* (that is, its analytical findings formulated through the process of systematic inquiry) have to do with elaborating upon the nature, the configuration, and the processes of the capitalist world-system as a historical socio-economic structure⁴⁰.

With respect to the nature of the capitalist world-system, world-systems analysis regards capitalist relations as being constitutive of the entire world-system, or, to put it somewhat differently, as being the fundamental way of organizing the world-system's economic activity. As such, they are characterized by three crucial definitional premises (Wallerstein 1983a; 1984c: 1-12, 59-63): profit maximization; the quest for competitive advantage through efficiency; and the exploitation of labor by the owners of the means of production. Being organized on a global level, economic activity of the world-system is predicated upon a single worldwide division of labor that unifies the multiple cultural systems of the world's peoples into a single, integrated economic system, in the context of which each part or area has acquired a specialized role of producing goods that it trades to others in order to obtain what it itself needs. Thus, from a point of view of world-systems analysis, the capitalist world-system economy is tied together by a complex network of global economic production and exchange. As Wallerstein puts it (1979: 272):

What distinguishes capitalism as a mode of production is that its multiple structures relate one to the other in such a way that, in consequence, the push to endless accumulation of capital becomes and remains dominant. Production tends always to be for profit rather than for use. In a capitalist system, the realization of profit is made possible by the existence of an economy-wide market, which is the measure of value even for those economic activity that do not pass through it directly....

What provides the continuity of a capitalist world-economy through its *longue durée* is the continuous functioning of its three central antinomies: economy/polity; supply/demand; capital/labor. The coexistence of these three antinomies is defining of capitalism, and the way their contradictions fit into each other is the clue to the dynamics of the system as a whole.

40 Here we follow Morrow (1992: 42-3) who observes that "*empirical theory* (also referred to as *analytical* or *substantive theory*)...represent[s] various ways of systematically organizing concepts in a manner that attempts to provide persuasively an explanation of phenomena. Such explanations seek to answer "why" and "how" questions about social events" (original emphasis).

In its most crucial respects, the configuration of the capitalist world-system has to do with the trimodal *core-semiperiphery-periphery* typology put forward by Wallerstein:

The core-periphery distinction...differentiates those zones in which are concentrated high-profit, high-technology, high-wage diversified production (the core countries) from those in which are concentrated low-profit, low-technology, low-wage, less diversified production (the peripheral countries). But there has always been a series of countries which fall in between in a very concrete way, and play a different role. The productive activities of these semiperipheral countries are more evenly divided. In part they act as a peripheral zone for core countries and in part they act as a core country for some peripheral areas. Both their internal politics and their social structure are distinctive, and it turns out that their ability to take advantage of the flexibilities offered by the downturns of economic activity is in general greater than that of either the core or the peripheral countries (1979: 97).

The *core* of capitalist world-system, thus, consists of those regions and nation-states that dominate the capitalist world-economy and expropriate the bulk of the surplus produced within it. In the core are found those societies that are the most economically advanced or developed, that have the greatest degree of technological advancement, and that have strongest governments and military structures. The *periphery*, on the other hand, refers to that segment of world-economy that is most extensively subjected to surplus expropriation by the core. The societies and regions of the periphery are those that are least economically developed, have the lowest level of technological advancement, and have the weakest government and military units. Finally, the *semiperiphery* denotes that segment of the capitalist world-economy that operates between the core and the periphery, and that contains features of both core and peripheral societies. The regions of the semiperiphery are more technologically and economically advanced than those of the periphery, but less so than those of the core. They play a crucial role as 'intermediaries' in the capitalist world-system by functioning as regional trading and financial centers. Moreover, as Wallerstein observes, their centrality in the capitalist world-economic complex is evidenced in the political and politico-economic role they play in the system. As he puts it (1979: 69-70):

The capitalist world-system needs a semiperipheral sector for two reasons: one primarily political and one politico-economic. The political reason is very straightforward and rather elementary. A system based on unequal rewards must constantly worry about political rebellion of oppressed elements.... The major political means by which such crises are averted is the creation of 'middle'

sectors, which tend to think of themselves primarily as better off than the lower sector rather than worse off than the upper sector. This obvious mechanism, operative in all kinds of social structures, serves the same function in world systems.

But there is another reason that derives from the particular needs of this kind of social structure, a capitalist world-system. The multiplicity of states within the single economy has two advantages for sellers seeking profit. First, the absence of a single political authority makes it impossible for anyone to legislate the general will of the world system and hence to curtail the capitalist mode of production. Second, the existence of state machineries makes it possible for the capitalist sellers to organize the frequently necessary artificial restraints on the operation of the market.

Regarding the trimodal typology of the capitalist world-system, Wallerstein observes that the delineation along the lines of core, periphery, and semiperiphery ought not to be understood in terms of rigid geographical separation and firm allocation of certain countries and regions to the position of a core, a periphery, or a semiperiphery within the system of global capitalist economic relations. Rather, it ought to be grasped as highly fluid and, in a certain sense, 'heuristic' mode of classification whose purpose is to offer a sense of *relational position* of different parts of the capitalist world-system at a certain point in time. Thus he observes that, in fact, the core is the only component of the capitalist world-economy that can be mapped out in terms of a relative long-term geographical persistence; the other two are prone to almost constant geographical respecifications. The relative long-term geographic persistence within the core of the capitalist world-economy is denoted by Wallerstein as a *period of hegemony* - that is,

that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called "great powers" is so unbalanced that one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes...in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. The material base of such power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic areas - agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance (Wallerstein 1983b: 101).

So far, Wallerstein argues (1983b: 102), there have been only three instances of absolute hegemony in the system of global economic relations. These correspond to the eras of 'golden age' of the Dutch, the British, and the United States empires. The in-between periods, accounting for much of the history of the system of capitalist world-economy, are, according to Wallerstein, the times of struggle for hegemonic position in the system.

The fundamental processes operative within the capitalist world-system are predicated upon - and driven by - the system's underlying economic motive - the quest for endless capital accumulation. This qualification makes the economic relationship between the core and periphery fundamentally exploitative. As argued by Wallerstein (in Shannon 1989: 29), trade and other forms of economic relationships between the core and the periphery benefit the former at the expense of the latter: the periphery receives less from the core for its economic activities than the core receives from the periphery for its activities; thus, most of the wealth generated in the periphery flows to the core.

The basis of this peripheral exploitation, in Wallerstein's view, is *unequal exchange* - that is, the process of inherently disparate exchange relations between low-wage products from the periphery and high-wage products from the core. As Wallerstein puts it (1979: 71):

If we think of the exchange between the core and the periphery of a capitalist system being that between high-wage products and low-wage product, there then results an 'unequal exchange'..., in which a peripheral workers needs to work many hours, at a given level of productivity, to obtain a product produced by a worker in a core country in one hour. And vice versa.

Thus, the process of unequal exchange is a result of differential forms of compensation to be found in the core and the periphery (high- and low-wage compensations), which make for the former receiving inexpensive goods from the periphery because of the low wages paid in producing those goods, and for the latter buying relatively expensive core goods produced by high-wage labor. Ultimately, unequal exchange makes for a substantial portion of the periphery's labor-value being transferred to the core, and - in turn - for the inability of the periphery to accumulate the capital necessary for successful economic 'modernization'. Hence, the perpetuation of the core-periphery relationship within the context of the capitalist world-system. As argued by Wallerstein,

[s]uch a system is *necessary* for the expansion of a world market if the primary consideration is *profit*. Without *unequal exchange*, it would not be *profitable* to expand the size of the division of labor. And without such expansion, it would not be profitable to maintain a capitalist world-economy, which would then either disintegrate or revert to the form of a redistributive world-empire (1979: 71, original emphasis).

What is revealed by the process of empirically encapsulating the essence of capitalist world-system - and, in particular, by elaborating upon the mechanism of peripheral exploitation - is, according to Wallerstein, the

existence of fundamentally exploitative and unequal relationship between the core and the periphery, operating at the world-wide (or global) level. For him, the existence (and persistence) of inequality as a system-level phenomenon is not a matter of merely analytical concern, but, to a great extent, an issue that is crucially related to the questions of freedom and (especially) equality- the foci of *normative implications* to be derived from world-systems analysis. Being rooted in particular vision of an alternative political orientation, Wallerstein's world-systems perspective is highly critical of global inequality promoted (and made possible) by existing capitalist world-system. In his view, the construction of an egalitarian, world-wide emancipatory project is not only a possibility, but urgently needed necessity - a position predicated upon Wallerstein's notion of *utopistics*, or

the science of utopian utopias, that is, the attempt to clarify the real historical alternatives that are before us when an historical system enters into its crisis phase, and to assess at that moment of extreme fluctuations the pluses and minuses of alternative strategies (Wallerstein 1990b: 291).

Thus, for him, clarifying the real historical alternatives in the form of "defining the better in a way that is critical of existing reality" is what characterizes utopia as a process (Wallerstein 1990b: 291). The better, which is the process of utopia expressed 'in concrete', is crucially connected with the task of "eradicating the vulgar, brutal, unnecessary consequences of material inequality", in Wallerstein's view something that is "intrinsically a quite achievable objective" (Wallerstein 1990b: 291).

Ultimately, guided by concerns for freedom (realizable in the form of eradicating the process of peripheral exploitation) and equality (to be achieved by implementation of a global emancipatory project), Wallerstein's world-systems analysis provides not only an 'empirically grounded diagnosis' of the capitalist world-system (offered through positing its nature, its configuration, and the processes at work), but - also - a vision of an alternative mode of world-wide organization, predicated upon utopian formulation of the 'necessity for the better'.

The Capitalist World-System: The Spatio-Temporal Dimension

So far the focus of our presentation has been on delineating the notion of the capitalist world-system as a socio-economic structure, as conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein. We have done so by positing its 'structural dimension' - that is, by elaborating upon the system's nature, its configuration, and the processes at work that, together, effectively provide for its 'structural socio-economic make up'. Apart from the structural dimension of the capitalist world-system, however, there is yet another,

spatio-temporal, dimension that is very much in evidence within the framework of world-systems analysis. Indeed, it may well be argued that this dimension is central to world-systems analysis for much (if not most) of the work done through its employment revolves around detailing the history of the capitalist world-system as it proceeds through time and space. In this context, the structural dimension of the system is but a "derivative" of the main focus on the spatio-temporal dimension, as materialized in a substantial body of work produced using the framework of world-systems analysis. As such, it is a *heuristic device*, or, to put it somewhat differently, a 'structural skeleton', that frames, informs and, simultaneously, 'demarcates' the scope of investigative interests of world-systems analysis.

Given the centrality of the spatio-temporal dimension of the capitalist world-system within world-systems analysis any attempt at offering its comprehensive treatment would (if possible at all) outstretch significantly the scope of this chapter, as well as intrude, as it were, upon its main purpose - which was (as suggested at the beginning of this chapter) to present an alternative socio-historical framework - alternative to that of the nation-state - within which globalization in its substantive dimension could be grasped, and thus could be dealt with, more adequately and more comprehensively. Thus, the specifics of the spatio-temporal dimension will not, and could not, be detailed here. Instead, what will be presented is a *rudimentary* spatio-temporal framework within which world-systems analysis addresses its particular investigative concerns.⁴¹

The spatio-temporal dimension of the capitalist world-system is periodized in terms of four major stages of its history⁴²: stage one, from approximately 1450 to 1640; stage two, from 1640 to 1760; stage three, from 1760 to 1917; and stage four, from 1917 to present. The period between 1450 to 1640 (denoted by Wallerstein as the 'long sixteenth century') is the time-frame within which the capitalist world-system emerged and was formed from the remnants of feudalism. The hallmark of the epoch was the geographical expansion of the European world (initially Spain and Portugal) into the newly 'discovered' areas of today's Central and Latin America (in particular the West Indies, Mexico, Peru and Brazil), the beginning of slave trade in Africa, and (most prominently by the United Provinces, or Holland) the solidification and furthering of commerce in Mediterranean and the East Indies. As Sanderson observes (1995:189-190), in this initial phase of the capitalist world-system's history

[t]he capitalist world-economy made up only a small portion of the world... (...about 20 percent of the habitable globe...). Most of the

⁴¹ For an authoritative source on capitalist world-system in the spatio-temporal dimension the Fernand Braudel Center' journal *Review* is perhaps the best and most comprehensive publication.

⁴² The following is drawn upon Sanderson 1995, in particular Chapter Six.

world was outside the system, and a good deal was even outside the external arena. Slave trade had begun in Africa during this period, but Africa still related to Europe as an external arena rather than as a genuine periphery. There was luxury trade with China and India, but they, along with the rest of Asia, were still outside the system.

The 1640 to 1760 stage marks the consolidation and solidification of the modern capitalist world-system. The main features of this phase include the advent of the British and French expansion into the regions of North America, Africa and the islands of both West and East Indies; the extension of the semiperipheral region through the inclusion of Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia and the northern colonies in America; and the making of the slave-based form of production a fundamental part of the capitalist world-system. In comparison to the first stage of the capitalist world-system's history the period from 1640 to 1760 is marked by relatively little geographic expansion and only moderate evolution.

The epoch of 1760 to 1917 is characterized by dramatic expansion of the capitalist world-system so as to encompass most of the globe. Thus, the most significant developments in this phase have to do with the incorporation of most of the rest of the world within the purview of the capitalist world-economy: in Asia, the Ottoman empire, China, the East Indies, and India became incorporated in the capitalist world-system; West Africa was also gradually taken in, as it were, in the course of the nineteenth century; Russia as well was included in the system, however as a semiperipheral rather than a peripheral region. Other important developments in the 1760 to 1917 period include, most prominently, the Industrial Revolution (as the 'fuel-engine' of the epoch) and the settler decolonization of the America(s).

Finally, the phase from 1917 to present marks relatively limited expansion but tremendous 'deepening' of the system. This current phase of the history of the capitalist world-system is characterized by the reconstitution(s) of the system's trimodal structure through, firstly, the advent of socialism(s) and communism(s) as alternative socio-economic forces within the system and, secondly, through social, political, and economic consequences of two World Wars. As well, it is marked by a massive mechanization of capitalist production and an intensification of its size and scale. As Sanderson suggests (1995: 195),

[t]he core today is made up of the leading industrial capitalist countries of western Europe, North America, Australia, and Japan, with the United States, Germany, France, and Japan being the four leading economic powers. Much of Latin America has been upwardly mobile into the semiperiphery, as have some Asian countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore.

Most of Africa, though, remains deeply embedded in the periphery with little hope in the foreseeable of much improvement.

Within the framework of this four-stage schema of the history of the capitalist world-system its changes, developments and transformations are analyzed through the prism of three distinct but interrelated historical processes: *the broadening of capitalist relations, the deepening of capitalist relations, and the Kondratieff (or long) waves and hegemony cycles*. The broadening of capitalist relations refers to the geographic expansion of capitalist world-system so as to incorporate more and more of the entire habitable earth. Thus, this process is congruent with the historical course of development of the system as such in the context of which new areas of the world become functional parts of its structure. As observed by Shannon (1989: 114), the incorporation of new areas occurs through the following developments: (1) the emergence of an economic sector that begins to produce goods in demand in the world-economy; (2) the passing of control over labor in this new sector into the hands of those who accumulate the surplus generated by workers for capitalists; (3) the extraction of the surplus generated in the new sector by the capitalist core; and (4) the creation of centralized administrative structures with the basic features of a core state in the new area, so as to assure the smooth extraction of economic surplus.

The deepening of capitalist relations refers to the increasing extension of the 'logic' of capitalist production, the capitalist market-place, and capitalist norms and values of economic relationships within the capitalist world-system itself. As such, this process is correlative to the institutionalization of capitalist relation within societies already in the system. In Sanderson's view (1995: 184-185), there are five fundamental subprocesses of deepening that make for the overall process of deepening of capitalist relations. These are:

1. *commodification*, or the increasing extent to which factors of production and human relationships come to be characterized by the goal of buying and selling in order to realize a profit; ...
2. *mechanization*, or the increasing application of advanced technological means to the process of production; ...
3. *contractualization*, or the increasing application of formalized rules and legalistic norms to the human relationships that are a fundamental part of the capitalist production process;
4. *proletarianization*, or the increasing replacement of various forms of forced labor (slavery, serfdom and their variations) by wage labor; ...
5. *polarization*, or the increased widening of the gap between core and peripheral states.

In terms of the Kondratieff waves, the third process refers to 'boom' and 'bust' periods of capitalist world-economy; in terms of hegemony cycles, it refers to instances of the economic rise and fall of particular nation-states to and from the position of extreme dominance within the world-economy. Fundamentally, the Kondratieff waves stand for long cyclical movements of 'expansion' and 'contraction' of the capitalist world-system in the context of which expansion occurs when the totality of world production is less than world effective demand, as permitted by the existing social distribution of world purchasing power, and contraction at the point in which total world production exceeds world effective demand, again, as permitted by the existing social distribution of world purchasing power. Contraction of the capitalist world-system is overcome through a political reallocation of world income which effectively expands world demand and sets in a new cycle of expansion. Thus, the interplay of expansion and contraction of the capitalist world-system in wave-like, Kondratieff cycles. As Wallerstein elaborates:

Because the imperatives of accumulation operate via the individual decisions of entrepreneurs, each seeking to maximize his profit - the so-called anarchy of production - there is an inherent tendency to the expansion of absolute volume in production in the world-economy. Profit can, however, be realized only if there is effective demand for the global product. But world effective demand is a function of the sum of political arrangements in the various states (the result of prior class struggles), which determine the real distribution of the global surplus. These arrangements are stable for intermediate periods of time. Consequently, world supply expands at a steady rate, while world demand remains relatively fixed for intermediate periods. Such a system must result, and historically has resulted, in recurring bottlenecks of accumulation, which are translated into periods of economic stagnation. The A-phases of expansion and the B-phases of stagnation seem to have occurred historically in cycles of forty to fifty-five years (sometimes called "Kondratieff cycles").

Each period of stagnation has created pressures to restructure the network of production process and the social relations that underlie them in ways that would overcome the bottlenecks to accumulation. Among the mechanisms that have operated to renew expansion are:

- (a) reduction of production costs of former core-like products by further mechanization and/or relocation of these activities in lower-wage zones;
- (b) creation of new core-like activities ("innovation") which promise high initial rates of profit, thus encouraging new loci of investment;
- (c) an intensified class struggle both within the core states and between groups located in different states such that there may occur at the end of the process some political redistribution of world surplus to workers in core zones...and to bourgeois in

- semiperipheral and peripheral zones, thereby augmenting world effective demand;
- (d) expansion of the outer boundaries of the world-economy, thereby creating new pools of direct producers who can be involved in world production as semiproletarianized workers receiving wages below the cost of production (1984a: 16-17).

As observed previously, hegemony refers to the situation in which a single core power has demonstrable advantages of efficiency simultaneously in production, commerce, and finance. Thus, it refers to the position of dominance of one core power within the overall capitalist world-system. Consequently, hegemony cycles denote time-spans within which one single core power asserts effective dominance over production, commerce, and financial activities within the capitalist world-system. As suggested by Wallerstein (1983b: 112), thus far there have been only three instances of hegemony in the history of the system: the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth century, and the United States in the mid-twentieth century. Accordingly, there have been only three hegemonic cycles: first from 1625 to 1672, second from 1815-1873, and third from 1945-1967. As he observes, the, as it were, in-between, 'post-hegemony' periods correspond to times of the struggle for hegemonic dominance.

To conclude, the spatio-temporal dimension of the capitalist world-system manifests itself in a two-fold manner: on the one hand, as the historical course of the capitalist world-system's development, establishment, solidification, and expansion, framed as, so far, a four-stage process; on the other, as particular trends and tendencies within the capitalist world-system that effectively shape the system's operation through time and space. Together, they form a general 'spatio-temporal skeleton' of the capitalist world-system within which world-systems analysis locates and observes its particular investigative interests.

Immanuel Wallerstein's World-Systems Analysis: A Summary

Revolting against the dominant mode of social scientific inquiry world-systems analysis provided an alternative conceptual and analytical apparatus, set against the critique of five fundamental points of contention. First, against the academic division of intellectual labor. Second, against the arbitrary separation between history and social sciences and to them corresponding modes of explanation. Third, against the state/society dichotomy as a unit of analysis. Fourth, against the classical definition of capitalism. Fifth, against the notion of progress in history. Arguing that, on the first point, artificially created social scientific disciplinary boundaries stood in the way of furthering human knowledge rather than contributing to its creation; that, on the second

point, the separation between history and social sciences and to them corresponding *ideographic* and *nomothetic* modes of explanation opposed the true basis of proper 'explanatory mechanism' which discerned any particularity only in non-particular categories, as well as universalized through invoking the language of particular categories; that, on the third point, the social framework within which the state and society were taken as the only analytical points of reference in analyzing social processes was becoming increasingly inadequate for the task of observing the process of social change and needed to be substituted with *historical system* as the proper unit of analysis; that, on the fourth point, the classical definition of capitalism, with its preeminent emphasis of the category 'free' to the neglect of the 'non-free' positing, was falling short of adequately encapsulating the nature of capitalist relations as projected globally and needed to be expanded so that it would include both; and that, on the fifth point, the notion of inevitably progressive and linearly deterministic human history needed to be challenged with the proposition of an open-ended, non-deterministic, and variable historical course, world-systems analysis established its supra-disciplinary and historically informed mode of inquiry that took the world-system as its fundamental unit of analysis, adopted the notion of *longue durée* as the temporal correlative of the spatial quality of the world-system as such, abandoned deterministic point of view on the notion of social change, and adopted analytical methodology that perceived reality in the state of constant flux.

Regarding the world-system's nature, its configuration and the processes at work, world-systems analysis posits capitalist relations (as characterized by profit maximization, the quest for competitive advantage through efficiency, and the exploitation of labor by the owners of the means of production) as the fundamental way of organizing the world-system's capitalist economic activity. In this context, a complex network of global economic production and exchange unifies the multiple cultural systems of the world's people into a single, integrated economic system. As well, it suggests the trimodal *core-periphery-semiperiphery* typology as, on the one hand, a way of conceptually apprehending the configuration of the capitalist world-system and, on the other, a means of analytically observing *unequal exchange* as a fundamentally exploitative relational processes underlying the 'structural arrangement' of the globally constituted capitalist economic relations.

Thus, through elaborating upon the capitalist world-system's nature, its structure, and the processes constitutive of its *modus operandi* world-systems analysis offers its, as it were, a 'structural socio-economic profile' that, together with the spatio-temporal dimension of the system as such (detailed as, on the one hand, the four-stage historical course that chronicles the capitalist world-system's inception, establishment, solidification and

expansion, and as, on the other, *the broadening and deepening of capitalist relations, and the Kondratieff waves and hegemony cycles* that effectively shape the system's functioning through time and space), frames both normative and investigative concerns and problem(atic)s to be investigated. In doing so, world systems-analysis submits an alternative socio-historical framework which has, perhaps, the potential basis for reorienting sociology towards the dimension of the global.

Chapter Four

ROLAND ROBERTSON'S 'VOLUNTARISTIC' WORLD SYSTEM THEORY:

The Theory of Globalization as a Conceptual Phenomenon

Towards a Sociology of the Global: On Theorizing and Analysis, Rudimentarily

MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN globalization as a substantive phenomenon and globalization as a conceptual phenomenon is not a matter of categorical separation of the two so as to make claim to their mutual exclusivity, but, rather, a matter of making differentiation between two interrelated but nonetheless distinct aspects of the category in question so as to get at its specifics for the purposes of conceptual qualification. Similarly, positing Wallerstein's world-systems analysis as the theory of globalization in its substantive dimension and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory as the theory of globalization in its conceptual dimension is not a matter of making claim to their mutual investigative exclusiveness so as to relegate one solely to the substantive aspect of globalization and the other to its conceptual 'counterpart'. The purpose is rather a matter of being sensitive to relative emphasis each of the theory places on particular dimension in its dealing with the problem(atic) of globalization. Thus, as in the case of differentiating between the two dimensions of globalization so in the instance of relegating Wallerstein's approach to the substantive aspect of the global and Robertson's approach to the other, conceptual, the purpose of categorical separation is to emphasize the distinctness of each of the dimension so as to be able to offer a more focused and elaborate presentation of the matter under investigation, and not to argue for the dichotomization of the categorical aspects in question - substantive and conceptual, in the case of globalization; theoretical and analytical, in the case of Wallerstein and Robertson. For, obviously, as, in reality, the substantive and the conceptual dimension of globalization are but the two interrelated sides of the global phenomenon as such so, the analytical moment in Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and

the theoretical moment in Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory are but the two interrelated expressions of an attempt to get at the complexities of the global, as perceived through the dimensions of the substantive and the conceptual.

Theorizing can never be separated from analysis. For the same as any theoretical expression is predicated upon the analytical considerations of the problem(atic) theorized, so any analytical investigation of the phenomenon under consideration necessarily builds on the theoretical foundations corresponding to it. In this context, Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory are, although distinct, complementary ways of dealing with the phenomenon of the global. The former offers analytical investigation of the global as evidenced substantively; the latter provides theoretical expression of its problematizing as manifested conceptually. Together, the two illuminate the phenomenon in different ways, one from the point of analytical treatment rooted in theoretical foundations, the other from the aspect of theoretical specification predicated upon analytical considerations.

In this chapter we consider Robertson's treatment of the conceptual dimension of globalization, offered in the form of 'voluntaristic' world system theory. Thus, its purpose is to get at the specifics of his kind of theorizing of the global so as to be able to discern the principles underlying the claims of 'voluntaristic' world system theory. Through doing so we are preparing grounds for comparative analysis of Robertson's and Wallerstein's approaches to globalization and, implicitly, for defending claims to their complementarity. In Chapter Five we develop our discussion to that specific end.

Roland Robertson: The Concept of Globalization

As defined by Robertson (Robertson and Lechner 1985b: 103), globalization refers to "the process by which the world is being made into a single place with systemic properties". Correspondingly, Robertson's task in dealing with the phenomenon of globalization has to do with theorizing about (or, in somewhat more concrete terms, accounting for) the processes which have made the world into that single place. Within the framework of his approach, then, globalization is best understood as indicating the problem of *the form* in terms of which the world becomes 'united', but, as he emphasizes it, by no means integrated in a functionalist sense; as a topic of inquiry, globalization is perceived as a conceptual entry to the problem of world order in the most general sense that, on the one hand, necessitates discussing historical and comparative matters and, on the other, necessarily implies interdisciplinary approach to the problematic in question (Robertson 1990b). Thus, in the context of Robertson's dealing with globalization, the concept as such is -

more than anything else - employed to denote a particular series of developments concerning the concrete structuration of the world-as-a-whole.

At the most elementary point of entry, Robertson's approach to globalization can be summarized as follows: since the sixteenth century there have been four major focal points of the dominant globalization process: *individuals, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind*.⁴³ It is largely in terms of conceptualizing and operatively constructing each of these reference points, as well as in terms of problematizing the relationship among them, that the globalization process has proceeded in recent centuries. Thus, within the framework of Robertson's approach, to deal with globalization means, on the one hand, to account for historically specific occurrences that have - in a manner of speaking - brought to life the four points of reference and the process of their interacting with one another and, on the other, to conceive of globalization *per se* as having primarily to do with the form in terms of which the world has moved toward unicity. Ultimately, to talk of globalization, in Robertson's view, implies, above all, making reference to a relatively specific path that the world has taken in the direction of it becoming singular.

The two specific claims that Robertson makes in the context of his general treatment of globalization are, firstly, the notion that there has been only one form of relatively recent globalization framed by the four reference points, themselves contested and changing in content; and, secondly, the idea that the overall process of globalization involves shifts in both the distinctiveness with which each of the four main components have been thematized and the degree to which each of them have been differentially accorded relative autonomy (Robertson 1992b: 175-76). Regarding the first claim, Robertson argues that it is important to recognize that not merely have

⁴³ The question that one could legitimately ask here is: 'Why these and not some others?'. In other words: 'Why place preminent emphasis on *individuals, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind* in the process of structuring of the world-as-a-whole?'. Although Robertson himself does not (to my knowledge) provide an explicit statement as to the choice of these four particular points of references, a hypothesis can be made that in his view these four constitute the *primary* social agents in the process of transformation of the world in-itself to the world for-itself. By 'primary' it is meant that the four points of references constitute the four 'fundamental social bases' from which the transformation of the world along the lines of the global is taking place. Evidently, that is not to say that these four are the only points of reference; it means to suggest that they are, as far as globalization in its conceptual dimension is concerned, the 'primordial' forms of the social from which all other forms of transformative social agency emanate, as it were. For example (to put it somewhat crudely), the social movement is certainly a transformative social agent in the process of structuring of the world-as-a-whole, and as such constitutes one of the social points of reference. However, because its 'fundamental unit of organization' is the individual, it is the latter that is taken as the preminent at this particular level of social reality construction and negotiation, at work in the process of transformation of the world in-itself to the world for-itself. The same is true for the nationally constituted society, the international system of societies, and humankind as the primary points of reference and the divergent forms of transformative social agents that are, as it were, rooted in the three.

conceptions of individuals, societies, international relations, and human kind become increasingly differentiated as globalization proceeds, but that, with the advent of globalization, all four of them have gone through internal shifts, changes and transformations. With respect to his second claim Robertson argues that one of the most important aspects and results of the general process of differentiation has been the *relativization* of the four reference points. In this context, he argues that the fact that this process of differentiation has also involved a strong trend in the direction of world unicity has accelerated the rise of competing interpretations of the 'global circumstance' and its directionality (or directionalities).⁴⁴ Ultimately, overarching Robertson's two claims about increasing relativization of standpoints, on the one hand, and proliferation of orientations to the global situation, on the other, is the idea of the two developments being but concrete manifestations of the processes inherent in the phenomenon of globalization as such - that of *universalization of particularism* and of *particularization of universalism*.

In a nutshell, the last two paragraphs outline Robertson's manner of dealing with the problematic of globalization. Of course, to merely outline his position means very little should the particulars of the position remain unaccounted for. Thus, self-evidently, it is the particulars of Robertson's treatment of globalization which are of the most immediate interest to us and, correspondingly, it is the particulars as such that we now turn to.

Robertson's 'Voluntaristic' World-System Theory

As already pointed out, globalization for Robertson refers to the process by which the world is being made into a single place with systemic properties. In his view, this making of the world-as-a-whole is intimately connected with the *compression of the world*, on the one hand, and the *intensification of consciousness of the world-as-a-whole*, on the other. Thus, for Robertson any meaningful approach to the problematic of globalization necessarily involves an attempt to elaborate upon the conception of the contemporary world-system⁴⁴, on the one hand, and the main general contours of the world-as-a-whole, on the other, so as to be able to deal conceptually with the notions of world-compression and the world-as-a-whole consciousness-intensification.

In Robertson's view, the overall process of globalization and the resulting single 'global arena' can best be treated in terms of what he proposes to call a '*voluntaristic*' world-system theory (Robertson and Lechner 1985a: 103). In the broadest sense, this theory is premised upon two

⁴⁴ Although the sense in which Robertson uses the notion of contemporary world-system has certain affinities with the idea of world-system as conceptualized by Wallerstein, in the context of his approach to globalization 'contemporary world-system' is employed as an indication of relatively recent nature of the process of globalization as such (therefore 'contemporary'), on the one hand, and as a reference to global properties of the contemporary world (therefore, 'world-system'), on the other.

positions: firstly, upon Dumont's notion that "the world as a whole, the world in its totality, should be regarded as consisting in a set of *globewide relationships between societies*, on the one hand, and *self-contained, 'windowless monads'*, on the other" (Dumont in Robertson 1992a: 25, original emphasis); and, secondly, upon the idea that the *global field* (or the world-as-a-whole) is "endowed" with its own structural properties which place certain constraints upon actions of global actors but, nonetheless, provide for a strong element of choice regarding direction(s) of change and the form(s) of global involvement (Robertson 1987b). Thus, in the context of the first position, 'voluntaristic' world-system theory, treats the global arena in terms of the problem of, on the one hand, uniqueness and discontinuity and, on the other, wholeness and continuity. Both of these are "embedded" in the process of simultaneous interconnectedness and separateness operating within the context of 'global-actors relationship'; in the context of the second, the theory deals with the world-as-a-whole in terms of the problematic of *globewide 'reality construction'* as an expression of (both internal and external) 'constraining' and 'liberating' properties of the global field as such.

In somewhat more specific terms, Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world-system theory is predicated upon five specific claims (Robertson and Lechner 1985a: 103). First, it rests on the assumption that the global system (or *global-human condition*) is not reducible to a scene consisting merely of societies and/or large -scale global actors but consists rather of *individuals, national societies, the system of national societies*, and *humankind* as the global field's four points of reference⁴⁵. Second, is based on the idea that the global system is a *sociocultural system* that has resulted from the compression of civilizational cultures, national societies, intra- and cross-national movements and organizations, subsocieties and ethnic groups, intra-societal quasi-groups, individuals and so on. Third, it is animated by the notion that, as the general process of globalization proceeds, there is a concomitant constraint upon these social entities to 'identify' themselves in relation to the global-human circumstance. Fourth, it draws upon the claim that, apart from the *already* existing 'traditional' global actors, the process of globalization also yields new actors (such as transnational movements and international organizations) that are negatively or positively oriented toward the global-human circumstance as such. And fifth, it is guided by the dictum that, as the four reference points of the global field, individuals, societies, the world system of societies, and humankind are to be treated in terms of one coherent analytical framework in the context of which reductionism - notably, functionalist, utilitarian, and materialist forms thereof - must be avoided.

⁴⁵ Thus he observes (Robertson 1992a: 78):

Together societies, individuals, the system of societies and mankind constitute the basic and most general ingredients of what I call the global-human condition, a term which draws attention to both the world in its contemporary concreteness and to humanity as a species.

À propos his voluntaristic world-system theory Robertson (Robertson and Lechner 1985a: 103-104) observes that advocating a specifically global point of view and level of analysis does not force accounting for globalization only in terms of entities at a particular level - be it global or subglobal. In his view, a *multidimensional* world-system theory ranges, in principle, across levels of analysis, precisely to examine new global constraints on, and involvements of, the social entities the discipline of sociology has traditionally dealt with⁴⁶. Further, for the reason of avoiding reductionism in dealing with the analytical dimensions of the process of globalization, Robertson points to the independent dynamics of global culture and argues for paying particular attention to cultural aspects of globalization; however, he does so without resorting to idealist reductionism. Specifically, his argument is that cultural pluralism is itself a constitutive feature of the modern world-system and that conceptions of the world-system - viewed as symbolic responses to globalization - are themselves important factors in determining the trajectories of that very process⁴⁷. Finally, regarding the 'problem of global order', Robertson argues that varying responses to globalization influence the very process itself, so that its direction and outcome (and hence the shape of the global system itself) are still very much "up for grabs".

'Voluntaristic' World-System Theory: The Particular-Universal Relationship

Of considerable importance to Robertson's approach to globalization is the analytical consideration of the *particular-universal relationship*. Central to the latter is the existence of the processes of *universalization of particularism*, on the one hand, and *particularization of universalism*, on the other. In Robertson's view (1992b), it is the constant interaction between the two that is constitutive of the particular-universal relationship as such.

But what brings about these two processes? According to Robertson (1991), it is the experience of *compression of the world* and the need for *global reality construction* as two fundamental elements of the process of globalization that are of the central importance to the existence of the processes of universalization of particularism and particularization of universalism and, thus, of the particular-universal relationship as such. Within the framework of Robertson's approach to globalization, the compression of the world refers to ever increasing constraint placed upon

⁴⁶ Implicit herein is Robertson's observation that social theory in the broadest sense needs to reorient itself from being concerned with the study of society in its unitary conception to the study of the world-as-a-whole (Robertson 1990a).

⁴⁷ On this point Robertson (1992b: 70) observes that "[a] multidimensional (and non-idealist) view of globalization implies that a viable global order does require the actual generalization of the legitimacy of diversity and of contending presuppositions".

multitude of groups and individuals to face each other in an "open ensemble of interlocutors and partners", while global reality construction has to do with the ideational and pragmatic aspects of interaction and communication between individual and collective actors on the global scene (Robertson 1991: 75). Expressed in terms of globalization's four elemental points of reference, the compression of the world and global reality construction are intimately connected to the four sets of interrelated change at work in the context of individual, national-societal, international, and overall human experiences, i.e., to individuals being increasingly subject to competing ethnic, cultural, and religious reference points; national societies being increasingly exposed internally to problems of heterogeneity and diversity and, at the same time, experiencing both internal and external pressure to reconstruct their collective identities along pluralistic lines; the system of international relations being ever more fluid and 'multipolar'; and the idea of humankind as a species being subject to contested thematization and scrutiny (Robertson 1990b: 57). Thus, in their most fundamental respects the compression of the world and global reality construction have to do with the *problem of identity and place* of individual, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind in the context of the global-human circumstance. Correspondingly, universalization of particularism and particularization of universalism are the two "consequences" of the world-compression and global reality construction. At the same time, they are the two constituents of the particular-global relationship. In the case of the former, this refers to an acknowledgment (and an expectation) of the formulation and global "institutionalization" of particularistic social identities against the background of expectations concerning basic similarities in the constitutional structures of each of the four reference points. In the case of the latter, it refers to a means of providing for individual, societal, international, and global human sociopolitical concreteness (in various formal and informal respects) to the global-human circumstance as such. Put differently (and simply), the universalization of particularism "involves...the idea that there is no limit to particularity, to uniqueness, and thus to difference and otherness", while the particularization of universalism "involves the idea of the universal being given global-human concreteness" (Robertson 1991: 77, 76).

In essence, then, the particular-universal relationship, substantiated through the simultaneously operating (and interacting) processes of universalization of particularism and particularization of universalism, has to do with the "struggle" by individuals, national societies, international system of societies, and humankind, as the four referential categories of the global field, for both assimilation into the universal and for adhering to the particular; in other words, for holding on to individual particularity while

simultaneously striving for global universality⁴⁸. According to Robertson, the particular-universal relationship is the basic feature of global-human condition and (in the context of more recent history) something like global cultural form, a major *axis of the structuration* of the world-as-a-whole. As he observes

the two [that is, the particular and the universal] have become tied together as part of a globewide cultural nexus - united in terms of the universality of the experience and, increasingly, *the expectation* of particularity, on the one hand, and the experience and, increasingly, *the expectation* of universality, on the other (Robertson 1991: 76, original emphasis).

Correspondingly, the tension between the particular and the universal in the context of the particular-universal relationship has to do with the friction between the specific and the communal, on the one hand, and the general and the impersonal, on the other - or (as Robertson, following Appadurai, would have it) "the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization" (Robertson 1991: 77).

Thus, in Robertson's view, globalization in its 'contemporary phase' can ultimately be thought of as a form of institutionalization of the particular-universal relationship through "the interpenetrating processes of societalization⁴⁹, individualization, the consolidation of the international system of societies, and the concretization of the sense of human kind" (Robertson 1991: 80), and the tension arising from this.

The Global Field as a Process of Symbolic Constructions

As we have seen, Robertson's approach to globalization takes its departure from empirical generalizations concerning the rapidly increasing compression of the entire world into a single, global field and proceeds toward considering conceptual ideas about the ways in which the world-as-a-whole should be 'mapped' in broadly sociological terms. Obviously, both strands of elaboration are of importance for dealing with the phenomenon of globalization, for, as Robertson himself suggests,

⁴⁸ I believe that a good example of the particular-universal relationship would be the phenomenon of contemporary nationalism. In particular, I am thinking of the Balkans and the nation-states that emerged after the disintegration of now former Yugoslavia. In their attempt to assert their particular national(istic) identities all of them are very keen on emphasizing their unique national features that, supposedly, make them distinct from all other (and especially neighboring) countries. Yet in their attempt to hop on the EC bandwagon all of them are rather "stout" in pointing to commonalities with the rest of Europe that, of course, make them "natural partners" in the EC association.

⁴⁹ By 'societization' Robertson means the commitment to the idea of the national society.

[g]lobalization does not simply refer to the objectiveness of increasing interconnectedness. It also refers to cultural and subjective matters. In very simple terms, we are talking about issues surrounding the idea of the world being 'for-itself'. The world is not literally 'for-itself' but the problem of being 'for-itself' has become increasingly significant, in particular because of the thematization of humankind in number of respects. In that respect global consciousness has partly to do with the world as an 'imagined community' (Robertson 1992b: 183).

What the notion of the *problem of being 'for-itself'* (or, in somewhat different terms, of *global consciousness*) refers to is the ways in which the world-as-a-whole is conceived to be possible. In other words, it refers to the ways of defining global situation (themselves predicated upon the existence of what Robertson terms as *globality* - that is, "the circumstance of extensive awareness of the world as a whole, including the species aspect of the latter" (Robertson 1992b: 78)) undertaken in a circumstance of heightened civilizational, regional, societal, and individual encounters. Thus, ultimately, the process of global-field symbolic construction (which is but another way of referring to conceptualizing the world-as-a-whole) has to do with cultural interpretations of the global-human circumstance, concretized as global actors' (pre)suppositions about what the world-as-a-whole is and what it ought to be.

For Robertson (1991), cultural interpretations of the global-human circumstance conceptualized within the framework of globalization's four points of reference are by no means homogenous. Not only do they differ with respect to their "contents", but they are also different when it comes to their "prominence" on the global scene. Thus, he makes a distinction between relatively dominant and alternative presuppositions concerning the structure and organization of the world-as-a-whole, both of which influence the trajectories of the process of globalization (Robertson 1985: 109).

In Robertson's view, given the scope and complexity of the contemporary global-human circumstance, it is not possible to have a situation where there could be a single "correct" set of presuppositions about the world-as-a-whole. He bases his claim on several grounds (Robertson 1985: 109-112): First, he argues that, in the context of considering differential cultural interpretations of the modern global circumstance, it is extremely doubtful whether it could be shown that a single set of presuppositions has in fact sustained the empirical operation of the expanding world-systems. In particular, his argument is based upon the proposition that expansion of the world-system in both economic and political terms has not involved, in a symmetrical relationship, the expansion of world culture to the point that all major actors on the global scene could be thought of as sharing the same presuppositions. Second, Robertson argues that the modern global system

facilitates the proliferation of *competing* societal (and other) definitions of the global situation. These, he observes, could possibly be seen as the cultural analogues to mercantilist strategies in the economic sphere, in the sense that a world-system containing relatively independent politically organized units stimulates - or even 'requires' - the development of *culturally protectionist strategies* as a means of attempting to 'close' a national culture to (what is often perceived as 'fundamentalist') external influences and claims in the global arena. Robertson grounds his observation in the premise that the development of the modern state entails the 'nationalization' of culture, that is, that the modern state is impossible without its becoming heavily involved in the production of a 'high' culture which is necessary not merely in order for the state to undertake its internal-administrative affairs, but also to deal with its 'identity problems'. Finally, Robertson argues that the global scene is highly pluralistic in the sense that there is a proliferation of civilizational, continental, regional, societal, and other definitions of the global-human condition, as well as considerable variety regarding identities formed in those respects without direct reference to the global situation. Thus, he points to the fact that "a multidimensional⁵⁰ (non-idealist) version of globalization implies that a viable world order does require the actual generalisation of the legitimacy of diversity and of contending presuppositions" (Robertson 1985: 111).

Ultimately then, the conceptualization of the global field through the process of symbolic constructions involves, in Robertson's view, the creation of differing images of the global condition that both construct and challenge structural aspects of the global-human circumstance.

The Global Field: Differing Images of World Ordering

To what extent can the pluralistic cultural interpretation of the global-human condition be envisioned as somewhat more orderly expression? According to Robertson, the possibility of that is not in question. For him, the pluralism of symbolic constructions of the global field is concretized in four different conceptions of the structuration of the world, each of which is grounded in ideas about world ordering, on the one hand, and possibilities for overcoming the 'dangers' of globalization, on the other. In Robertson's view, all four conceptions represent *globe-oriented perspectives* in that each of them "espouses as a central aspect of its message or policy a concern with the patterning of the entire world" (Robertson 1992b: 79).

The four-fold schema of 'pluralistic imagery' offered by Robertson (1992a: 78-83) revolves around the concepts of *Global Gemeinschaft* and *Global*

⁵⁰ Elsewhere (1992b:26-77) Robertson refers to multidimensionality as "a mode of grasping the basics of...the global-human condition, basics which at the one and the same time take into account the most general features of *life* in relatively recent history and the growing concern with the connections between different conceptions thereof" (original emphasis).

Gesellschaft, each of which is characterized by two variants that are, in turn, concretely expressed in two distinct but interrelated expressions (the *centralized* and the *decentralized* for *Global Gemeinschaft* and the *symmetrical* and the *asymmetrical* for *Global Gesellschaft*, respectively). As well, each of the four images of world ordering in both of its versions corresponds to one of the four referential points of the global-human circumstance (see table 4-1).

Thus, within the context of *Global Gemeinschaft* 1 as the first image of the structuration of the world, *the world is perceived as being ordered only in the form of a series of relatively closed societal communities*. The *symmetrical* version of this image of world ordering sees societal communities as relatively equal to each other in terms of the worth of their cultural traditions, their institutions, and the kinds of individuals produced in them. The *asymmetrical* version, on the other hand, regards one or a small number of societal communities as necessarily being more important than others as judged by the worth of their cultural traditions, their institutions, and the kinds of individuals produced in them. As Robertson observes (1992b: 78, original emphasis),

[i]n the context of the late twentieth-century world, both versions tend to seize upon the idea that *individuals* can only live satisfactory lives in clearly bounded societal communities. This does *not* mean, however, that this image emphasizes individualism or individuality. Rather, it involves a particular concern with the problem of the 'homelessness' of individuals confronting the 'dangers' of globalization.

The second variant of the pluralistic cultural interpretation of the global-human circumstance, *Global Gemeinschaft* 2, postulates that *the world should and can be ordered only in terms of a fully globewide community per se*, in the context of which contemporary world is perceived as almost literally a 'global village'. From this perspective (Robertson 1992b: 79), the *centralized* version of this image of world order "insists that there must be a globewide Durkheimian 'conscience collective', while the *decentralized* version maintains that a global community is possible on a much more pluralistic basis" (original emphasis). Both versions, however, stress *humankind* as central in the process of structuring of the world-as-a-whole. In this context, they both suggest that the 'dangers' of globalization are to be overcome by commitment to the communal unity of the human species.

In the view of the *Global Gesellschaft* 1 as the third image of world ordering, *the world should and can be ordered as a series of open societies, with considerable sociocultural exchange among them*. The *symmetrical* version of this image considers all societies as politically equal and of reciprocally beneficial material and cultural significance. The *asymmetrical* version entails the view that there must be dominant or hegemonic societies which play strategically significant roles in sustaining the world and, indeed, that they are the

Table 4-1: Differing Images of World Ordering

ROBERTSON'S TAXONOMY OF THE STRUCTURATION OF THE WORLD AS A GLOBAL FIELD			
<i>Global Gemeinschaft</i>		<i>Global Gesellschaft</i>	
<i>Global Gemeinschaft</i> 1	<i>Global Gemeinschaft</i> 2	<i>Global Gesellschaft</i> 1	<i>Global Gesellschaft</i> 2
(individual as the primary point of reference)	(humankind as the primary point of reference)	(national society as the primary point of reference)	(world system of national societies as the primary point of reference)
The world perceived as being ordered only in the form of a series of relatively closed societal communities	The world perceived as being ordered only in terms of a fully globewide community per se	The world perceived as being ordered only in terms of a series of open societies, with considerable sociocultural exchange among them	The world perceived as being ordered on the basis of formal, planned world organization
SYMMETRICAL VERSION	CENTRALIZED VERSION	SYMMETRICAL VERSION	CENTRALIZED VERSION
Societal communities relatively equal to each other in terms of the worth of their cultural traditions, their institutions, and the kind of individuals produced in them	Global community built on 'conscience collective'	All societies considered politically equal and of reciprocally beneficial material and cultural significance	Commitment to a strong supra-national polity (i.e. the world government)
ASYMMETRICAL VERSION	DECENTRALIZED VERSION	ASYMMETRICAL VERSION	DECENTRALIZED VERSION
Small number of societal communities regarded as necessarily being more important than others, as judged by the worth of their cultural tradition, their institutions, and the kind of individuals produced in them	Global community built on a pluralistic basis	Some societies considered as being dominant and hegemonic, and thus of crucial importance for animating and sustaining the world order	Commitment to a federation at the global level

primary mechanism of world order. In both cases *national societies* are regarded as necessarily constitutive of the central feature of the modern global circumstance; for both versions, the 'dangers' of globalization are to be confronted by extensive societal collaboration or by a hierarchical pattern of inter-societal relationships.

Finally, *Global Gesellschaft 2* conceives of *the world as being ordered on the basis of formal, planned world organization*. Thus, the *centralized* version of this image is committed to a strong supra-national polity, while the *decentralized* form advocates something like a federation at the global level. Both variants take *the world-system of societies* as constituting the major unavoidable dimension of contemporary global-human condition. As well, both of them share the view that the only effective way of dealing with the 'dangers' of globalization is by systematic organization of the processes involved.

Within the framework of Robertson's four-fold distinction of the differing images of world ordering, two concepts stand out as being central to the overall schema: on the one hand, the *Global Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* distinction, and, on the other, the notion of 'dangers' (or problems) of globalization. Why the distinction? In Robertson's view (1991), the usage of the notions of *Global Gemeinschaft* and *Global Gesellschaft* is useful as a way of "upgrading" Toennies' distinction between the particular and the universal values as a means of conceptualizing different modes of societal organization (and, as Durkheim would have it, different forms of social solidarity). Thus, within the context of the global (rather than societal) framework, the globalized variant of the *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* theme refers to the relationship between the particular and the communal elements of the global field (and values associated with them), on the one hand, and the universal and the impersonal elements (and values associated with them), on the other. Specifically, it refers to the relationship between *individuals* and *humankind* as the two particularistic elements of the world-as-a-whole, on the one hand, and *nationally constituted societies* and *the world system of societies* as the two universalistic elements, on the other. As developed by Robertson's model of differing images of world ordering, in the context of *Global Gemeinschaft 1* and *2* the structuration of the world is envisioned around the particularistic (or communal) values of societal and globewide communities in the context where individuals and humankind are seen as focal dimensions of the global-human circumstance; within the framework of *Global Gesellschaft 1* and *2* world ordering is seen as being congruent with the universalistic (or impersonal) values of a series of open societies and planned world organization where national societies and the world-system of societies are thought of as central to world ordering.

As to the 'dangers' of globalization, Robertson points to the two most important: the first one has to do with complexities related to the possibility of meaningful solidarity under conditions of differentiation, and the second

one with the problematic of individual identity in the face of an institutionally differentiated state-organized society (Robertson 1992a: 72). In somewhat different terms, the two are conceptualized as the problems of *commitment* and *complexity* (Turner in Lechner 1992: 316). As pointed out by Turner (Turner in Lechner 1992: 316-17), the two problems are predicated upon the workings of *differentiation*, *relativization*, and *socialization* as the three processes "inherent" in the process of globalization as such. The first one (termed by Turner as a *problem of global order*) is related to the notions of *polyethnicity* and *multiculturalism* in the global scene. In this context, as societies become more differentiated by global forces, there emerges a dramatic increase in the problems of political and cultural coherence. The second one (denoted by Turner as a *problem of institutionalization of doubt*) refers to the process of *decontextualization* of cultures and a corresponding emphasis on reflexivity as a means of 'relativizing all worlds'. Finally, the third one (referred to by Turner as a *problem of the relativization of citizenly involvement*) has to do with the notion of challenging the autonomy and sovereignty of nation-states and thereby relativizing conventional conceptions and conditions of citizens' participation and motivation.

Thus, it is the problems of complexity and commitment as the resultants of the processes of differentiation, relativization, and socialization that are central to the formulation of the differential modes of world ordering, themselves concretized in an adherence to either the particularistic or the universalistic values related to one of the globalization's four points of reference. For, in the final analysis, it is as an attempt to deal with the 'dangers' of globalization that the pluralistic cultural interpretations of the global field come into being and that the different images of the world's structuration - elaborated upon in Robertson's four-fold schema of differing images of world ordering - become operationalized and sustained.

Globalization in the Spatio-Temporal Dimension

As already pointed out, Robertson's approach to the phenomenon of globalization attempts to deal with the process as such in both its cultural and historical (that is, spatio-temporal) dimension (with, however, emphasis being placed upon the former). Thus, apart from focusing on symbolic responses to globalization, concretely expressed as pluralistic cultural interpretation of the global-human circumstance, Robertson also considers historically specific occurrences that have brought to life the global field's four points of reference and contributed to the movement of the world toward unicity, toward its transformation in a place with global properties.

The most detailed outline of globalization in the spatio-temporal dimension put forward by Robertson is offered in the form of what he denotes as a *minimal phase model of globalization*. This five-stage model, where each phase is accorded corresponding temporal, spatial and substantive

properties, indicates "the major constraining tendency which have been operating in relatively recent history as far as world order and the compression of the world in our time are concerned" (Robertson 1990a: 25). Thus, delineated in skeletal terms, Robertson's 'spatio-temporal skeleton' of globalization looks as follows (Robertson 1990a: 26-27):

1. The germinal phase (lasting in Europe from the early fifteenth until the mid-eighteenth century)

Characterized by:

- Incipient growth of national communities and downplaying of the medieval 'transnational' system;
- Accentuation of concepts of the individual and of ideas about humanity;
- Heliocentric theory of the world and beginning of modern geography;
- Spread of Gregorian calendar.

2. The incipient phase (lasting -mainly in Europe - from the mid-eighteenth century until the 1870s)

Characterized by:

- Sharp shift towards the idea of the homogenous, unitary state;
- Crystallization of conceptions of formalized international relations, of standardized citizenly individuals and a more concrete conception of humankind;
- Sharp increases in conventions and agencies concerned with international and transnational regulation and communication;
- Beginning of the problem of 'admission' of neo-European states to 'international society';
- Themmatization of the nationalism-internationalism issue.

3. The take-off phase (lasting from the 1870s until the mid-1920s)

Characterized by:

- Increasingly global conceptions as to the 'correct outline' of an 'acceptable' national society;
- Themmatization of ideas concerning national and personal identities;
- Inclusion of some non-European societies in 'international society';
- International formalization and attempted implementation of ideas about humanity;
- Very sharp increase in number and speed of global forms of communication;
- Rise of ecumenical movements;
- Development of global competitions;

- Implementation of World Time and near-global adoption of Gregorian calendar
- The First World War
- The League of Nations.

4. The struggle-for-hegemony phase (lasting from the early 1920s to the mid-1960s)

Characterized by:

- Disputes and wars about the fragile terms of the globalization process established by the end of the take-off period;
- Globewide international conflicts concerning forms of life;
- Nature of and prospects for humanity sharply focused by the Holocaust and atomic bomb;
- The United Nations.

5. The uncertainty phase (beginning in the 1960s and displaying crisis tendencies in the early 1990s)

Characterized by:

- Inclusion of Third World and heightening of global consciousness in the late 1960s;
- the moon landing;
- Accentuation of 'post-materialist' values;
- The end of Cold War and spread of nuclear weapons;
- The great increase in number of global institutions and movements;
- Societies increasingly facing problems of multiculturalism and polyethnicity;
- Conceptions of individuals being rendered more complex by gender, ethnic and racial considerations;
- Civil rights;
- End of bipolarity - more fluid international system;
- Greatly enhanced concern with humankind as a species-community;
- Interest in world civil society and world citizenship;
- Consolidation of global media system.

Why the early 15th c. Europe as the beginning of the spatio-temporal path of globalization? According to Robertson, it was at this historical juncture (that is, during the period of the decline of feudalism in Europe) that the process of globalization began to take shape. In other words, it was then that the four referential points of the global field had been framed. As he observes,

[d]uring that period there was an acceleration in the early shaping of the nationally organized society; the mounting thematization of the (primarily male) individual; the enhancement of the system of inter-state relations; and the beginnings of modern ideas of humanity, particularly in philosophy and in early international law (Robertson 1992b: 182).

After this initial framing, each of the four points of reference went through a series of changes and transformations; each of them, advancing through the stages delineated by Robertson, became a more definite aspect of the global field. Obviously, this process of "concretizing" individual, national societies, the international system of societies, and humankind did not proceed in an even fashion: at certain stages, some of the components gained in prominence while others, as it were, lagged behind. During the take-off phase, however, the four components were accorded more symmetrical emphasis, and it was this "symmetricity" that, in Robertson's view, provided grounds for "launching" globalization as a full-blown economic, political, social, and cultural expression of contemporary world.

According to Robertson, apart from the purpose of delineating the spatio-temporal path of globalization, the five-stage model offered is employed as a means of conveying his main point regarding the nature and logic of the process. As he states, after 'mapping' the global condition,

my main point is that there is a general autonomy and 'logic' to the globalization process - which operates in *relative* independence of strictly societal and other more conventionally studied sociocultural processes. The global system is not an outcome of processes of basically intra-societal origin...or even of the development of the inter state system. Its making has been much more complex and culturally rich than that (Robertson 1990a: 27-28, original emphasis).

Roland Robertson's 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: A Summary

Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory is an attempt to deal with globalization in its conceptual meaning. In the context of his theorizing, thus, the term globalization is used to refer to the process by which the world has become a single place with systematic properties, or, somewhat more specifically, to denote a particular series of developments concerning the concrete structuration of the world-as-a-whole. Of central importance to Robertson's approach is the recognition that dealing with globalization requires an understanding that the process as such proceeds not along the lines of societal and inter-societal developments, but rather in terms of conceptualizing and operatively constructing globalization's four points of

reference (individual, national society, the international system of societies, and humankind) and problematizing the relationship among them. Hence, his 'voluntaristic' world-system theory is necessarily multidimensional in that it ranges across different levels of analysis in order to deal with the four referential points in an interactive, rather than comparative, fashion.

The particularities of Robertson's approach to globalization are intimately connected with his dictum that the proper understanding of globalization requires its treatment in both cultural and spatio-temporal (that is, historical) dimensions. Broadly, the former refers to the symbolic points of reference along which the structuration of the world takes shape, while the former has to do with historically specific occurrences that are instrumental in the process of the inception, operationalization, and perpetuation of globalization as a world-historical process.

Of central importance for Robertson's dealing with the cultural dimension of globalization is his analysis of the particular-universal relationship which, in his view, constitutes the global cultural form, the main axis of the structuration of the world-as-a-whole. The resultant of the processes of universalization of particularism and particularization of universalism, and the interaction between the two, the particular-universal relationship stands for an interactional and relational association of individuals, national societies, the international system of society, and humankind as they attempt to come to terms with the problem of identity and place in the context of the experience of world-compression and the need for global reality construction.

According to Robertson, coming to terms with the problem of identity and place within the purview of the global field necessarily involves constructing cultural interpretations of the global-human circumstance - that is, conceptualizing the ways in which the world-as-a-whole is 'structurally' ordered. In his view, the images of world ordering differ in their fundamental categories and their 'prominence' on the global scene to the point that it is possible to talk about competing, as well as relatively dominant and alternative, definitions of the global situation. As a way of dealing with these differential projections of the structuration of the world Robertson offers a four-fold Global Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft typology in the context of which world ordering is categorized according to the adherence to the particularistic or the universalistic values centered around one of globalization's four points of reference. Ultimately, the pluralistic cultural interpretations of the global-human circumstance are different expressions of an attempt to conceive of a means of dealing with the 'dangers' of globalization, themselves perceived as the problems of complexity and commitment resulting from the processes of differentiation, relativization, and socialization.

The second aspect of Robertson's voluntaristic world-system theory, the treatment of globalization in its spatio-temporal dimension, is offered in

the form of an elaboration of a five-stage historical path of globalization. As observed by Robertson, aside from presenting a schematical account of historically specific occurrences that make for the conceptualization of globalization's four reference points, thus providing grounds for its shaping as a world-historical process, the purpose of the five-stage outline is to convey his main point regarding the nature and 'logic' of globalization - namely, that it is a process that proceeds in relative autonomy from, and independence of, societal and societally-based developments. As well, its making and operation involve both the structuration of the world along the lines of simultaneously subsocietal, societal, intersocietal, and intrasocietal frames of reference and the differential cultural interpretations of it.

To conclude, Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world-system theory stresses the irreducible significance of identities, intersubjective consciousness, the normative, and the symbolic, all of which are seen as key features in providing individual and collective 'definition(s) of the situation' for various global actors. Its premise is that these conditions under which identities, intersubjective consciousness, the normative, and the symbolic effect changes at different levels of 'global arrangement' are themselves impacted by changes in the latter, so as to produce new 'definitions of the situation' and new levers for change. This claim constitutes the core of Robertson's kind of theorizing, in the context of which emphasis of *sociocultural 'logic'* of globalization is seen as being of central importance in dealing with the principal categories, aspects, and manifestations of globalization process.

Chapter Five



ON IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN AND ROLAND ROBERTSON, COMPARATIVELY AND METATHEORETICALLY: A Comparative and Metatheoretical Analysis of World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World-System Theory

On the Course of Comparative and Metatheoretical Analysis

THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE NEED for reorienting sociology towards the direction of the global is related crucially to the possibility of offering directional guidelines for the course of sociology's respecification along the lines of its congruency with the demand for analytical and conceptual treatment of social life as manifested globally. As elaborated upon in Chapters Three and Four, the guidelines for the analytical and conceptual "retooling" of the discipline are to be found within the frameworks of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory which, as the two attempts to come to terms with globalization in its analytical and substantive dimensions, suggests fruitful analytico-theoretical grounds for shifting sociology away from its established and, by implication, dominant mode of the nation-state-based consideration of social life in all of its aspects. They do so by breaking away with positing the centrality of the nation-state (or, more generally, society) as the fundamental and preeminent unit of analysis of social life and introducing the notion of world system (or world-system) as an alternative socio-historical entity of global scope that, on the one hand, provides for the possibility of getting at, both analytically and theoretically, the specifics of social life as manifested globally and, on the other, makes mandatory the (re)invention, as it were, of the analytical and conceptual apparatus of the sociological discipline.

In the previous two chapters we elaborated upon the empirical claims of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory in an attempt to make evident the possible guidelines for the reorientation of sociology towards the demand for taking in the global. In

Chapter Five the argument for the importance of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory in the task of respecifying sociology along the lines of the global shell be furthered by making claim for the relative complementarity of the two approaches and, on the basis of their complementarity, the possibility of combining the two into a fruitful research practice with the global as its preeminent analytical and theoretical investigative interest. The relative complementarity of world systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory will be established by means of metatheoretical consideration of the two, geared towards setting out their *ontological, epistemological, action, and explanation* presuppositions in a comparative manner; the possibility for combining the two into a fruitful research practice will be dealt with by elaborating upon their respective *investigative interests, methodological strategies, empirical procedures, and practical methodological grounds* as four distinctive 'component-parts' of a research strategy. Both in the case of a discussion of the metatheoretical categories and a consideration of the four elements of research strategy in general the specifics of the treatment of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory will be informed by the general consideration of the respective categories in question.

On Ontology, Epistemology, Action and Explanation as the Forms of Metatheory, Rudimentarily

In most general terms⁵¹, *metatheory* can be thought of as a theory about theory, or as "a form of rational inquiry of argumentation concerned with the theory of theory or theory about theory" (Morrow 1992: 3). As such, metatheory can be regarded as a language of presuppositions for it deals with philosophical and methodological assumptions of particular theoretical approach, in the context of which an analysis of metatheoretical categories of any kind of theoretical framework exacts discussing a theory about given theoretical framework, or, to put it somewhat differently, the theoretical 'underpinnings' of the theoretical orientation under consideration. To talk about metatheory thus is to talk about one of the three forms of theoretical language (the other two being *empirical* and *normative theory*⁵²), a language of

⁵¹ Detailed treatment of metatheory and its categorical delineations cannot be proffered here. The aim and scope of the project allow for but an elementary introduction of the metatheoretical categories, the clarification of which is taken as the jumping off point for the metatheoretical treatment of Wallerstein's world systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory. For more elaborate discussion on metatheory see Morrow 1992 and 1994 (especially Chapter Two), or Guba and Lincoln 1994.

⁵² With regards to the three forms of theoretical language Morrow (1992: 1) observes that "every form of scientific text is composed of forms of language which can be characterized as different types of sentences. The construction of social scientific knowledge is thus the end-product of the interplay of these different modes of analysis."

presuppositions, which deals with philosophical and methodological assumptions of particular theoretical approach (Morrow 1992).

Now metatheory, as a form of presuppositional philosophical and methodological claim-making, concerns itself with four types of philosophical and methodological assumptions: *ontology*, *epistemology*, *action*, and *explanation*. Broadly, *ontology* has to do with making assumptions about the nature of things - that is, about different forms of 'reality' and different forms of 'being'. The most fundamental and most important ontological distinction with respect to these two categories is that of 'subject' (or 'agency') as opposed to 'object' (or 'structure'). *Epistemology*, on the other hand, has to do with making assumptions about what constitutes scientific knowledge. As such, epistemology is concerned with elucidating the criteria by which scientific knowledge (or science) can be demarcated from non-scientific knowledge (or pseudo-science). The most fundamental and most important epistemological distinction with respect to the 'demarcation criteria' is that of 'positivism' as opposed to 'anti-positivism' - the former referring to the mode(l) of social scientific inquiry that, to a substantive degree, emulates the hypothetico-deductive mode(l) of inquiry operating within the framework of the natural sciences; the latter denoting an 'alternative' mode(l) of social scientific inquiry, set against the one proffered by the natural sciences. *Action*, as a type of metatheoretical language, has to do with an "account" of the extent to which interactions among variety of social actors are either constrained by, or freed from the constraint of, 'overarching' social structure. Here, the most important and most fundamental distinction is that of 'determinism' as opposed to 'voluntarism'. Finally, *explanation*, as a type of metatheoretical language, has to do with providing for different forms of understanding of phenomena under investigation. The most important and most fundamental distinction with regards to different forms of explanation is that of 'nomothetic' as opposed to 'ideographic' - the former referring to generalized, law-like forms of explanatory discourse; the latter implying particularized, interpretative forms of explanatory strategy.

The 'metatheoretical skeleton' outlined above is to be regarded as a 'structural framework' within which an analysis of analytical and theoretical presuppositions of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory is to be undertaken. As such, it is a necessary point of departure in an attempt to get at the metatheoretical specifics of the two approaches and thus set the ground for claiming the possibility of combining the two into a fruitful research practice that has the global as its preeminent analytical and theoretical investigative interest.

World-Systems Analysis: Metatheoretical Presuppositions

The habitual and for the most part prevalent definitional positioning of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis methodology is premised upon well

understood concepts of realist ontology and positivist epistemology, as well as to-them-corresponding notions of deterministic form of action and nomothetic type of explanation. Within the context of this kind of 'metatheoretical delineation' world-systems analysis is often thought of as but a variant of hypothetico-deductive mode(l) of social scientific inquiry whose objective is to account for the 'essence' of its unit of analysis - the capitalist world-economy (or, the modern world-system) - by means of 'discovering' universal mechanisms of its functioning. This is possible because the world-system is an in- and for-itself 'objectively' existing 'totality' whose structure and 'mode of operation' - aside from determining actions of the world-system's agency - provide for the possibility of formulating general form of explanatory discourse.

How correct is the above conceptualization of the metatheoretical presuppositions of world-systems analysis? In essence, it is very much erroneous. As it will be demonstrated in the remainder of the section, not only it is based on rather inadequate reading of Wallerstein and his work, but (and which is even more troublesome) it is a result of, on the one hand, serious misapprehension and, on the other (and consequently), almost complete inversion of the basic categories of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis.⁵³ These are two crucial sources of confusion when it comes to grasping world-systems analysis metatheoretically.

World-Systems Analysis: Ontology

As Wallerstein himself has repeatedly stated in his numerous writings, the object of his analysis is the capitalist world-economy. One of its fundamental (but, unfortunately, often overlooked) features is that it is a historical system characterized by both institutional structural properties and historically constituted operative processes⁵⁴. The two are intrinsically related and it is the interaction between them that *constitutes* capitalist world-economy as such. Thus, the latter - Wallerstein's unit of analysis - is not an entity that, irrespectively of its structural properties and processes, exists 'objectively' in- and for-itself; rather, it is a *historically formed structure* extant (and *constructed*) *precisely because* of the existence of its institutional structural properties and its historically constituted operative processes and the interaction between the two. Hence, the capitalist world-economy, analytically investigated by

⁵³ In what follows, I will try to formulate an 'alternative metatheoretical foundation' of world-systems analysis. Recognizing that an attempt for detailed elaboration would, in itself, require engaging in work whose volume would greatly exceed the scope and aim of the present project, the formulation of my understanding of the metatheoretical presuppositions of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is necessarily illustrative and, hence, 'inadequate'. Instrumental for conceptualizing my understanding of Wallerstein's metatheory was Robert L. Bach's "On the Holism of a World-Systems Perspective" (in *Processes of the World-System* (1980), edited by Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein).

⁵⁴ Chapters One and Two in Wallerstein's *The Politics of World-Economy* (1984a) offer analytical discussion about these two 'component-parts' of capitalist world-economy.

Wallerstein, corresponds to the notion of structure as put forth by Christopher Lloyd (1993: 48):

Structures have superhuman, non-phenomenal existence through time, even for centuries, and they are the context and object of events, actions, behavior, and thought. Structures can be conceived as the systems of social rules, roles, relations, and symbols in which events, actions, and thought occur and lives are lived. *But structures have to be reproduced continually in thought and through action and cannot exist apart from collective thought and behaviour* (emphasis added).

Thus, to postulate realism (in its traditional meaning) as being an ontological 'property' of world-systems analysis is to, in a way, misunderstand Wallerstein and his formulation of the capitalist world-economy. Yes, the later is a structure. However, it is also a *historically conceptualized* structure whose properties are neither merely the aggregate of institutional formations and processes that constitute them, nor independent of the structuring practices of their actors. These specific historical and structural elements of capitalist world-economy make world-systems analysis' ontological position that of a *historical and structural realism*, rather than merely (and only) realism.

World-Systems Analysis: Epistemology

The proper understanding of epistemological foundations of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is predicated upon further refinement of its central analytical concept - the capitalist world-economy. The latter is identified by Wallerstein as, on the one hand, a unique form of social-system organization and, on the other, a single system in which capitalism had grown. This characterization of the capitalist world-economy as both unique and single social system makes discovering its mechanisms by means of comparing it to "other" capitalist world economies impossible. Thus, given both its uniqueness and unicity, the only strategy for establishing (and knowing) the nature of the capitalist world-economy is by knowing and understanding its history. Concretely, this means tracing the history of the capitalist world-economy from the sixteenth century because, as we have seen it, it was at that historical juncture that, according to Wallerstein, the system had come into being, its rules had been established, and its orientation towards the global had taken its course.

Thus, the strategy of Wallerstein's inquiry is not premised upon hypothetico-deductive mode(l) of reasoning in the context of which pre-conceived general model serves as a basis for 'discovering' universal operative mechanisms. Rather, the focus is on the formation of the system itself through a set of processes singular in time and space. What is under investigation is *not* the structure, but the *processes*. Being constructed by the latter, the former is, as it were, an 'outcome' of inquiry.

It is rather obvious that this form of investigation is in many respects opposed to positivist epistemology in its familiar sense. Although the goal is to understand the structure (that is, the capitalist world-economy), its understanding is not possible by means of providing universal laws of history and development. What is required is an awareness of historical specificity, particularity, and fluidity of processes constitutive of the structure. Hence, the epistemological foundations of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis could be characterized as a form of *historical constructivism*⁵⁵.

World-Systems Analysis: Explanation

Denoting the epistemology of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis as historical constructivist has important implications for understanding the form of explanation offered. The best way of getting at it is by means of conceptualizing explanation as such as, on the one hand, *explanatory strategy*⁵⁶ and, on the other, *explanatory type*.

The so to speak 'immediate concern' of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is to explain and account for particular processes constitutive of the capitalist world-economy as a social and socio-historical structure. In order to do so, Wallerstein analyses each of the processes as being unique in its own right. However, understanding the particularities of each process is not an end in itself; the main goal is to understand and explain the ways in which the processes are interrelated and interact with one another, so as to be able to arrive at explanation of the capitalist world-economy as a particular form of socio-historical structure. Thus, the particular explanatory strategy underlying Wallerstein's task at hand can perhaps be best described as being *monographic*⁵⁷ - that is, comprising both ideographic and nomothetic modes of

⁵⁵ I am not certain if this term has prior existence, or if it is my "invention". What I mean by 'historical constructivism' is a form of epistemology that is, on the one hand, sensitive to seeing social processes in specific historical contexts and studying them with that notion in mind (hence 'historical'), and that, on the other, recognizes that these processes are constitutive of an overall - and larger - social structure whose understanding is possible only by means of it being constructed through knowing the processes that form it (hence 'constructivism'). Another way to explain 'historical constructivism' is to use an 'architectural metaphor', i.e. an architect conceives of the whole by means of composing it from the parts. In order to do so, s/he needs to know and understand the parts both as they function on their own and as they interact with one another. Thus, the whole is a construct resulting from the proper understanding and 'piecing' of the parts.

⁵⁶ By 'explanatory strategy' I mean a particular way (or 'method', or 'mechanism') which underlies given type of explanation and whose employment provides for formulating that explanation.

⁵⁷ What I mean by 'monographic' is the form of explanatory strategy that seeks to explain the unique whole (the capitalist world economy) through analyzing the particulars (given historically constituted processes) that constitute the whole as a specific social and socio-historical structure. The etymology of 'monographic', as employed in the context of monographic explanatory strategy, is congruent with the Greek words *monos*, meaning single, alone (and referring to the capitalist world economy as a unique and singular kind of historical world-system) and *graphikos*, meaning capable of painting, drawing, writing (and referring to the possibility of proffering an explanation - or, in the context of the word *graphikos*, 'representation' - of the 'monos' by means of apprehending its constitutive historical

interpretation whereby it commences with an attempt at understanding the particular and proceeds towards the goal of explaining the whole.

The types of explanation proffered by world-systems analysis can be characterized as being *structural*, *functional*, and *causal*. That is, the intention, within the framework of world-systems analysis, is to provide explanations that will account for the structure(s) of the processes constitutive of the capitalist world-economy, the function(s) they have in the process of both its formation and reproduction, and the ways in which they are causally (as well as structurally and functionally) related to both one another and - thus - to the constructed social structure.

World-Systems Analysis: Action

Finally, the concept of action⁵⁸ implied by Wallerstein's world-systems analysis is congruent with Marx's assertion about men making their history, however, not in the circumstances of their own choice. Put differently, social action takes place within the context of given social structure which has both constraining (or conditioning) and 'liberating' powers. The two necessarily impact social action which, as it were, 'fluctuates' between its determinist and voluntaristic mode. However, within the framework of particular political vision that world-systems analysis rests upon, possibly the best way of getting at Wallerstein's concept of social action is to denote it as a form of *praxis* - that is, a particular type of conscious action oriented toward transformation.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Metatheoretical Presuppositions

Differently from Wallerstein's world-systems analysis whose methodological and analytical dimensions have been subject to critical scrutiny and evaluation, Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory has not, as of yet, received much of evaluative critical attention (except in the form of occasional 'appreciative review' (see, for example, Lechner (ed.) 1992)). Partly, this is because Robertson put forth the tenets of his theory fairly recently, in 1985 (see Robertson and Lechner 1985a), and, subsequently, detailed it in a series of articles that, each in its own way, dealt with particular aspects of his position, never presenting it as a fully worked out 'programmatic treatise' (Even his book *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (1992b) is, for the most part, a collection of previously published papers on the subject of

processes). In this sense, monographic explanatory strategy can be thought of as being affinitive with *monograph*, understood as a treatise (that is, an explanatory discourse) on a single genus, species, or subject (that is, the capitalist world economy).

⁵⁸ As observed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (in Bach 1980: 289), within the theoretical framework of world-systems analysis social action is construed as taking place "at the level of a world-system as a whole - not 'society' in the abstract, but a definite 'world', a *spatio-temporal whole*" (original emphasis).

globalization. As such, it does not provide more systematic exposé on 'voluntaristic' world system theory but, rather, rehashes the previously dealt with dimensions of Robertson's position on globalization). Given the rather unique "brand" of Robertson's theorizing, the central categories of his theoretical approach, as well as the fundamental relations presented within the framework of his dealing with globalization, do not lend themselves to the type of intellectual and (meta)theoretical confusion, as in the case of Wallerstein's world-systems analysis. As well, given the absence of normative implications, they are also not conducive to any form of ideologically grounded critique (to which Wallerstein's world-systems analysis had been submitted from both the Left and the Right), except, perhaps, the one that considers the lack of normative component in 'voluntaristic' world system theory as crucially problematic and, thus, legitimately subject to 'critical' reservations. Thus, elaborating upon the metatheoretical presuppositions of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory is an undertaking of rather different a nature than the one of dealing with Wallerstein's world-systems analysis' metatheory: for, devoid of argumentative and metatheoretical component, it requires but an elucidation of the principal metatheoretical categories of Robertson's theoretical position that, once put forth, come to be subjects for subsequent critical scrutiny.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Ontology

As previously observed, ontology concerns itself with the problem(atic) of the nature of reality as encapsulated within the framework of particular theoretical (or, more broadly, philosophical) framework. Thus, the most fundamental question ontology poses is 'What is the nature of that which is tried to be explained?', or, in the context of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory, 'What is the nature of the unit of analysis under investigation?'. As detailed in Chapter Four, the unit of analysis of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory is *contemporary world system*. The sense in which Robertson employs the notion of contemporary world system, however, differs from Wallerstein's concept of world-system. Concretely, in the context of Robertson's approach, 'contemporary world system' is employed as an indication of, on the one hand, the relatively recent nature of the process of globalization as such (therefore 'contemporary') and, on the other, as a reference to global properties of the contemporary world (therefore 'world system'). For Robertson, the contemporary world system is an entity characterized by, and hence composed of, historically constituted both operative processes and structural properties. Thus, he regards the interconnectedness and interaction of the two as instrumental for bringing about the contemporary world system (or, in somewhat different terms, *global field*, or the *world-as-a-whole*) as an historically conceptualized 'resultant' of, on the one hand, the interplay, as it were, between institutional formations and

to-them-corresponding constitutive processes and, on the other, the structuring practices of their actors (or 'agency'). For Robertson, then, the nature of the contemporary world system as the unit of analysis under investigation within the framework of his 'voluntaristic' world system theory corresponds to the notion of a historically formed socio-historical structure whose fundamental structural properties are neither an aggregate of institutional formations and processes that constitute them, or independent of the structuring practices of the agency, but, quite contrarily, a consequent of the constant negotiation, as it were, between the two. This kind of understanding of the nature of the object of inquiry makes for the characterization of the ontological position of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world-system theory as a form of *historical and structural realism*.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Epistemology

Robertson's concern with the contemporary world system, or the *world-as-a-whole*, is very much rooted in understanding historically specific processes that have enabled the constitution of the global field's four points of reference and, thus, for the symbolic construction of the global field. In other words, his interest lies in understanding specific elements (or 'properties') of the global field but not, however, as an end onto itself. Rather, understanding the 'particulars' is in the function of, on the one hand, understanding the process of the conceptualization (or 'construction') of the 'whole' and, on the other, apprehending the processes of interconnectedness and interaction of the particulars within the framework of the formation of the larger 'whole'. Concretely, this means that Robertson is concerned with, on the one hand, concrete historical processes that have brought about the formation of *individuals, national societies, the system of national societies, and humankind* as the four points of reference and, concomitantly, 'building blocks' of the world-as-a-whole and, on the other, the ways in which these four referential points interrelate and interact in the process of symbolic construction and defining of the global field. Put differently, the concern lies in investigating a set of historically constituted processes, singular in time and space, that make (known) and account for the formation of the 'structural properties' of the larger, overall whole. Hence, the epistemological foundations of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world-system theory can be thought of as being a form of *historical constructivism*⁵⁹, where 'historical constructivism' denotes a way of getting epistemologically at the particulars of the contemporary world system and, thus, the contemporary world system.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Explanation

⁵⁹ For brief discussion on *historical constructivism* see page 120, footnote 55.

Regarded through the prism of, on the one hand, *explanatory strategy* (that is, a particular way (or 'method', or 'mechanism') that underlies given type of explanation and whose employment provides for formulating that explanation) and, on the other, *explanatory type* (that is, a particular form of explanation that aims at elucidating specific dimension of the object investigated), the metatheoretical category of explanation, as it pertains to 'voluntaristic' world system theory, can be delineated as, on the one hand, a *monographic* explanatory strategy and, on the other, involving *structural*, *functional*, and *causal* explanatory types.

The monographic explanatory strategy implies that the 'explanatory focus' of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world-system theory lies in getting at the specifics of the world-as-a-whole, as structured through (as already observed) a set of historically constituted processes singular in time and space. This, in turn, is made possible by analyzing each of the processes constitutive of the world-as-a-whole as being (and understanding them as being) unique in its own right, and proceeding towards an understanding and explanation of the ways in which these processes are interrelated and interact with one another so as to be able to arrive at an understanding and, thus, explanation of the contemporary world system as a particular form of socio-historical structure. Thus, the monographic explanatory strategy operating within the framework of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory stands for a type of explanatory strategy that effectively brings together both *ideographic* and *nomothetic* modes of explanation for it makes for, as it were, a 'symbiotic mergence' of an attempt at understanding the particular and the goal of explaining the whole (or the 'universal').⁶⁰

The structural, functional, and causal types of explanation at work within the framework of 'voluntaristic' world system theory suggest that the intention of Robertson's theoretical strategy is to provide the kinds of explanation that will account for all (in the case of the structural explanatory type) the 'structural properties' of the processes constitutive of the contemporary world system, (in the case of the functional explanatory type) the function(s) they have in the process(es) of both its constitution and reproduction, and (in the case of the causal explanatory type) the ways in which they are causally (as well as structurally and functionally) related to both one another and, concomitantly, to the constituted social structure as such. Ultimately, then, it is through these three explanatory types that 'voluntaristic' world system theory perceives the prospect of offering an adequate explanation of the contemporary world system as its object under investigation.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Action

⁶⁰ For additional observations on monographic explanatory strategy see page 120, footnote 57.

Marx's assertion about men making their history, however, not in the circumstances of their own choice can, generally be taken as congruent with Robertson's concept of action. For him social action takes place within the context of given social structure which, simultaneously, creates both 'structural constraints' and 'structural outlets' that effectively, to a various degree, pose, or dispose of, 'structural barriers' on social action and thus make it oscillate between the extremes of a determinist and a voluntaristic mode. However, for Robertson the course of social action is in no way determined, nor is there a possibility of predicting its direction: it is, as he would have it, very much 'up for grabs'. For Robertson, social action is a consequence of a multitude of socio-cultural tendencies whose attributes themselves are dependent upon the character of presently existing 'structural constraints' and 'historical contingencies'. Therefore, the type of action suggested within the framework of Robertson's 'voluntaristic' world system theory can, perhaps, be best denoted as *structurally constrained* or, in somewhat different terms, *historically contingent*.

On the Metatheory of World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory, Comparatively

In Chapter Four the claim was made that Wallerstein's world-systems analysis and Robertson's 'voluntaristic world system theory' were distinct, but complementary ways of dealing with globalization - the former offering analytical investigation of the global as evidenced substantively, the latter providing theoretical expression of its problematizing as manifested conceptually. To the end of substantiating this proposition, Chapters Three and Four detailed the empirical claims of the two approaches and, in the process, pointed to the principles underlying their respective claims as the possible grounds for reorienting sociology towards the direction of the global. In this context, the metatheoretical treatment of world-systems theory and 'voluntaristic' world systems analysis further refined the basis for the 'complementarity thesis' by making evident the similarities between the two not only at the level of empirical claims but also at the presuppositional level of their metatheories. It also set the grounds for extending the argument into the realm of research practice where world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory are seen in terms of the possibility of their combining into a fruitful research practice with the global as the preeminent analytical and theoretical investigative concern. Comparing the metatheoretical categories of epistemology, ontology, explanation, and action as they pertain to world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory, thus, had as its purpose the objective of making evident, to the greatest possible extent, the similarities (and thus the basis for complementarity) between the two at the level of the metatheoretical, as well

as setting the jumping off point, as it were, for exploring the possibility of their convergence into a productive research practice of the global.

Establishing complementarity between world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory at the level of the metatheoretical requires the comparative delineation of the specifics with respect to their particular ontological, epistemological, explanation, and action groundings. In other words, it means making apparent the extent to which the two approaches exhibit a degree of similarity with regards to the metatheoretical dimensions in question. As evidenced in the foregoing metatheoretical treatment of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory, that degree of similarity is quite great. Hence, considering the metatheory of the two approaches comparatively calls for but a summary-restatement of the similarities as observed at the levels of ontology, epistemology, explanation, and action.

The most obvious similarity between world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory is apparent with regards to their respective objects of inquiry or, more to the point, units of analysis. For both of them the focus of immediate analytical and theoretical concern lies in investigating *contemporary world system* (or *world-system*) as a particular socio-historical structural entity of the global scope. In other words, both approaches regard the contemporary world(-)system as their preeminent unit of analysis and, perhaps even more importantly, as the only legitimate socio-historical setting within which meaningful analysis and theorizing of social life in all of its aspects and dimensions can take place.

At the ontological level both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory conceive of the contemporary world(-)system as a historical system characterized by both institutional structural properties and historically constituted operative processes that, in constant interconnection and interplay with one another, effectively constitute the system as such. Thus, both approaches posit the contemporary world(-)system not as an entity that, irrespectively of its structural properties and processes, exists 'objectively' in- and for-itself but, rather as a historically formed social structure existent and being (re)constructed precisely because of the existence of, and the interaction between, its institutional structural properties and its historically constituted operative processes. This kind of understanding of contemporary world(-)system as the object of inquiry, or the unit of analysis, shared by world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory alike, makes for their ontological positions being, in both cases, denoted as a form of *historical and structural realism*.

At the epistemological level both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory seek to grasp the constitution of contemporary world(-)system recognizing that the system as such is a unique and singular form of socio-historical organization. The recognition of the

system's both uniqueness and unicity makes for both approaches to adopt the kind of epistemological orientation that would enable them to discern the constitution of contemporary world(-)system through understanding the *processes* of its formation, structuring, and reproduction through time and space - that is, through coming to terms, as it were, with its history. In this context, the epistemological focus of both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory lies in investigating specific elements (or 'properties') of contemporary world(-)system, as well as historically particular interconnections and interactions among them, so as to be to get at the specifics of the history of the system and, thus, at knowing the system as such. Thus both approaches construct the knowledge of contemporary world(-)system *via* historically informed investigation of the 'particulars', and the relations among them, that, as it were, account for the composition of the 'whole' to be known. By implication, then, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory exhibit *historical constructivism* as a particular form of their respective epistemological orientations.

At the level of explanation, discerned through the categories of explanatory strategy and explanatory type, both approaches are concerned with accounting for and explaining specific processes constitutive of contemporary world(-)system as a particular socio-historical structural entity. To that end, as previously observed, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory analyze each of the unique processes constitutive of contemporary world(-)system in an attempt to understand and explain the ways in which these are interrelated and interact with one another, so as to be able to understand and, thus, explain their object of inquiry - the contemporary world(-)system. Thus, the particular explanatory course underlying both approaches' task at hand - explaining their objects of inquiry - comprises both ideographic and nomothetic modes of explanation (for it commences with an attempt to understand the 'particular' and proceeds towards the goal of explaining the 'whole') and merges them symbiotically into a *monographic* explanatory strategy. Within the framework of the monographic explanatory strategy both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory offer three types of explanation: *structural*, *functional*, and *causal*. That is, both of them attempt to explain the structure(s) of historical processes constitutive of contemporary world(-)system; the function(s) they have in the course of its formation, structuration, and reproduction; and the ways in which they relate causally, as well as structurally and functionally, to both one another and to the systemic structure as such.

Finally, at the level of action world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory, although exhibiting a degree of similarity, differ in one fundamental respect - namely, the element of, so to speak, 'intentionality of action'. The similarity of the two approaches is evidenced in the fact that, for

both of them, the concept of action is, in general terms, made congruent with Marx's assertion about men making their history, however, not under circumstances chosen by themselves. In other words, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory see social action as taking place within the framework of given social structure which, offering simultaneously both 'structural constraints' and 'structural outlets', makes action oscillate between the extremes of its determinist and voluntaristic moments. Where the two differ in their concepts of action, however, is on the point of presence or absence of the element of intentionality of social action. The particular political vision that world-systems analysis rests upon (namely, a vision of alternative mode of world-wide organization, predicated upon utopian formulation of the necessity for the better) renders its concept of social action a form of *praxis* - that is, a particular type of conscious action oriented toward transformation. In contrast, not being grounded in any kind of political vision, 'voluntaristic' world system theory makes no claim to any form of intentionality of social action - that is, to the presence of the element of transformative orientation: hence, rather than conceiving of social action as a form of *praxis*, it espouses the form of action that can best be denoted as *structurally constrained* or, somewhat differently, *historically contingent*.

On Research Practice

To talk about research practice is necessarily to invoke different categories of methodological inquiry. Essentially, the latter can be thought of as particular levels of research-strategy formulation whose purpose is to elucidate conceptual basis of the research strategy. Thus, to look into the categories of methodological inquiry is to consider (1) investigative interests, (2) methodological strategies, (3) empirical procedures, and (4) practical methodological grounds as four distinctive 'component-parts' of an overall research strategy.

Investigative Interests

As argued by Morrow (1994: 211) *investigative interests* of a particular research strategy are inherently connected to their disciplinary practices. They not only offer 'demarcation criteria' for various social scientific disciplines but, rather, provide for the possibility of getting at their fundamental qualifying features (concealed in the usual qualitative-/quantitative-methods polarization). Essentially, these have to do with the difference between *transformative* and *reproductive* practices, in themselves instrumental for the normative foundations of particular research logic.

The first type of disciplinary practice - *world-historical social theorizing* - is characterized by the interest in comprehending and, in some cases, transforming the social and systemic relations that constitute society (Morrow 1994: 211). Its purpose is to provide for an account of "the underlying

principle of change at work in the emergence and disappearance of the numerous forms of human life and the countless welter of human activities and relationships" (Fay in Morrow 1994: 211). In contrast, *the social engineering model* - the second type of disciplinary practice - "is interested in empirical decisions in order to conceptually reproduce, rather than to reveal and transform, given social order. [Its purpose] is to inform state and, in some cases, corporate policy and programming" (Fay in Morrow 1994: 214).

Based on their particular investigative interests, both social theorizing and social engineering, as two distinct disciplinary practices, employ corresponding 'research logics' - *intensive explication* and *comparative generalization* (characteristic of the former), and *statistical causal modeling* (at work in the context of the latter) (Morrow 1994: 212-214). The first - intensive explication - incorporates a case-study focus on specific individual actors, mediations and systems (therefore 'intensive'), on the one hand, and understanding the underlying semantic, sociocultural, and structural relations that are constitutive of historically unique actors, mediations and systems (therefore 'explication'), on the other. The second - comparative generalization - consists of comparing the patterns disclosed through intensive explication across a finite set of historically comparable cases in order to make limited generalizations. The third - statistical causal modeling - is based on associations between standardized variables for a large number of cases, be they individuals, mediations, or systems.

Methodological Strategies

In their broadest sense, *methodological strategies* refer to specific strategies of theory construction. As such, they can be thought of as non-empirical (or, arguably, 'pre-empirical') methods - that is, the 'primordial' means of forming and formulating particular research strategy (or research program). Another way of getting at the concept of methodological strategies is by thinking of them as being particular types of *non-empirical argumentation*, *rhetorical strategies*, or *reflexive methods*⁶¹ (Morrow 1994: 232).

Particular methodological strategies characteristic of world-historical social theorizing type of disciplinary practice include different forms of argumentation: *metatheoretical*, *deconstructive* and *historicist*, *existential*, and *normative*.⁶² In essence, metatheoretical argumentation has to do with the

⁶¹ Thus Morrow (1994: 232) observes: "Broadly these [that is - different types of methodological strategies] can all be characterized as *reflexive methods* in the sense that they involve forms of cognition (which also involve emotional responses) that go beyond research techniques narrowly understood as merely a process of matching concepts and data" (original emphasis).

⁶² The focus upon the methodological strategies characteristic of world-historical social theorizing follows from two premises: one, our dealing with world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory as two particular forms thereof; and, two, Morrow's observation that

status of 'logic' as a part of methodology; deconstructive and historicist argumentation involves the contextualization of discursive reading of research; existential argumentation involves self-reflexivity; and normative argumentation invokes the categories of normative claim-making. Put differently, the first type of argumentation has to do with differentiating between 'formal' and 'practical' logic (*logic-in-use*); the second, with the distinction between *antihistoricism* and *logocentrism*, on the one hand, and *historicism* and *deconstructive reflexivity*, on the other; the third, with the notions of 'objective' and 'subjective' forms of social scientific inquiry; and the fourth, with 'disinterested' and 'interested' forms of knowledge.

Empirical Procedures

In their broadest sense, *empirical procedures* can be thought of as types of research undertaken within the framework of given research community. More specifically, they refer to particular techniques of analysis at work in the context of particular *research design*.

A research design is defined as "the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusion, [and that involves] (1) a study's questions; (2) its propositions, if any; (3) its unit(s) of analysis; (4) the logical linking of the data to the proposition; and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings" (Yin in Morrow 1994: 250-251). As such, the research design necessarily has to do with the logic of experimentation, as understood in its both narrow and broader defining qualifications.

To talk about different research designs is to invoke the notions of *extensive* and *intensive* research design (Morrow 1994: 250). In essence, the former refers to aggregate analysis of variables and is linked closely with the social engineering model of theorizing; the latter refers to analysis of small number of cases in terms of great number of individual properties and is linked closely to the world-historical social theorizing model. As observed by Morrow (1994: 251), "[f]rom the perspective of intensive research designs, each case resembles others of that type, which allows construction of limited generalizations, as well as explications of the individual case". Thus, the primary means of investigation within the context of intensive research designs is a *case study*.

though such types of non-empirical or reflexive argumentation are acknowledged specifically as part of social theorizing, they largely are excluded as nonscientific within the framework of logical empiricist accounts of research.

In principle, of course, non-empirical methods are recognized in positivist conceptions of research even if they are not usually termed as such. What is most important, however, is because they are put in the background rather than the foreground, assumptions with regard to such procedures require only minimal justification due to the way they can invoke the authority of the reigning positivism in methodology training (Morrow 1994: 232-233).

There can be distinguished four types of case-study based intensive research designs (Morrow 1994: 252-66): *historical and comparative sociology, ethnography and participant observation, participatory action research, and narrative and discourse analysis*. The first type is concerned with meaningful historical interpretation (by explicating an individual case), on the one hand, and analysis of causal regularities (by employing the generalizing case-study method), on the other; the second is characterized by an interest in contemporary events of potential practical and political significance; the third, by an inquiry into dynamics of power and exploitation, potentially linked to practical interventions and transformations; and the fourth, with the analysis of meanings in social life.

Practical Methodological Grounds

To talk about practical methodological grounds of a given research strategy is to refer to its level of analysis. Another way of getting at the concept of practical methodological grounds would be to invoke the notion of 'moments of inquiry', or to employ the category of 'taxonomy' (or 'typology') of social research (Morrow 1994: 215, 268). Perhaps the most fruitful way of talking about the practical methodological grounds is *via* the three-fold level-analysis distinction: (1) action level; (2) systemic level; and (3) mediational level. Somewhat more 'technical' terms for the three levels of analysis are: (1) *social psychological analysis of individual actors*; (2) *macrostructural analysis of social systems*; and (3) *sociocultural analysis of mediations* (Morrow 1994: 215-217, 268-270).

Each of the three levels of analysis is characterized by both *naturalistic* and *interpretative* strategies of inquiry. Thus, the primary naturalistic strategy operating in the context of social psychological analysis of individual actors (or the action-level research) is *individual-level modeling*, whose task - ideally - is "to establish universal covering laws of behavioral processes" (Morrow 1994: 216); the fundamental interpretive strategy is intimately connected to different types of *interpretive social psychologies* (or interpretive accounts of individual focused analyses) characterized by "*actor explication*, which follows the hermeneutic model in analyzing unique cases, and *actor generalization*, concerned with identifying general rules of individual action in specific causal contexts" (Morrow 1994: 216, original emphasis).

The naturalistic strategy at work within the context of macrostructural analysis of social systems (or the systemic-level research) is referred to as *system-level modeling* (or, specifically, *aggregative comparative research*) whose task is to "identify crucial variables in systems dynamics on the basis of large sample of cases" (Morrow 1994: 217). The systemic-level interpretive strategy is referred to as systemic analysis, characterized by, on the one hand, *systemic explication* and, on the other, *system generalization*. The aim of the former is to define the processes of social reproduction and contradiction within specific

historical case; the focus of the latter is upon formulating historically contingent types of generalization based on comparative case-study approach (Morrow 1994: 217).

Finally, the naturalistic strategy operating at the mediational research-level (or sociocultural analysis of mediations) is denoted as *mediation-level modeling* whose task is to identify "the probabilistic conditions of social change or correlations between aggregate properties of groups and institutional orders" (Morrow 1994: 217). The interpretive *mediations-analysis* strategy is characterized by *mediation-level explication* and *mediational generalizations*. The former "involves an attempt to identify intensively the crucial points of potential rupture, breakdown, or change in the processes of reproduction carried out at the intersection of systemic and social integration" (Morrow 1994: 217); the latter has to do with formulating generalizations at the level of groups and institutional orders.

World-Systems Analysis as a Research Practice

Just as establishing the grounds for considering the claim about the complementarity of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory necessitated delineating their respective metatheoretical positions, so the consideration of the proposition about the possibility of converging the two into a productive research practice oriented toward the global necessarily requires consider the position of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory with respect to investigative interests, methodological strategies, empirical procedures, and practical methodological grounds as four distinctive dimensions of research practice. Thus, the immediate task at hand is to consider world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory as two forms of research practice *via* situating their different facets within the framework of the four levels of research-strategy formulation indicated above, and, on the basis of that consideration, evaluate the possibility of their merge into a research practice of the global.

Firstly, then, world-systems analysis as a research practice, as considered through the categories of investigative interests, methodological strategies, empirical procedures and practical methodological grounds.

World-Systems Analysis: Investigative Interests

As already pointed out (see the section on the metatheory of world-systems analysis), the research focus of world-systems analysis rests upon detailed investigation of one (or several) elements characteristic of given systemic property under consideration: the task is to offer a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon in question by means of detailed historical investigation, in the context of which different properties of the object of inquiry are 'exposed' to 'comparative historical scrutiny' in order to account for the complexities related to the possibility of interpretive understanding.

Thus, the two 'research logics' operating in the context of world-systems analysis' research strategy are, on the one hand, *intensive explication* and, on the other, *comparative generalization*.

The particular research logics employed by world-systems analysis are related directly to its specific investigative interests. These clearly fall on the side of 'transformative', as opposed to 'reproductive' practices. As Wallerstein himself has pointed out repeatedly, the goal of world-systems analysis is to offer - by means of its study - a comprehensive understanding of the capitalist world-economy as historically unique world system and thus to elucidate the possibilities for world-historical change. These are most visible at the point when capitalist world-economy enters a period of crisis, which - in Wallerstein's view - is 'heralded' by the system's entrance into a new phase characterized by the normality of social disintegration and the correlative rejection of liberalism, concretely expressed in the passionate call for democracy (Wallerstein 1992a: 32). Ultimately, these kinds of investigative interests, put to practice through the employment of the corresponding research logics, make for world-systems analysis qualifying as the *world-historical social theorizing* type of disciplinary practice.

World-Systems Analysis: Methodological Strategies

Perhaps the best starting point in dealing with methodological strategies as they pertain to world-systems analysis would be to consider the form of normative argumentation at work in the context of world-systems analysis as a research practice. To do so implies making an attempt at answering the following question: 'Does world-systems analysis adhere to the notion of "disinterested", or "interested", form of knowledge?'. In other words, 'Is world-systems analysis prone to make normative and value judgments?' In short, the answer is 'yes'. As observed previously (see Chapter Three), the project of world-systems analysis is guided by particular political vision - namely, establishing socialist world-government (or 'system'). As such, its analysis of the capitalist world economy is necessarily connected with the critique of its main operative mechanism - unequal exchange (or peripheral exploitation) - which is regarded as standing opposed to the notions of freedom and equality. The end-objective of world-systems analysis is demonstrating - by means of extensive historical and comparative analysis - that globe-wide inequality is specific to capitalist world-economy alone and that, as such, it can be done away with through the processes of establishing an alternative form of world-wide social organization. Thus, 'embedded' in the 'logic' of world-systems analysis is the notion of 'interested' form of knowledge, itself expressed concretely in the kinds of normative claim-making.

If the above premise about 'interested' form of knowledge to be found at work within the context of world-systems analysis is granted as valid, then

it seems plausible to argue that formulating this kind of knowledge requires an 'interested subject'. In other words, if the so to speak point of departure of world-systems analysis is an 'inherent interest' in certain kind of political discourse, than it is to expect that interpretative skills of its 'subjects' - that is, the world-systems analysis research community - are necessarily grounded in, and become possible through, their particular, "politically marred", experiences and "prejudices". If this is indeed the case, than any reference to the form of existential argumentation operative within the context of the world-systems analysis research community needs to revolve around the notion of *insider knowledge* (or, in many respects, *standpoint theorizing*) rather than depersonalized and decontextualized form of social scientific inquiry.

The positioning of world-systems analysis along the lines of "social science as interpretation of process" (Wallerstein 1986a: 1306) necessarily informs the interpretative, historical constructivist epistemological basis of the disciplinary practice. The latter, it could be argued, proceeds from deconstructive and historical 'moments' of world-systems analysis, concretely expressed in reflection on the operation and historicity of scientific languages as part of the research process, i.e. in *deconstructive* and *historical forms of argumentation*. In this context, the history of social theory and scientific disciplines, on the one hand, and the linguistic basis of all forms of representation, on the other, are both taken as being relevant for the research practice of world-systems analysis. In other words, within the context of the world-systems analysis research practice *antihistoricism* and *logocentrism* are replaced by *historicism* and *deconstructivism* as, on the one hand, a form of awareness about the conditions of the production of scientific knowledge and, on the other, a form of critique of naïve realist understanding of 'reality representation'.

Finally, the presence of the above-discussed forms of normative, existential, and historical and deconstructivist reflexive procedures in the research practice of world-systems analysis suggests, it could be argued, the use of context-dependent logical criteria as a particular kind of metatheoretical rhetorical strategy. Here, the 'case-sensitive', practical and informal logical procedures, rather than *formalism* and *logical essentialism*, are employed as a means of getting at particular, empirically informed research objectives⁶³. In this context, it is the kind of 'task at hand' that exacts particular form of metatheoretical argumentation, and not *the* form of metatheoretical argumentation that determines the kind of approach to 'task at hand'.

World-Systems Analysis: Empirical Procedures

⁶³ This, to be sure, does not imply that formal logic is completely dispensed with; rather (as observed by Morrow (1994: 235) "[the latter] is conceptualized as part of a set of heuristic (and rhetorical) devices that can, in the appropriate context, instruct argumentation".

On the dimension of empirical procedures, world-systems analysis qualifies as *historical and comparative* type of case-study based on intensive research designs. Its task is to provide meaningful historical interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation by means of comparative inquiry into its main socio-historical manifestations. In this context, the mode of inquiry employed by world-systems analysis falls in line with what is known as comparative historical method, a particular type of comparative historical analysis coterminous with the notion of methods of agreement and difference (Morrow 1994: 253). In case of the former - methods of agreement, that is - an emphasis is placed upon investigating two (or several) different cases that have a common outcome: explanation, thus, involves a search for the shared characteristic that is effective cause of similarity. On the other hand, the latter - namely, methods of difference - are concerned with two (or several) otherwise similar cases that have different outcomes. Here, explanation involves searching for the factor(s) of difference that generate(s) that different outcome. In the context of world-systems analysis both aspects of comparative historical method are employed as operative 'research tools'. On the one hand, there is interest in accounting for the shared characteristics of particular socio-historical manifestations that account for the specifics of the phenomenon under investigation; on the other, there is interest in explaining particular historical factors that made for the emergence of given socio-historical manifestations that account for the specifics of the phenomenon under consideration.

In addition to comparative historical methods, world-systems analysis makes use of other types of comparative historical analysis: *the use of concepts for a meaningful historical interpretation, analysis of causal regularities in history, and applications of a general model to history* (Morrow 1994: 253). Arguably, the first type - the use of concepts for a meaningful historical interpretation - is 'embedded' in the 'logic' of comparative historical analysis; the other two - the analysis of causal regularities in history, and applications of a general model to history - are employed within the context of world-systems analysis to the extent that the latter offers two trimodal general historical distinctions, i.e. the world system-world empire-world economy, on the one hand, and (particular to the capitalist world-economy) the core-semiperiphery-periphery, on the other.

World-Systems Analysis: Practical Methodological Grounds

As a particular form of research practice, world-systems analysis is to be located at the level of *macrostructural analysis* of social systems. Its investigative concerns correspond to the task of elucidating structural properties constitutive of capitalist world-economy as a particular form of social, political, economic, and cultural system(ic) formation. Moreover, the particular methodological strategy employed in the context of world-systems

analysis' research practice corresponds to the above discussed *systemic analysis*. As already pointed out, the task of world-systems analysis' methodological approach is to undertake analysis of the capitalist world-economy's systemic properties so as to be able to generate an understanding of the global system.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory as a Research Practice

The main difficulty in dealing with 'voluntaristic' world system as a research practice consists in the fact that, unlike world-systems analysis whose particular analytical methodology has been 'institutionalized' in the Fernand Braudel Center as a distinct kind of social scientific (or, more pointedly, research) community, 'voluntaristic' world system theory, as of yet, has not been made extensive use of as a specific research methodology, nor has it been established as a 'tried-and-tested' form of research orientation. One of the reasons, evidently, is the relatively recent formulation of the main tenets of the theory which renders it at the stage of, in a manner of speaking, 'theoretical infancy', with the prospects of further developments and refinements. The other difficulty (and in close relation to the first one) is the fairly small adherence that 'voluntaristic' world system theory has mustered so far. In fact, apart from Roland Robertson who formulated the theory and elaborated upon its main dimensions there are not all that many of those who employ the theory as their principal research framework and practice. Again, the reasons for that have to do with the state of relative 'theoretical infancy' of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as an investigative paradigm and research orientation.

Dealing with 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice, then, requires a 'leap of imagination', as it were. It entails the possibility of regarding the theory *as if* it were 'institutionalized' in a distinct kind of research community (as in the case of world-systems analysis), *as if* it were adhered to as a principal mode of investigative and research orientation. Hence, what follows is a treatment of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice, with the 'leap of imagination' taken as an investigative point of entry; an elaboration upon the theory's positioning with respect to investigative interests, methodological strategies, empirical procedures, and practical methodological grounds as the four dimensions of research practice, based on its consideration as an institutionalized form of investigative and research orientation.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Investigative Interests

As a particular form of research practice 'voluntaristic' world system theory is concerned with accounting for (or theorizing) the ways in which the world *in-itself* is transformed into the world *for-itself*, that is, with the process(es) that bring(s) about constitution of the world as a *global field*, or as a single, global

place. Theorizing the process(es) of transformation, thus, is based upon 'historically conscious' and comparative theoretical scrutiny of individuals, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind as the four general points of reference around which particular socio-historical processes shaping the world as a global field are thematized and operationalized. In this context, the premise underlying the investigative interests of 'voluntaristic' world system theory is congruent with the interest in comprehending particular historically constituted social, political, economic, and cultural relations emanating from the four points of reference, so as to be able to arrive at an understanding of the process(es) of constitution of the world as a single, global place. As such, 'voluntaristic' world system theory focuses on theorizing given relations constitutive of particular socio-historical processes, as well as comparing analytically theorized relations and processes in order to make limited generalizations about its object of inquiry - the global field as constituted in the process of transformation of the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself*. Thus, based on the particular form of research strategy and its corresponding logics of research, 'voluntaristic' world system theory can, ultimately, be thought of as *world-historical social theorizing* type of disciplinary practice, characterized by corresponding research logics of *intensive explication* and *comparative generalization*.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Methodological Strategies

Dealing with methodological strategies as they pertain to 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice implies considering different forms of argumentation employed by the theory in the process of constructing its particular research strategy. To do so, then, means to consider the presence, or the absence, of *metatheoretical*, *deconstructive* and *historicist*, *existential*, and *normative* forms of argumentation within the framework of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a particular form of research orientation.

As the specific form of research strategy whose aim is to comprehend particular socio-historical processes constitutive of the world-as-a-whole through the research logics of intensive explications and comparative generalizations, 'voluntaristic' world system theory necessarily differentiates between 'formal' and 'practical' logic as the two dimensions of its research methodology. In other words, in its attempt to get at the processes that transform the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself*, 'voluntaristic' world system theory makes use of different forms of logical criteria in the process of 'investigative discovery' - that is, it recognizes that it is the nature investigation that informs the kind of logical criteria of inquiry employed and not *the* logical criterion of inquiry that informs the kind of approach to investigation. Ultimately, it is thus the 'case-sensitive' form of

metatheoretical argumentation that operates within the framework of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice.

Being historically grounded form of research orientation, 'voluntaristic' world system theory indispensably employs historicist and deconstructive forms of argumentation - that is, it is, on the one hand, sensitive to the relevance of the context and conditions in which particular findings are produced to their evaluation and ultimate validation and, on the other, aware of various forms of mediation (linguistic, in particular) at work in the process of getting at reality 'out there'. As such, 'voluntaristic' world system theory is 'immanently' conscious of the essentially historicist and 'reflexive' nature of the social as a *milieu* within which it locates its particular investigative and research interests.

Not being rooted in any (at least apparent) form of normative claim-making, 'voluntaristic' world system theory is hence devoid of normative and, relatedly, existential forms of argumentation. In other words, the form of knowledge produced by 'voluntaristic' world system theory is 'disinterested' for it is not based on any form of *standpoint theorizing* - that is, any particular position which serves as a basis of given research practice. In that sense, not being based on *insider knowledge* as a technique of investigation, the form of social scientific inquiry at work within 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice is "strategized" as 'objective'.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Empirical Procedures

As a world-historical social theorizing type of disciplinary practice that employs intensive explication and comparative generalization as its operative logics of research, 'voluntaristic' world system theory translates itself, as it were, into *intensive research design* based on *historical and comparative techniques of analysis*. That is, it is concerned with providing meaningful, historically grounded, interpretation of its object of inquiry through comparative investigation of specific socio-historical processes accounting for its constitution. Its mode of inquiry is congruent with what is recognized as *comparative historical method*, a particular form of comparative historical analysis that, on the one hand, focuses upon investigating a small number of dissimilar processes that converge in a common outcome and, on the other, on a small number of similar processes that diverge in differing outcomes. The goal is to attempt to discern those shared characteristic(s) that effectively generate(s) commonality, on the one hand, and, on the other, those factor(s) of divergence that effectively generate(s) difference at the outcome. Thus, as a particular form of research design, 'voluntaristic' world system theory concerns itself with theorizing both different socio-historical processes that converge in a singular socio-historical structural manifestation and

apparently similar socio-historical processes that manifest themselves as different forms of socio-structural expressions.

Apart from comparative historical method, 'voluntaristic' world system theory employs *the use of concepts for a meaningful historical interpretation, analysis of causal regularities in history, and applications of a general model to history* as other types of historical and comparative techniques of analysis. The first strategy is a necessary point of departure of any veritable historical and comparative analysis, the second one postulates the particular-universal relationship as the basic feature of global-human condition and a major axis of structuration of the world-as-a-whole, and the third one provides a 'general historical skeleton' of globalization in terms of positing individuals, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind as four preeminent points of references of the process in general. These strategies, along with comparative historical method, define the methodo-analytical basis of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a particular form of research design.

'Voluntaristic' World System Theory: Practical Methodological Grounds

In terms of its particular level of analysis, 'voluntaristic' world system theory mediates between *social psychological analysis of individual actors, sociocultural analysis of mediations and macrostructural analysis of social systems* - that is, across action, mediational, and systemic 'moments of inquiry'. Conceived of as a multidimensional mode of theoretical inquiry, it is interested in examining all levels of the social in order to be able to grasp, as fully as possible, the process of transformation of the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself*, that is, the process(es) of constitution of the world as a global field in terms of the fourfold distinction of individuals, nationally constituted societies, the international system of societies, and humankind. Thus, 'voluntaristic' world system theory considers all social actors, mediating social practices and institutions, and systemic properties (and understanding thereof in terms of specific qualifications and existing interrelations) as being equally important for meaningful theorizing of globalization as a conceptual problematic to be investigated.

In its attempt to take in, as it were, all levels of analysis 'voluntaristic' world system theory makes use of *interpretive strategies of inquiry* characteristic of all these moments of inquiry. Thus, it employs *actor explication* and *actor generalization*, *mediation-level explication* and *mediation-level generalization*, and *system explication* and *system generalization* as particular analytical strategies that provide for the possibility of meaningful, historically grounded, comparative analysis of the social, as manifested globally, at all these levels of analytico-theoretical investigation.

On the Prospects of Merging World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory into a Research Practice of the Global

Previously, the argument about the importance of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory in the process of respecification of the sociological discipline along the trajectories of the global was furthered by postulating complementarity of the two approaches and, on the basis of their complementarity, the possibility of their convergence into a research practice that would have the global as its preeminent investigative and research objective. Now just as establishing complementarity of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory required comparative treatment of their respective positionings with regards to the metatheoretical, as expressed through the dimensions of ontology, epistemology, action, and explanation, so exploring the prospects of merging the two into a research practice of the global necessitates dealing, in a comparative perspective, with the positional standings of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory with respect to investigative interests, methodological strategies, empirical procedures, and practical methodological grounds as four distinctive forms of research practice. In other words, it requires pointing comparatively to the similarities and differences between world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory on each of the four respective dimensions of research practice and, on these grounds, assessing the tenability of the 'convergence thesis'. Ultimately, it implies answering the question: 'What is the basis for the convergence of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory into a research practice of the global?'.

On the dimension of investigative interests both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory share the qualification of the *world-historical social theorizing* type of disciplinary practice that employs *intensive explication* and *comparative generalization* as two particular type of research logics. That is, both of them share the interest of understanding their object of inquiry, contemporary world(-)system (particularized by world-systems analysis as the capitalist world economy and by 'voluntaristic' world system theory as the global field, the world as a single place, the world-as-a-whole, the world *for-itself*), in terms of analytical and theoretical scrutiny of the socio-historical processes that account for its constitution. As a consequence, both are engaged in detailed, historically grounded, investigation of particular social, political, economic, and cultural relations constitutive of the socio-historical processes in question, in the context of which different dimensions of the contemporary world(-)system are exposed to comparative treatment in order to get at the possibility of interpretive understanding of the object of inquiry. Thus, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory are engaged in, on the one hand, analyzing and theorizing relations and processes constitutive of the

phenomenon under investigation and, on the other, comparing analyzed and theorized relations and processes so as to be able to make limited generalizations about the properties of the contemporary world(-)system as their immediate investigative interest.

On the dimension of methodological strategies, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory make use of *metatheoretical* as well as *historical* and *deconstructive* forms of argumentation. In other words, both of them differentiate between, on the one hand, 'formal' and 'practical' logic as the two dimensions of their respective research methodologies, and, on the other, historicism and antihistoricism, and logocentrism and deconstructive reflexivity, as the particular expressions of their operative research processes. That is, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory make use of different forms of logical criteria in the process of analytical and theoretical scrutiny of given dimensions of their object of inquiry, recognizing that it is the nature of analytical and theoretical investigation that informs the kind of logical criteria employed and not the other way around; as well, both of them are sensitive to, on the one hand, the importance of the conditions of production of scientific knowledge for its evaluation and ultimate validation, and, on the other, various forms of mediations operating in the process of 'social reality construction'.

Where the two differ with respect to methodological strategies is on the point of *existential* and *normative* forms of argumentation. Being rooted in a particular kind of political vision, world-systems analysis necessarily employs *standpoint theorizing* as a specific form of positional basis for its research practice, in the context of which 'personalized' and 'contextualized' form(s) of social scientific inquiry yield(s), as it were, 'interested' form(s) of knowledge, concretized in the normative claim-making. In contrast, not being prone to normative claim-making, 'voluntaristic' world system theory "strategizes" its research practice as a 'depersonalized' and 'decontextualized' form of social scientific inquiry, in the context of which the absence of 'insider knowledge' (or standpoint theorizing) eventuates in 'disinterested' form(s) of social scientific knowledge.

On the dimension of empirical procedures both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory share the characteristic of being *historical* and *comparative* type of case-study based *intensive* research design that employ *comparative historical methods*, *the use of concepts for a meaningful historical interpretation*, *analysis of causal regularities in history*, and *applications of a general model to history* as different methodological strategies of comparative historical analysis. As such, both of them are concerned with meaningful historical interpretation and analysis of causal regularities through, firstly, using historical concepts as necessary points of departure of their analytical and theoretical investigations; secondly, investigating, on the one hand, a small number of dissimilar processes that converge in a common

outcome and, on the other, a small number of similar processes that diverge in differing outcomes, so as to be able to discern the shared characteristic(s) that effectively generate(s) commonality, on the one hand, and, on the other, the factor(s) of divergence that effectively generate(s) divergence at the outcome; thirdly, positing given relations and processes as the basic features, or essential properties, of the phenomenon under investigation; and, fourthly, proffering 'general historical skeletons' of their respective objects of inquiry.

Finally, on the dimension of practical methodological grounds, both world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory as particular forms of research practice are to be located at the level of *macrostructural analysis of social systems*. Put differently, for both of them immediate investigative concerns correspond to the task of elucidating contemporary world(-)system as a particular form of social, political, economic, and cultural system(ic) formation by means of employing specific *interpretive* analytical strategies of *system explication* and *system generalization*. In addition, 'voluntaristic' world system theory regards *social psychological analysis of individual actors* and *sociocultural analysis of mediation* as important as macrostructural analysis of social systems for meaningful, historically grounded, comparative analysis of the social in its global dimension. Its practical methodological grounds, therefore, encompass, in addition to the systemic, both action and mediational 'moments of inquiry'. As well, its interpretive analytical strategies, along with system explication and system generalization, include *actor explication* and *actor generalization*, and *mediation-level explication* and *mediation-level generalization*.

As the foregoing delineation makes evident, the grounds for the prospects of merging world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory into a research practice that would have the global as its focal research and investigative interest are rather substantial. The affinity of the two approaches on all four dimension of research practice allows them to be 'naturally' oriented towards one another. Accordingly, not only would they complement one another in all important aspects of a new research practice of the global but, together, they would also open up new possibilities for valid analytical and theoretical explorations of the global as expressed both substantively and conceptually.

Even in evident 'points of contention' between world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory with regards to the dimensions of methodological strategies and practical methodological grounds, the nature of dissimilarities is not 'unreconcilable'. The absence of existential and normative forms of argumentation within the framework of 'voluntaristic' world system theory is not a 'deficiency' inherent in the theory as such; rather, it is, arguably, a matter of, as it were, 'investigative choice' rather than 'theoretical and methodological necessity'. Thus, there is, in principle, nothing that precludes the possibility of these two forms of argumentation

becoming legitimate aspects of 'voluntaristic' world system theory's methodological strategies; nothing that does not allow for their incorporation in the 'methodological arsenal' of 'voluntaristic' world system theory as a research practice. Just as the research practice of world-systems analysis is not necessitated by the presence of existential and normative forms of argumentation so, ultimately, the research practice of 'voluntaristic' world system theory should not be regarded as predicated upon the absence of the two.

Similarly, the 'discrepancy' between world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory on the dimension of practical methodological grounds is also not a matter of irreconcilable methodological contradiction. The fact that, differently from 'voluntaristic' world system theory whose practical methodological grounds incorporate action, mediational, and systemic 'moments of inquiry', world-systems analysis focuses predominantly on the level of macrostructural analysis of social systems does not render the possibility of incorporating the levels of social psychological analysis of individual actors and sociocultural analysis of mediation inherently untenable. For, analogously to the previous disparity, there is, in principle, nothing in world-systems analysis as such that *a priori* excludes the possibility of action and mediation 'moments of inquiry' being - in addition to the level of macrostructural analysis of social systems - made legitimate aspects of the practical methodological grounds of its research practice; nothing to suggest that the level of macrostructural analysis of social systems is *the* level of analytical focus of world-systems analysis as a research practice. Thus, rather than being perceived as a matter of 'analytical and methodological necessity', world-systems analysis' focus on the systemic 'moment of inquiry' should, ultimately, be regarded as a matter of 'conscious investigative choice'.

In the end, the prospects for the convergence of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world systems theory into a research practice of the global are clearly there. Whether and how these will be put into practice depends, in many respects, on the course of sociology's response to the challenge of the global.

World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory Comparatively and Metatheoretically: Concluding Reflections

Exploring the grounds of furthering the argument about the importance of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory for sociology's reorientation towards the dimension of the global, we have put forth the proposition about relative complementarity of the two approaches and, based on that complementarity, the possibility of their convergence into a research practice that would have the global as its focal point of analytic and theoretical investigative interest. Having as our conceptual points of

entry into establishing the basis for claiming affinities of world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory with regards to metatheory and research practice the treatment of particular categories of the dimensions in question we have established that, indeed, there are substantive grounds for claiming their compatibility and, thus, the possibility of merging the two into a productive research practice of the global. In the end, we have observed that the prospects of realizing the possibility of constructing the research practice of the global depend, in many crucial respects, on the kind of response sociology will (and is able to) offer to the challenge of the global.

Where does all of this leave us? With yet another one of many grumbles about the dismal state of the sociological discipline or a 'programmatic statement' for the latter's transformation? Hopefully, it leaves us somewhere in between. To the degree these pages are the 'grumbles' about the predicament of sociology, they are so in the light of, on the one hand, the real challenge posed to the discipline and, on the other, the dismal response that the discipline itself has so far given to the challenge posed. Thus, they are the 'grumbles' set against the realization that the challenge to sociology is as serious as sociology's response is, regrettably, frivolous; the 'grumbles' belched out, as it were, in opposition to the state where it appears that the more serious the challenge gets the more frivolous the response becomes. As such, they imply a call for action to the discipline that *can* and *is able* to rise to the challenge of the global adequately but, almost as if consciously, had chosen not to do so.

To the extent that these pages are written as a 'programmatic statement' for the transformation of sociology, they are written as such in the light of realization that the challenge to the discipline is a real one - that it is a challenge emanating from the real transformative developments of the social as sociology's preeminent focal point of interest (as, in the final analysis, sociology's *raison d'être*), and not from overheated intellectual imagination. In this context, they are the 'programmatic statement' offered to support the realization that the real challenges need constructive responses - that it is not enough to merely grumble but to, at least attempt to, point towards constructive strategies for combating the challenge, chart out constructive directions towards, as the saying goes, 'the light at the end of the tunnel'. What they purports to be, therefore, is a 'programmatic statement' for the transformation of sociology not in terms of meticulously worked out, prescriptive schemata for the course of action to be observed and followed steadfastly, but in terms of (one of) the possible grounds on which to construct the course of transformative action. Hence, they are the point of departure (or, perhaps, one of the possible points of departure), and not the end-point, of a potential strategy for the realignment of sociology along the trajectories of the global.

Ultimately, as it stands right now, the challenge of the global is but the combat of sociology with itself. In this combat the winner, or the loser, is one and the same. What is at stake is the relevance of sociology as the discipline of the social. What is to be lost is ever increasing inadequacy of sociology in dealing with the social as manifested globally. If, in this context, the ghost of globalization turns out to be the 'dark side' of sociology than in the combat against the challenge of the global - in the combat against itself - sociology has nothing to lose but its own demons.

Chapter Six



GLOBALIZATION AS A SUBSTANTIVE AND CONCEPTUAL PHENOMENON REVISITED: Secondary Observations, Tentative Conclusions

The Contours of the Global

THE ADVENT OF THE GLOBAL, or globalization as manifested both substantively and conceptually, poses a serious challenge to the status of sociology as a (or *the*) discipline of the social. The challenge is manifested as a recognition (in the better case), or a refusal to recognize (in the worse, or the worst, case), that, with the advent of the global, sociology finds itself on rather slippery scholastic a terrain, concretized as the discipline's ever increasing inadequacy at dealing with social life in its global dimension. The advent of the global dimension of social life thus forces sociology to examine the appropriateness of its analytical and conceptual apparatus and, in recognizing (or being forced to recognize) its inappropriateness for the task of getting at the social in its global dimension, explore the possibilities of its strategic reorientation along the lines of the demand for apprehending the global in its analytical and conceptual dimensions. The advent of the global, in short, forces the discipline of sociology to come face to face with the emanant 'What is to be done?' dilemma - the question, that is, of 'What is to be done in light of the respecification of social life along the trajectories of the global?'

Dealing with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?' is, in many crucial respects, predicated upon informed understanding of the global - that is, upon grasping both the substantive and conceptual dimensions of the phenomenon of globalization. Concretely, this implies getting hold of, on the one hand, the specific socio-historical processes that account for growing interdependence across the world on a number of different dimensions and, relatedly, the movements of worldwide expansion of various institutions, collectivities, and practices, and, on the other, the different forms of

conceptual understandings of the ways in which the world becomes (and comes to be perceived as) a single, global place (or the 'global field'). As well, it means understanding globalization as a specific, historically grounded, process, as well as a way of apprehending conceptually the given socio-historical trajectories that make for the 'structuration' of the world as globally constituted a 'locality'.

Within the framework of sociology, getting at an understanding of the global in its both substantive and conceptual dimensions has been characterized by drawing upon several distinct (often contradictory, but also, not uncommonly, complementary) positional standings. Generally, the substantive dimension of the global has been situated within the parameters of the following propositions (Waters 1995): firstly, that the phenomenon of globalization has been at work since the very beginning of human history and that its current phase (often termed as the 'neo-liberal globalization') stands for nothing but an acceleration of the overall process; secondly, that the process of globalization corresponds to the era of capitalist development and modernization; and thirdly, that globalization is a recent phenomenon associated with 'post-industrialism' and, what is often termed as, 'disorganized capitalism'. The most popular conceptual understanding of globalization has, for the most part, been situated within the broader context of the third proposition about the 'affinity' between globalization and the condition of 'post-industriality' characteristic of 'disorganized' capitalism, refined in the forms of three approaches - namely, the information society thesis; the post-Fordist thesis; and the post-modernist thesis. All of these offer then specific perspectives as both analytical and conceptual grounds for sociology's attempt to get at an understanding of globalization in its substantive and conceptual dimensions, and, thus, chart out the map, as it were, towards the possibility of dealing fruitfully with the 'What is to be done in the face of the global?' dilemma.

But how helpful are these propositions as the grounds for understanding the global as manifested both substantively and conceptually?

The Propositions on Globalization as the Substantive Phenomenon: A Critique

The first proposition - the idea about globalization being the process that is present since the very beginning of human history but accelerated at the latter's current stage⁶⁴ - renders, in my view, the concept of globalization

⁶⁴ This proposition has, most recently, been advocated by Andre Gunder Frank (1998). In general, his argument is that the process of globalization proceeds within the framework of the socio-historical entity of world-system. In his view, however, the beginnings of the world-system are to be dated back to the period of some five thousand years ago and not to the epoch of the 'long sixteenth century'. The world-system, Gunder Frank argues, is much older than the 'Eurocentric' accounts would have us to believe: its origins are much farther back in history and are not to be made coterminous with the

utterly superfluous. In other words, if the phenomenon is at work since the beginning of human history, why call it globalization to begin with; why not simply refer to it as the course of human history or, simply, human history - history as such. What is it that, in the context of the first statement, makes globalization globalization to begin with? I would argue, it is absolutely nothing. For if we truly subscribe to the first proposition than both the concept of globalization as well as, to a great extent, the idea of its acceleration lose much (if not all) of its usefulness and, ultimately, meaning.

The second proposition - the notion that the process of globalization corresponds to the era of capitalist development and modernization - is, although useful to a degree, somewhat imprecise and, hence, problematic. It is useful to the point of associating globalization with capitalism for, as demonstrated in Chapter One, it is only within the context of capitalism as a socio-historical formation that globalization can be understood. It is imprecise and problematic, however, because it associates globalization with the processes of (capitalist) development and modernization. As we have seen, globalization in its substantive dimension is a 'resultant', as it were, of the historically constituted 'interplay' of a range of social, economic, political, and cultural tendencies and practices. Development and modernization, on the other hand, are two processes of rather limited 'historical scope and range' that, understood properly (that is, as the processes that have to do with (often imposed) attempts at emulating the Western mode(l) of progress in the post-World War Two period), refer to a particular set of tendencies relatively short in history and, almost invariably, relegated primarily to the economic sphere of societal life and organization. Accordingly, the two cannot be regarded as being the 'equivalents' to globalization in its substantive, socio-historical dimension. To be sure, the processes of both development and modernization have their place in the overall 'historical framework' of globalization; however, the two are not, and - given their attributes - cannot be, identical to the framework as such.

Although correctly identifying some of the processes shaping contemporary condition and, thus, 'concretizing' globalization at the current stage in history, the third proposition - the notion that the process of globalization is a recent phenomenon associated with post-industrialism and disorganized capitalism - is problematic because it relegates the phenomenon of globalization to the notions of post-industrialism and disorganized capitalism as manifested in the context of contemporary (that is, late-twentieth-century) Western society alone. Thus, by failing to recognize the far-reaching extent of both the processes in question and capitalism as such, this approach deprives the socio-historical process of globalization of its

'age of discovery' and the period of European expansion into the areas of the 'New World'. In this context, globalization, as inherent in the dynamic of the world-system, is itself at least a five-thousand-years-old process.

world-wide - that is, truly global - dimension and aspect. In being identified with and accounted for in terms of the changes and transformations affecting contemporary Western world alone, globalization, in the context of the third proposition, translates into not much more than the 'globalization of the West', or the 'Western globalization'.

If, as demonstrated, the three propositions on globalization as the substantive phenomenon do not constitute proper analytical grounds for enabling sociology to get at the global in its substantive dimension, and thus enter the realm of possibility of dealing with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?', what then is to be considered as the alternative analytical grounds? As detailed in Chapter One, it is the proposition that posits globalization in its substantive dimension as corresponding to the historical course of inception, development, solidification, and expansion of capitalism as a world-historical phenomenon. In other words, a framework within which globalization is defined as *a set of historically constituted social, political, economic and cultural arrangements that gave form to a particular constellation of social, political, economic, and cultural relations which, driven by the 'functional prerequisite' of the overall structural formation within which they stand "embedded", expanded worldwide and, in the process, generated conditions of ever-greater interconnectedness as the 'material expression' of the process of structuring the world-as-a-whole.* Set against the three previous propositions on globalization as the substantive phenomenon, the above 'framing' is 'comparatively advantageous' in that, firstly, it recognizes the complexities related to the process of getting at the phenomenon of globalization by referring, implicitly, to its conceptual dimension; secondly, it historicizes globalization as manifested substantively by means of its relating to historically constituted and variant processes of capitalism's inception, development, solidification and expansion; and (in relation to the first 'advantage'), thirdly, it suggest, again implicitly, that globalization is not only a historically constituted process of ever greater interrelatedness and interconnectedness of the world's political, economic, social and cultural spheres but, also, a process of symbolic construction and defining of the world as a single place with global and systemic properties - the world as a 'global field'. It is thus on the basis of these three 'comparative advantages' in relation to the three propositions delineated above that the fourth proposition on globalization should, ultimately, be considered as the most appropriate analytical grounds for getting at the global in its substantive dimension.

The Propositions on Globalization as the Conceptual Phenomenon: A Critique

Understood properly, the three propositions on globalization as the conceptual phenomenon represent 'conceptual refinements' of the suggestion that globalization is a recent phenomenon to be associated with post-

industrialism and the disorganized mode of capitalism - the third approach to the global as manifested substantively. Framed as the information society thesis, the post-Fordist thesis, and the post-modernist thesis, they are its 'conceptual refinements' in that, in the process of constructing their respective approaches, they take the 'second structural shift' - that is, the transformation of capitalism from the 'organized' to the 'disorganized' mode of functioning - and the 'condition of post-industriality' as their common foundational points of departure. As such, all three propositions are problematic to the extent that they 'ground' their respective claims in, as previously argued, rather inadequate understanding of the substantive dimension of the global.

In light of their shared foundational points of departure, the common 'deficiency' of all three propositions is manifested concretely in terms of, on the one hand, their 'investigative focus' being limited to the Western world alone and, on the other, the insufficient recognition of a deeper structural dimension of the developments (be they informational, post-Fordist, or post-modernist) under consideration. In turn, this deficiency makes for, on the one hand, the kind of understanding whereby globalization (in a "better" scenario) is - somehow - something that "occurs" in the Western world and then 'spreads out' world-wide, or (in a worse, or the worst, scenario) something that "happens" globally, however only within the parameters of the Western world; on the other hand, it - for the most part - makes for the inability to situate the tendencies under consideration within the framework of larger social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of the socio-historical structure within which they stand 'embedded', thus preventing the possibility of formulating observations offered on the basis of probing, as it were, 'essential relations', rather than 'surface appearances', of the tendencies considered.

The Information Society Thesis: A Critique

The information society thesis, with its central premise of the movement from a goods-producing to the an information- and service-producing society in the context of which knowledge and information manifest themselves as global strategic resources and transforming agents, exhibits, in its most prominent expressions, both aspects of the above discussed 'deficiency' shared by all three propositions on the global as expressed conceptually. In Masuda's version, the information society thesis as a 'techno-utopian' proposition about the transformation of the world is firmly rooted in the consideration of the most advanced parts of the world (particularly, Canada, Sweden, and, most prominently, Japan) and the exploration of observable relations between information technology, or the 'information space', and social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of the society. In short, it offers a 'proto-Western' vision of the future which relegates to informational

transformative developments in the most advanced parts of the world the role of a 'revolutionary vanguard' that sets the course of transformative change on the global scale. In this context, grounded in the world-wide 'dissemination' of general social benefits brought about by the advent of the information technology, globalization is taken to be the process of this global transformative change that, emanating from the most advanced parts of the world, comes to encompass the world in its entirety, transforming it into a 'global information space'.

Even in its more productive expression, Castells' notion of the 'informational mode of development', the information society thesis, although devoid of the absence of contextualization of given transformative tendencies within the framework of larger structural social, political, economic, and cultural contexts, nonetheless falls pray, as it were, to the West-oriented 'investigative gaze'. In his treatment of the informational mode of development as the global transformative agent at the current stage of history, Castells, for he is concerned with the global effect of the transformative changes of the capitalist system, contextualizes his analysis within the general structural framework of capitalist relations. Consequentially, he makes evident that the transformative changes observed in the context of the particular kind of capitalist mode of development are transforming not only apparently observable relations of social, political, economic, and cultural expressions of the capitalist system but also, and more importantly, the character of the capitalist system as such. In framing his analysis, however, Castells focuses primarily (if not exclusively) on transformative changes brought about by the informational mode of development as they take place in the context of the Western parts of the world. Thus, his investigative focus is preeminently on what is, arguably, deemed as the locus and 'epicenter' of change and, by implication, the transformative mode(l) of universal significance and application. Correspondingly, his notion of globalization as the process of respecification - through the informational mode of development - of the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations, and thus of the capitalist system as such, along the trajectories of advanced, 'informational capitalism' as a particular form of global structural arrangement, is constructed as a 'particular universalized by the force of its dominance' - that is, on the basis of the 'West-centered' process of transformative change made universal.

How justified is this universalization? It is justified to the extent that the system of capitalist relations investigated by Castells is a socio-historical structural entity that is global in its fundamental orientation and, as such, a socio-historical system characterized by general underlying 'operative principles'. Thus, to the degree that the informational mode of development is taken by Castells to represent a new general underlying operative principles of the capitalist system at its advanced, 'informational' stage, its

universalization could be 'grounded' in some kind of justification. It is not justified, however, to the extent that it is *taken* as being universal without giving investigative consideration to the possibilities of different, 'non-West-centered', mode(s) of respecification of the system of capitalist relations along the trajectories of the global. For to *a priori* assume the 'present dominant' as the 'future universal' without allowing for, or as much as considering, the possibility of alternative mode(s) of constructing transformative change is to be oblivious to the potency of the 'unaccounted-for' - in other words, to, in many respects, fall back to the logic of the modernization thesis. And surely, the intent of Castells' work is more ambitious than that.

The Post-Fordist Thesis: A Critique

Almost identically to the information society thesis, the post-Fordist proposition falls short of fully theorizing the conceptual dimension of globalization on the grounds of, as if by default, its 'West-centered' investigative focus and, in some cases, lacking a 'deeper structural dimension' of its particular mode of investigation. Although pointing to important tendencies, trends, and developments with regards to the conceptual dimension of the global, it nonetheless remains a rather problematic reading of its fundamental conceptual expressions.

In Piore and Sabel's version, the post-Fordist thesis is 'concretized' in terms of the notion of 'second industrial divide' as the process of transformative change of the complex of capitalist industrial-economic relations, in response to the 1970s general crisis of the capitalist system. Thus, their particular investigative concern corresponds to examining the character of industrial-economic relations so as to get at the reasons for the shift from the Fordist model of mass-production industrial activity to the post-Fordist system of flexible-specialized industrial activity. Correspondingly, the basis of their investigative inquiry is located in an analysis of the complex of industrial-economic relation of, once again, most advanced (whatever this 'advanced' is supposed to suggest) parts of the world - namely, the West. Even more specifically, their 'investigative gaze' is oriented towards the United States as their principle 'exploratory grounds'. It is, thus, in this context that they offer their elaboration upon the 'second industrial divide' as the transformative agent of the capitalist industrial-economic relations and, implicitly, the process of globalization as a means of strategic reorientation of the world economy along the trajectories of the 'disorganized' mode of capitalist industrial-economic relations. Again, as in the case of the information society thesis, 'West-centrism' is the jumping off point for universalization.

The 'investigative depth' of Piore and Sabel's exploration of the 'second industrial divide' operates within the sphere of the 'observable' rather than the 'depth-structural'. In other words, in the context of their

concern with the transformation from the Fordist model of mass-productive industrial activity to the post-Fordist flexible-specialization industrial production orientation, Piore and Sabel relegate their investigative undertaking to the realm of the industrial-economic alone, never exploring the 'deeper structural dimension' of its relationship with the social, the political, and the cultural - never observing it in the context of given socio-historical structural entity within which these are evidenced. In this context, the notion of capitalism invoked within the framework of their particular propositional delineation is a notion of the complex of industrial-economic relations, never the notion of the socio-historical system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Analogously, the notion of respecification of capitalist relations, encapsulated in the metaphor of 'second industrial divide', is an elaboration of transformative changes from the vintage point of industrial-economic relations, not from the standpoint of the structural system of social, political, cultural, *and* (industrial-)economic relations.

Differently from Piore and Sabel, the New Times project, in its dealing with the post-Fordist proposition, considers the notion of 'epochal shift' (or 'divide') from the point of view of socio-historical structure of social, political, economic, and cultural arrangements - that is, from the viewpoint of the system of capitalist relations. Thus, it is able to establish that the 'post-Fordist condition', as the metaphor for the notion of epochal shift, stands not only for the transformative changes in the realm of industrial-economic relations but for a broad set of general transformative tendencies within the system of capitalist social, political, economic, and cultural relations. Where the New Times project falls short is in taking contemporary Western societies - that is, the West - as the preeminent 'epicenter' of the post-Fordist respecifications that, as if by default, sets the course and pace of the changes world-wide. In this context, globalization, as the process of world-wide respecification of social, political, economic, and cultural relations along the post-Fordist lines, translates as the phenomenon that, emanating from the West, comes to encompass (and transform) the world in its entirety - as, in other words, the 'logic of transformation' that, if reflected upon critically, falls dangerously close to the notion of "modernization" with global pretensions.

The Post-Modernist Thesis: A Critique

Particularized in terms of different theories of post-modernity⁶⁵, the post-modernist thesis attempts to get at the phenomenon of globalization in its

⁶⁵ The categorical separation between *postmodern theories*, on the one hand, and *theories of post-modernity*, on the other, is 'grounded' in Webster's observation that

scholars who conceive of a *postmodern condition* are significantly different from *postmodern thinkers* who reject the entire approach of those who endeavour to explain the present using the conventions of established social science. That is, we may distinguish the position of those who argue that we may conceive of a *reality* of postmodernism, from that of postmodern

conceptual dimension from the standpoint of various forms of post-modernist developments - that is, different frameworks of respecifying the modern. Thus, it concerns itself with the significance of the post-modern, and the various forms thereof, in the process of reconstituting the world along the trajectories of the global - that is, the process of transformation of the world as the place with the global as its, as it were, 'accidental property' to the place with the global as its 'inherent qualification', of the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself*. As such, the post-modernist proposition regards the global in its conceptual dimension as, ultimately, reflecting (or being a reflection of) the 'condition of post-modernity' - the condition of post-modern respecification(s) of social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks.

Jencks's version of the post-modernist thesis considers particular aspects of the 'post-modern condition' in the context of which the cultural movement of post-modernism is taken as central in the process of post-modern respecification(s) of the contemporary socio-cultural framework. The process of transforming the world *in-itself* to the world *for-itself*, in this context, is crucially related to the globally oriented workings of the cultural practices of post-modernist movement(s) (encapsulated in the concept of 'world village'), as evidenced in the socio-cultural context of the most advanced parts of the world.

Again, as in the case of the variants of both the industrial society and the post-Fordist propositions, the lack of 'investigative depth' and 'West-centrism' stand prominent within the framework of Jencks's approach. What he accounts for is, on the one hand, the character of post-modern respecification(s) of the socio-cultural framework as observed in the West alone and, on the other, the post-modern respecification(s) of the socio-cultural framework alone, as worked out through the notion of post-modern cultural movement(s). In this context, the conceptual dimension of globalization is, implicitly, confined to the process of, on the one hand, the post-modern respecification(s) of the socio-cultural sphere alone, and, on the other, the post-modern respecifications of the socio-cultural sphere as they occur throughout Western hemisphere alone. As such, it is taken as an inherent property of the world only within parameters of the socio-cultural and the Western.

thinkers who argue that, while we do inhabit a world that is different - and hence postmodern - from anything that has gone before, this very difference throws into doubt the validity of orthodox tenets of social explanation (Webster 1995: 163, original emphasis).

In this context, then, the postmodern theories are the theories that, in dealing with the particulars of the 'contemporary circumstance', cast away, as it were, established conceptual and analytical social scientific apparatus; theories of post-modernity, by contrast, are the theories that attempt to get at the particulars of the 'post-modern condition' by means of using established conceptual and analytical social scientific apparatus. In other words, the former can be thought of as *new forms* of theorizing the 'contemporary circumstance' in its particular aspects, whereas the latter can be framed as ways of getting at the 'post-modern condition' *via* 'conventional forms' of theorizing.

Jameson's dealing with the phenomenon of the post-modern "rectifies", to a degree, the shortcomings of Jencks's account in that it establishes connection between the cultural realm and the overall socio-historical structural entity of capitalism within which it finds its corresponding expression(s). Within Jameson's framework of analysis, then, post-modernity is seen as the particular type of cultural logic characteristic of the latest, 'disorganized' mode of capitalist enterprise - the particular form of 'cultural reflex', the specific 'mode of cultural production' corresponding to the latest expression of capitalist relations in general. As such, it is a 'new systemic cultural norm' operating in the context of a new, global-scale form of multinational capitalism.

To the extent, then, that Jameson probes deeper into the nature of the post-modern and sees it as, as it were, the 'structural-functional' respecification of the cultural framework in the light of the overall structural reconfiguration of the system of capitalist relations in general, his analysis, in going beyond the level of 'surface appearances' and entering the 'underworld of essential relations', points to a productive way of getting at the global in its conceptual dimension. Where it falls astray from this path is in focusing its 'investigative gaze' on the post-modern cultural forms of the Western world alone. In doing so, it universalizes the cultural logic of the structural reconfiguration of capitalism in the West for the 'new cultural reflex' of the system of capitalist relations world-wide. It gives, in other words, 'transformative preeminence' to the Western expressions of the post-modern in the process of world-wide respecification of the cultural framework of the new, purportedly global, form of 'late', 'disorganized' multinational capitalism. In short, Jameson's analysis of post-modernity as the cultural logic of late capitalism is problematic in the same manner as Castells treatise on the informational mode of development as a new general and underlying operative principles of the capitalist system at its advanced, 'informational' stage: despite its productive gloss it is tarnished, as it were, by the general tendency of 'West-centrism'.

Furthering and, in many respects, building upon Jameson's analysis, Harvey offers the thesis that the post-modern is not only (and merely) the cultural logic of late, disorganized capitalism, but as an overall condition of the system of capitalist relations at the current stage in history. Engendered in the metaphor of the 'condition of post-modernity', the post-modern, although with cultural connotations, stands, in the context of Harvey's treatment, for a series of structural respecifications of the overall complex of social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks along the trajectories of a 'flexible mode of accumulation' and 'disorganized mode of social and political regulation'. As such, it symbolizes new logic of operation - global in scope - of the capitalist system of social, political, economic, and cultural relations.

In his treatment of post-modernity, then, Harvey clearly perceives (in fact, he argues for recognizing) the 'deeper structural dimension' of the interconnections between cultural, social, political, and economic domains of the system of capitalist relations. Accordingly, he regards the connections in which these stand to one another not as characterized by the base-superstructure mode of analysis but, rather, as qualified in terms of a 'grid of interrelational respecifications' in the context of which the respecifications of the cultural mold and are molded by the interrelations of the respecifications of the social, the political and the economic. In this sense, Harvey's analysis undoubtedly goes beyond the 'surface level of appearances' and, in elaborating upon the 'condition of post-modernity', dwells within the realm of 'deeper essential relations'.

In elaborating upon the 'condition of post-modernity' in terms of 'deeper structural relations' of the capitalist system, however, Harvey is not able to rid himself completely of the 'predicament of West-centrism'. To be sure, of all varieties of the post-modernist thesis Harvey's approach goes farthest in an attempt to disassociate itself from the permeation of the West-centered bias. None the less, in establishing terrain for substantiating specifics of his proposition, Harvey grounds his 'investigative gaze' in the particulars of, predominantly, Western conditions. To the extent that he does so, the 'condition of post-modernity' he so persuasively elaborates upon cannot - if taken seriously (as it ought to) - be considered as much more than the condition of Western post-modernity.

Shifting away from the considerations of post-modernity in terms of particular cultural logic of late capitalism or the overall condition of the character of capitalist relations at the current stage in history, Beck offers analysis of the post-modern in terms of fully matured aspects of the modern - that is, in terms of the modern being able to look upon itself 'reflexively'. The 'post' in post-modernity, thus, stands for the condition of 'reflexivity' operating within the framework of modernity faced with the limits of its own 'logic of operation'. In this context, post-modernity translates itself into 'modernity with consciousness', into, as Beck would have it, the state of 'reflexive modernity'.

As Beck argues, the post-modern as the reflexive modern has its roots in the emergence of 'risks' as the globally oriented threats to the survival of the modernity's 'logic of operation', predicated upon idea(l)s of 'progress' and 'prosperity'. Standing for, as it were, the 'dark side of modernity', global risks thus force modernity to reflect upon itself 'critically' and, in an attempt to salvage itself from the prospects of its own terminus, construct a new mode of socio-organizational functioning befitting for the new circumstance. According to Beck, this new mode of socio-organizational functioning within the framework of 'reflexive modernity' is "strategized" in terms of a 'risk society' as the 'socio-organizational correlative' of the condition of

'permanent reflexivity' - that is, the state of constant reckoning with the 'unknown' in the process of risk managing.

In the context of Beck's approach to post-modernity, then, the 'risk society' is regarded as the socio-organizational mode characteristic of a 'reflexive modernity' that brings about the respecification(s) of social, political, economic, and cultural frameworks of the modern so as to make them conducive to the state of 'permanent reflexivity' as a form of global awareness about the possibility of modernity's ending in the face of its own 'dark side'. As such, it stands for a globally oriented means of 'radicalizing' the modern along the trajectories of the 'reflexive' and, through doing so, for the possibility of prolonging the modern (in the form of 'progress' and 'prosperity') on the basis of fundamentally altered social, political, economic, and cultural 'landscapes'.

Similarly to Jameson and Harvey, Beck "weaves" his analysis of the post-modern as the reflexive modern by interrogating 'essential relations' between the social, the political, the economic, and the cultural in the process of their respecification within the framework of the risk society as the socio-organizational response to global threats (or 'risks') as the 'dark side of modernity'. Thus, he makes evident the 'deeper structural side' of reflexive modernity as the underlying logic of the 'surface appearances' - that is, observable manifestations - of transformative changes in the light of the globally oriented threats to the modern. Where he falters in offering a veritable theory of the conceptual dimension of the global is at the point of giving his notion of reflexive modernity a pretense of universality. Being rooted in specifically European experience of the process of 'globalization' ("concretized" through the undertaking of the project of 'European-unionization'), Beck's analysis of post-modernity necessarily draws upon specific 'socio-organizational' *milieu* as the investigative grounds for exploring the premise of reflexive modernization. Accordingly, his theory is "flavored" with particular social, political, economic, and cultural parameters that may, or may not, be characteristic of (and reproducible in) other parts of the globe. 'Euro-centered' in its basic orientation, in other words, his argument for the post-modern as reflexive modernity thus cannot be but rather problematic if posited as a 'general pulse' of the world *for-itself*.

Finally, Albrow's treatment of post-modernity takes Beck's proposition of the possibility for radical respecification of the parameters of the social, the political, the economic, and the cultural to an extreme by considering the post-modern as 'a new configuration of both human activities and conditions of existence' - as a new era in human history. In the context of Albrow's argument the post-modern is taken to be not the respecification of the modern along the lines of permanent reflexivity but, rather, the latter's termination in the guise of a new, 'global age'.

The global age, according to Albrow, marks the end of the logic of expansion (characteristic of the modern) and the beginning of the logic of 'survival with the justice' (characteristic of the post-modern). Put differently, it implies recognition that social life is inevitably shaped, and takes place, within the 'constraints of the global', that is, within the confines of the finitude of the world. This kind of recognition, Albrow argues, brings about the shift from the orientations of the modern age to the normative imperatives of the global age in the context of which 'modernism' (as, in Albrow's interpretation, the commitment to values of the modern age) gives way to 'globalism' (as the commitment to values which focus on the condition of the globe and the well-being of people in relation to it), 'modernity' (as the 'hallmark' of the modern age) to 'globality' (as the 'hallmark' of the global age), and 'modernization' (as the process of transforming the world according to the dictates of the Modern Age) to 'globalization' (as a widespread sense of transformation of the world along the lines of the global point of reference). In this context, instead of specific social, political, economic, and cultural relations characteristic of the modern age, a qualitatively different set of social, political, economic, and cultural expressions takes roots as, in Albrow's view, an ultimate expression of the demarcation line between the old modern and the new, global, post-modern.

Now differently from previously discussed propositional refinements of the post-modernity thesis, Albrow's argument is essentially a 'speculative treatise' on the nature of the present. As such, it is not subject to the shortcomings at work in the context of arguments put forth by Jencks, Jameson, Harvey, and Beck - at least not to the full extent and in the conventional sense. The extent to and the sense in which Albrow's approach does exhibit the problems of 'West-centrism' and absence of 'investigative depth' is manifested, in the case of the former, in terms of, an almost celebratory, 'unreflexive' acceptance of the premises put forth by the advocates of the post-modern and their 'universalization' in the form of the 'global age' hypothesis; and, in the case of the latter, in insufficient exploration of the practical grounds as, ultimately, the basis of confirming the plausibility of the global age proposition. Put differently, what is problematic in Albrow's argument is, on the one hand, the lack of critical reflection upon ever proliferating forms of post-modern discursivity as the 'building blocks' of the particulars of his thesis and, on the other, the 'speculative' and, for the most part, analytically unsubstantiated grounding of his proposition as such. For, as it would seem to be apparent, just because things are framed and projected in a certain way does not necessarily mean that they are such in their true character and disposition. John Laffey's (1993) counsel that 'We have no illusions except an illusion that we have no illusions' seems, in this context, to be more than suggestive.

From World-Systems Analysis and 'Voluntaristic' World System Theory to the Research Practice of the Global

The foregoing critical reflections on the particular variants of the propositions on globalization as both substantive and conceptual a phenomenon point, in many crucial respects, to the elementary inadequacies of most of predominant analytical and theoretical frameworks in getting at the global and, therefore, in orienting the sociological discipline towards productive grounds for dealing with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?'. As demonstrated, inadequacies of the attempts to analytically and theoretically apprehend globalization as both substantive and conceptual a phenomenon are concretized as, invariably, the problem of 'West-centrism' and, in some cases, the absence of 'investigative (be it analytical or theoretical) depth' - that is, as the predicament of 'universalizing the dominant particular' (or what is perceived as such) and the lack of investigative concern with going beyond the level of 'surface appearances' and exploring the realm of the 'underworld of essential relations'. Manifested in this way, they stand as, if not the barrier then, the weighty obstacle in giving credibility to various "treatises" on the global as veritable accounts of globalization as manifested either substantively or conceptually.

Another problematic aspect shared by all the theories critically reflected upon above is their preeminent emphasis on the nation-state (or, more generally, society) as *the* framework of their respective investigative concerns. In other words, in dealing with the global all theories take the nation-state to be *the* context in which globalization as the problem(atic) to be investigated is to be framed, observed, analyzed, and, ultimately, explained. They all take as given that globalization is something that manifests itself through the confines of the social, political, economic, and cultural parameters of the nation-state. In doing so, they prevent themselves from considering the possibility that the advent of the global, or globalization in its substantive and conceptual expressions, brings forth a new, globally oriented, form of social framework that escapes the boundaries of the nation-state and, in doing so, engenders its own social, political, economic, and cultural parameters, as well as their 'logic of operation'. Thus, they cut themselves off from the prospects of conceiving globalization as truly global in its fundamental predisposition, and not (as it appears when globalization is considered from the standpoint of the nation-state) as 'inter-nation-societal', or inter-national. In other words, in foisting upon the global the framework of the 'national-societal' the accounts of globalization as substantive and conceptual a phenomenon ultimately frame the latter as either the substantive or the conceptual expression of the process of 'internationalization'.

Evidently, the modes of analytical and theoretical investigation that suffer from 'West-centrism', absence of 'investigative depth', and disorientation with regards to appropriate analytical framework "inherent"

in the logics of their inquiry are inevitably problematic as appropriate accounts of globalization as truly a global phenomenon and, as such, are of little help in pointing sociology towards the direction of its analytical and conceptual respecification(s) along the trajectories of the global. That does not mean, obviously, that the insights proffered by them are of no analytical and theoretical value whatsoever. On the contrary, they are quite valuable for they contain important contributions for getting at various tendencies at work within certain aspects and dimensions of globalization in its substantive and conceptual manifestations. However, in and of themselves they are *not*, and cannot be regarded as, the sociological expressions of an understanding of the global as such.

If the discipline of sociology, then, is to adequately deal with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?' and, through its successful dealing with the dilemma, make itself conducive to apprehending truthfully the nature of the global in both of its dimensions, its principal task ought to be informed by moving away from the analytical and theoretical forms of understanding the global that exhibit the tendencies dealt with above (of course, retaining all of their productive contributions) and becoming sensitive to the kinds of both analytical and theoretical frameworks that offer 'alternative' analytical and theoretical parameters for getting at globalization as substantive and conceptual a phenomenon. In short, the task of sociology ought to correspond to paying close attention to the analytical and theoretical frameworks that perceive globalization as such as truly a global phenomenon.

The productive analytical and theoretical parameters for getting at the global as truly global do exist, and they exist within the framework of the sociological discipline itself. They are offered by world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory in terms of their respective analytical and theoretical orientations. They are evidenced in the socio-historical framework of the historical system (or, more to the point, world-system) as the meaningful analytical grounds for dealing with globalization as the substantive phenomenon, put forth by world-systems analysis; they are also evidenced in the multidimensional conceptual framework of the global as meaningful theoretical grounds for dealing with globalization as the conceptual phenomenon, put forth by 'voluntaristic' world system theory. Ultimately, they are also at work in the ways the two can be pronounced complementary and, on the basis of that complementarity, synthesized into a productive research practice that offers the prospects of interrogating globalization, both substantively and conceptually.

Taken together, these two approaches provide the discipline of sociology with the possibility of transcending, as it were, the 'West-centrism', the absence of 'investigative depth', and the disorientation with regards to appropriate analytical framework, at work within the 'conventional'

approaches to the problem(atic) of globalization. In terms of the prospect for the research practice of the global, they offer sociology the possibility of getting at globalization in its substantive and conceptual dimensions meaningfully and, through doing so, also set the discipline on the course of the possibility for coming to terms with the dilemma of 'What is to be done?'. In this way, they effectively open up the gates of the path towards a sociological discipline of the global.

Sociology of the Global: Prospects and Possibilities

The prospects and possibilities for the sociological discipline to make itself conducive to the analytical and theoretical scrutiny of globalization as manifested substantively and conceptually are, in many crucial respects, reflected in the potentiality of the proposition for synthesizing world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory into the meaningful research practice of the global. In this context, the prospects and possibilities for constructing the sociological discipline of the global rest upon sociology's ability and willingness to 'institute' the research practice of the global and adopt it as its central analytical and theoretical investigative orientation. In concrete terms, this means broadening and, thus, respecifying the 'conceptual and analytical arsenal' of sociology by means of making it grounded in philosophical, historical, geographical, and psychological aspects of analytical and theoretical inquiry. As the foregoing discussion aimed to demonstrate, combined together, world-systems analysis and 'voluntaristic' world system theory offer productive grounds for the respecification of sociology's analytical and conceptual apparatus and, through doing so, point to potentially useful strategies for realizing the project of constructing the sociological discipline of the global.

The challenge facing the sociological discipline of the global parallels the extent to which the discipline will be able to offer a diagnosis of globalization as a new, qualitatively different socio-historical framework within which social, political, economic, and cultural aspects of social life are increasingly given form. Thus, the challenge to sociology of the global has to do with the possibility of the discipline for a meaningful interpretative understanding of philosophical, psychological, social, geographical, and historical dimensions of social, political, economic, and cultural expressions of social life as constituted globally, so as to be able to explain the nature of the phenomenon of globalization in its both substantive and conceptual manifestations. In this context, the challenge to sociology is, ultimately, the challenge to the prospect of writing a 'monograph' of the global as the grounds for engaging in the task of 'diagnostic critique'⁶⁶ - the task of critical

⁶⁶ Term *diagnostic critique* is used by Douglas Kellner (1995) as a way of 'decoding' 'deeper structural dimension' of the texts of media culture. As such, it is a way of getting beyond the level of

interpretation of underlying trends and tendencies discerned within the matrix of philosophical, psychological, social, geographical, and historical dimensions of social, political, economic, and cultural expressions of social life in its global dimension.

Animated by the vision of a better future - the future that actualizes the betterment of human condition - diagnostic critique ought to orient its analytical and conceptual interrogations towards the undertaking of critical interpretation of the processes of the global, so as to be able to point to openings for, and barriers to, the possibility of creating *global social space* (for we cannot, in the context of global dimension of social life, talk about the nation-state, or society, as understood in its conventional sense) as the globally constituted framework within which the ideals of human freedom and equality, as the concretizations of the betterment of human condition, can be realized. In other words, diagnostic critiques of the sociological discipline of the global need to, if they are to be rendered meaningful outside of the parameters of the academic enterprise, constitute themselves as the practices of "disentangling" the matrixes of philosophical, psychological, social, geographical, and historical dimensions of social, political, economic, and cultural expressions of social life in its global dimension, all to the end of 'guiding' the social action oriented towards transformative intents to the goal of creating more just and egalitarian conditions of social existence. In short, they need to be inherently interested in the social as expressed globally, however the social not as new experimental grounds for demonstrating their theoretical and analytical pedantry and sophistication but, rather, the social

'surface appearance' of given cultural forms and discerning 'essential relations' they exhibit in larger soci(et)al context. As Kellner puts it (1995: 116-117),

[r]eading media culture diagnostically thus presents insights into the current political situation, into the strengths and vulnerabilities of the contending political forces, into the hopes and fears of the population. From this perspective, the texts of media culture provide important insights into the psychological, socio-political, and ideological make-up of a specific society at a given point in history. Reading media culture diagnostically also allows one to detect what ideological solutions to various problems are being offered, and thus to anticipate certain trends, to gain insights into social problems and conflicts, and to appraise the dominant ideologies and emerging oppositional forces. Consequently, diagnostic political critique enables one to perceive the limitations of mainstream conservative and liberal political ideologies, as well as helping to decipher their continuing appeal. It enables one to grasp the utopian yearnings in a given society and challenges progressives to develop cultural representations, political alternatives, and practices and movement which address these predispositions.

Such diagnostic reading thus helps with the formulation of progressive political practices which speak to salient hopes, fears, and desires, and the construction of social alternatives that are grounded in existing psychological, social, and cultural matrixes. Consequently, diagnostic...critique does not merely offer another clever way of reading...but provides weapons of critique for those interested in producing a better society.

In the context of the sociology of the global, 'diagnostic critique' refers to critical interpretative interrogations of the 'deeper structural dimension' of social life in its global dimension in order to be able to get at 'essential relations' underlying its 'surface appearances' - to, in different terms, be able to unmask the 'hidden' through penetrating the 'observable'.

as the terrain of ongoing struggles of human agency for the ideals of freedom and equality. For the social scientific disciplinary practice that is not grounded in the social as a real human landscape deprives itself of much (if not all) of its purpose of being: its self-projected sense of meaning turns into a self-incurred infliction of meaninglessness and its disciplinarily purported air of importance collapses into a common-sensical recognition of its worthlessness.

References



- Albrow, Martin. 1990. "Introduction". Pp. 3-13 in *Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from International Sociology*, edited by Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King. London and Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.
- . 1996. *The Global Age*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C.. 1996. "Critical Reflections on 'Reflexive Modernization'". *Theory, Culture and Society* 13(4): 133-138.
- Amin, Samir. 1996. "The Challenge of Globalization", translated by David Luckin. *Review of International Political Economy* 3(2): 216-259.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1986. "Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery". *Comparative Studies in Society and Periphery* 28(2): 356-361.
- . 1990. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy". Pp. 295-310 in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, edited by Mike Featherstone. London: SAGE Publications.
- . 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Archer, Margaret S.. 1990. "Theory, Culture and Post-Industrial Society". *Theory, Culture and Society* 7(2-3): 97-119.
- Aronowitz, Stanley. 1981. "A Metatheoretical Critique of Immanuel Wallerstein's *The Modern World System*". *Theory and Society* 10(4): 503-520.
- Bach, Robert L.. 1980. "On the Holism of a World-Systems Perspective". Pp. 289-310 in *Processes of the World-System*, edited by Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- Badham, Richard. 1984. "The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society". *Current Sociology* 32(1): 1-136.

- Barnet, Richard and John Cavanagh. 1996. "Electronic Money and the Casino Economy". Pp. 360-373 in *The Case against the Global Economy (and for a Turn toward the Local)*, edited by Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Baudrillard, Jean. 1988. *Selected Writings* (edited by Mark Poster). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1988. "Sociology and Postmodernity". *Sociological Review* 36(4): 790-813.
- , 1992. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London And New York: Routledge.
- , 1994. "Is There a Postmodern Sociology". Pp. 187-204 in *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives in Social Theory*, edited by Steven Seidman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1989. "On the Way to the Industrial Risk Society?: Outline of an Argument", translated by Peter Morgan. *Thesis Eleven* 23(?): 86-103.
- , 1992a. "From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment", translated by Mark Ritter. *Theory, Culture and Society* 9(1): 97-123.
- , 1992b. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, translated by Mark Ritter. London: SAGE Publications.
- , 1994a. "The Reinvention of Politics: Toward a Theory of Reflexive Modernization". Pp. 1-55 in *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- , 1994b. "Self-Dissolution and Self-Endangerment of Industrial Society: What Does This Mean?". Pp. 174-183 in *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash. 1994. *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Bergesen, Albert. 1990. "Turning World-System Theory on its Head". Pp. 67-81 in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, edited by Mike Featherstone. London: SAGE Publications.
- Best, Steven and Douglas Kellner. 1991. *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations*. Macmillan Education Ltd.
- Beyer, Peter. 1994. "Introduction: Religion in Global Society", "Four Approaches to Globalization", "Socio-Cultural Particularism in a Global Society". Pp. 1-69 in *Globalization and Religion*. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- Bina, Cyrus. 1997. "Globalization: The Epochal Imperatives and Developmental Tendencies". Pp. 41-58 in *The Political Economy of Globalization*. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Böhme, Gernot and Nico Stehr, eds.. 1986 *The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Boyne, Roy. 1989. "Politics and Ideology in the World Economy". *Polish Sociological Bulletin* 1(85): 49-64.
- Bronner, Stephen Eric. 1995. "Ecology, Politics, and Risk: The Social Theory of Ulrich Beck". *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 6(1): 67-86.
- Bulman, Raymond F.. 1996. "Discending Major Shifts in the World-System - Some Help from Theology?". *Review* 19(4): 383-400
- Burbach, Roger, Orlando Núñez and Boris Kagarlitsky. 1997. *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms*. London and Chicago: Pluto Press.
- Campanella, M. L.. 1990. "Globalization: Processes and Interpretations". *World Futures* 30(1&2): 1-16.
- Castells, Manuel. 1986. "High Technology, World Development, and Structural Transformation: The Trends and the Debate". *Alternatives* 11(3): 297-343.
- . 1989. *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

- . 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Chase-Dunn, Christopher K.. 1995. "World-Systems Analysis". *Annual Review of Sociology* 21(?): 387-417.
- Clarke, Simon. 1990. "New Utopias for Old: Fordist Dreams and Post-Fordist Fantasies". *Capital and Class* 42(?): 131-155.
- Dobb, Maurice. 1963. *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (2nd ed.). New York: International Publishers.
- Drucker, Peter F.. 1993. *Post-Capitalist Society*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc..
- Featherstone, Mike. 1983. "Consumer Culture: An Introduction". *Theory, Culture and Society* 1(3): 4-9.
- , ed.. 1990. *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: SAGE Publications.
- . 1995. *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds.. 1995. *Global Modernities*. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Ferguson, Marjorie. 1992. "The Mythology about Globalization". *European Journal of Communications* 7(1): 69-93.
- Fiedler, Leslie. 1971. "The Death of Avant-Garde Literature". Pp. 454-460 in *The Collected Essays of Leslie Fiedler*, vol. 2. New York: Stein and Day / Publishers.
- Fieldes, Diane and Tom Bramble. 1992. "Post-Fordism: Historical Break of Utopian Fantasy?". *Journal of Industrial Relations* 34(4): 562-579.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1995. "The Modern World System Revisited: Rereading Braudel and Wallerstein". Pp. 163-194 in *Civilizations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change*, edited by Stephen K. Sanderson. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

- . 1998. *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Friedman, Jonathan. 1990. "Being in the World: Globalization and Localization". *Theory, Culture and Society* 7(2&3): 311-328.
- . 1992. "General Historical and Culturally Specific Properties of Global Systems". *Review* 15(3): 335-372.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1981. "Modernism and Post-modernism". *New German Critique* 22(winter): 15-18.
- . 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goldfrank, Walter. 1990. "Current Issues in World-Systems Theory". *Review* 13(2): 251-254.
- Gordon, D.. 1988. "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?". *New Left Review* 168(?): 24-65.
- Guba, Egon G. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research". Pp. 105-117 in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, edited by Norman K. Dentlin and Yvonna S. Lincoln. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- Gupta, Satya Dev. 1997. "The Political Economy of Globalization: An Introduction". Pp. 1-12 in *The Political Economy of Globalization*. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. "Modernity versus Postmodernity". *New German Critique* 22(Winter):3-14.
- Hagan, Robert. 1975. "Societal Disjunction and Axial Analysis: Review Commentary of the Social Theory of Daniel Bell". *Review of Social Theory* 3(2): 40-44
- Hall, Stuart and Martin Jacques, eds.. 1989. *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s*. London: Lawrence & Wishart (in association with *Marxism Today*).
- Hall, Thomas D.. 1996. "The World-System Perspective: A Small Sample from a Large Universe". *Sociological Inquiry* 66(4): 440-454.

- Hannerz, Ulf. 1986. "Theory in Anthropology: Is Small Beautiful? The Problem of Complex Cultures". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28(2): 356-374.
- . 1992. "The Global Ecumene as a Network of Networks". Pp. 34-56 in *Conceptualizing Society*, edited by Adam Kuper. London and New York: Routledge.
- . 1993. "When Culture is Everywhere: Reflections on a Favourite Concept". *Ethnos* 58(1&2): 95-111.
- Hannerz, Ulf and Ovar Lofgren. 1994. "The Nation in the Global Village". *Cultural Studies* 8(2): 198-207.
- Harvey, David. 1985. "The Geopolitics of Capitalism". Pp. 128-163 in *Social Relation and Spatial Structures*, edited by D. Gregory and J. Urry. London: Macmillan.
- . 1987. "Flexible Accumulation through Urbanization: Reflections on Post-Modernism.". *Antipode* 19(3): 260-286.
- . 1989. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- . 1992. "The Condition of Postmodernity". Pp. 299-316 in *The Post-modern Reader*, edited by Charles Jencks. London: Academy Editions.
- Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1977. "Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System". *Review* 1(2): 111-145.
- , eds.. 1980. *Processes of the World-System*. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- . 1982. *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- Huyssen, Andreas. 1986. *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Jameson, Frederic. 1984. "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism". *New Left Review* 146: 53-92.

- . 1991. *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Jencks, Charles. 1986. *What is Post-Modernism?*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- . 1987. *Post-Modernism: The New Classicism in Art and Architecture*. New York: Rizzoli.
- . 1992a. "The Post-Modern Agenda". Pp. 10-39 in *The Post-Modern Reader*, edited by Charles Jencks. London: Academy Editions.
- , ed.. 1992b. *The Post-Modern Reader*. London: Academy Editions.
- Jenks, Chris. 1993. *Culture*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Jewsiewicki, Bogumil. 1987. "The African Prism of Immanuel Wallerstein". *Radical History Review* 39: 50-68.
- . 1991b. "Globalization or Regionalization?". Pp. 1-16 in *Dispelling the Myth of Globalization: The Case for Regionalization*. New York: Praeger.
- Kearns, Gerry. 1988. "History, Geography and World-Systems Theory". *Journal of Historical Geography* 18(?): 281-291.
- Kearney, M.. 1995. "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 547-565.
- Kellner, Douglas. 1995. *Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern*. London and New York: Routledge.
- King, Anthony D. 1995. "The Times and Spaces of Modernity (or Who Needs Postmodernism?)". pp. 108-123 in *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Kivisto, Pete. 1980-81. "Touraine's Post-Industrial Society". *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 8(1): 25-43.

- Kondratieff, N. D.. 1979. "The Long Waves in Economic Life". Review 2(4): 519-562.
- Kumar, Krishan. 1976. "Industrialism and Post-Industrialism: Reflections on a Putative Transition". *Sociological Review* 24(3): 439-478.
- . 1991. *Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society*. Penguin Books Ltd..
- . 1995. *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories of the Contemporary World*. Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
- Kutsche, Paul. 1989. "World System Theory as an Interrogator of the Social Science Curriculum". *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 18(1): 129-134.
- Laffey, John. 1993. *Civilization and its Discontented*. Montreal & Cheektowaga, New York: Black Rose Books.
- Lash, Scott. 1993. "Reflexive Modernization: The Aesthetic Dimension". *Theory, Culture and Society* 10(1): 1-23.
- Lash, Scott and John Urry. 1987. *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Laxer, Gordon. 1995. "Social Solidarity, Democracy and Global Capitalism". *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 32(3): 288-313.
- Lechner, Frank J.. 1992. "The Sociology of Roland Robertson: A Symposium" (Includes: William R. Garrett, "Thinking Religion in the Global Circumstance: A Critique of Roland Robertson's Globalization Theory"; Edward A. Tiryakian, "From Modernization to Globalization"; Bryan S. Turner, "The Concept of 'The World' in Sociology: A Commentary on Roland Robertson's Theory of Globalization"; Roland Robertson, "Globalization: A Brief Response"). *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion* 31(3): 296-323.
- Levin, Harry. 1966. "What Was Modernism?". Pp. 271-295 in *Refractions: Essays in Comparative Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lévy, Brigitte. 1997. "Globalization and Development: Facing the Challenges". Pp. 315-335 in *The Political Economy of Globalization*. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

- Little, Daniel. 1991. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Westview Press, Inc..
- Lloyd, Christopher. 1993. *The Structures of History*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Low, Setha M.. 1996. "A Response to Castells: An Anthropology of the City". *Critique of Anthropology* 16(1): 57-62.
- Luke, Timothy W.. 1995. "New World Order of Neo-World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in Informalizing Glocalities". Pp. 91-107 in *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Lyon, David. 1986. "From 'Post-Industrialism' to 'Information Society': A New Social Transformation?". *Sociology* 20(4):577-588
- Lyotard, Jean-François. 1994. "The Postmodern Condition". Pp. 27-38 in *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives in Social Theory*, edited by Steven Seidman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKay, John P., Bennett D. Hill, and John Buckler, eds.. 1991. *A History of Western Society* (4th ed.), vol. I and II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- MacLaughlin, Jim. 1994. "Geopolitics and Geoculture in World-Systems Theorizing: A Review Essay". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 28(4): 62-69.
- Mair, Andrew. 1997. "Strategic Localization: The Myth of the Postnational Enterprise". Pp. 64-88 in *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Mandalios, John. 1996. "Historical Sociology". Pp. 278-302 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. Turner. Blackwell Publishers, Inc..
- Mandel, Ernest. 1975. *Late Capitalism*, translated by Joris De Bres. London: NLB.

- Mander, Jerry and Edward Goldsmith, eds.. 1996. *The Case against the Global Economy (and for a Turn toward the Local)*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Martin, William G.. 1994a. "A Global Social Structure?: Evaluating the Advancement of the World-Systems Perspective". *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* (Supplement 1): 241-254.
- . 1994b. "The World-Systems Perspective in Perspective: Assessing the Attempt to Move beyond Nineteenth-Century Eurocentric Conceptions". *Review* 17(2): 145-185.
- Masuda, Yoneji. 1981. *The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society*. Tokyo: Institute for the Information Society.
- Miles, Ian. 1985. "The New Post-Industrial State". *Futures* 17(6): 588-617.
- Mittelman, James H., ed.. 1996. *Globalization: Critical Reflections*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Morrow, Raymond A. 1992. "An Introduction to Metatheory". Edmonton: University of Alberta.
- (with David D. Brown). 1994. *Critical Theory and Methodology*. SAGE Publication, Inc..
- Münz, Peter. 1992. "What's Postmodern, Anyway?". *Philosophy and Literature* 16(2): 333-353.
- Nederveen Pieterse, Jan. 1994. "Globalization as Hybridisation". *International Sociology* 9(2): 161-184.
- Neuberg, Leland Gerson. 1975. "A Critique of Post-Industrialist Thought". *Social Praxis* 3(1&2): 121-150.
- Offe, Claus. 1985. *Disorganized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Peet, Richard. 1991. *Global Capitalism: Theories of Societal Development*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Piore, Michael J. and Charles F. Sabel. 1984. *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books, Inc..

- Piven, F. F.. 1995. "Is it Global Economics or Neo-Laissez-Faire?". *New Left Review* 213(?): 107-115.
- Ragin, Charles and Daniel Chirot. 1984. "The World System of Immanuel Wallerstein: Sociology and Politics as History". Pp. 276-312 in *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, edited by Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ritzer, George. 1978. "Reflections on the Paradigmatic Status of Sociology". *Mid-American Review of Sociology* 3(2): 1-15.
- . 1983. "The 'McDonaldization' of Society". *Journal of American Culture* 6(1): 100-107.
- . 1990. "Preface: The Coming of Age of Sociological Metatheorizing". *Sociological Forum* 5(1): 3-15.
- . 1990. "Metatheorizing in Sociology". *Sociological Forum* 5(1): 3-15.
- Robertson, Roland. 1977. "Individualism, Societism, Worldliness, Universalism: Thematizing Theoretical Sociology of Religion". *Sociological Analysis* 38(4): 281-303.
- . 1987a. "Globalization Theory and Civilizational Analysis". *Comparative Civilizations Review* 17(?): 20-30.
- . 1987b. "Globalization and Societal Modernization: A Note on Japan and Japanese Religion." *Sociological Analysis* 47 (S): 35-42.
- . 1988. "The Sociological Significance of Culture: Some General Considerations". *Theory, Culture & Society* 5: 3-23.
- . 1990a. "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept". *Theory, Culture & Society* 7: 15-30.
- . 1990b. "After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization". Pp. 45-61 in *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*, edited by Bryan S. Turner. SAGE Publications, Inc..

- . 1991. "Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the Problem of Globality". Pp. 69-90 in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, edited by Anthony D. King. Department of Art and Art History: State University of New York at Binghamton.
- . 1992a. "'Civilization' and the Civilizing Process: Elias, Globalization and Analytic Synthesis". *Theory, Culture & Society* 9: 211-227.
- . 1992b. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- . 1995. "Globalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity". Pp. 25-44 in *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Robertson, Roland and Frank Lechner. 1985a. "Modernization, Globalization and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems Theory". *Theory, Culture & Society* 2(3): 103-117.
- Robertson, Roland and JoAnn Chirico. 1985b. "Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration". *Sociological Analysis* 46(3): 219-242.
- Robertson, Roland and Bryan S. Turner. 1989. "Talcott Parsons and Modern Social Theory - An Appreciation". *Theory, Culture and Society* 6(4): 539-558.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1997. "Sense and Nonsense in Globalization Debate". *Foreign Policy* 107(?): 19-37.
- Roudometof, Victor and Roland Robertson. 1995. "Globalization, World-System Theory, and the Comparative Study of Civilizations: Issues of Theoretical Logic in World-Historical Sociology". Pp. 273-300 in *Civilizations and World-Systems: Studying World-Historical Change*, edited by Stephen K. Sanderson. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Rustin, Michael. 1994. "Incomplete Modernity: Ulrich Beck's Risk Society". *Radical Philosophy* 67(summer): 3-12.
- Sanderson, Stephen K.. 1995a. *Social Transformations: A General Theory of Historical Development*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

- Sanderson, Stephen K. and Thomas D. Hall. 1995a. "World System Approaches to World-Historical Change". Pp. 95-108 in *Civilizations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change*, edited by Stephen K. Sanderson. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Shannon, Richard. 1989. *World-Systems Perspective*. Westview Press, Inc..
- Smart, Barry. 1993a. *Postmodernity*. New York: Routledge.
- . 1993b. "Theorizing the New Industrial Space: Castells on Capitalism, Information Technology, and the City". *Thesis Eleven* 7(36): 151-158.
- . 1994. "Sociology, Globalization and Postmodernity: Comments of the 'Sociology for One World Thesis'". *International Sociology* 9(2): 149-159.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1990. "Towards a Global Culture?". *Theory, Culture and Society* 7(2&3): 171-191.
- So, Alvin Y.. 1990. *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and World-Systems Theories*. SAGE Publications, Inc..
- Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997. "Neither Global nor Local: "Glocalization" and the Politics of Scale". Pp. 137-166 in *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Taylor, Peter. 1987. "The Poverty of International Comparisons: Some Methodological Lessons from World-Systems Analysis". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 22(1): 12-39.
- Teeple, Gary. 1995. *Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Therborn, Göran. 1995. "Routes to/through Modernity". Pp. 124-139 in *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
- Tucker, Robert C., ed.. 1978. *The Marx-Engels Reader* (2nd ed.). New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.

- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press, Inc..
- , 1976a. "A World-System Perspective on the Social Sciences". *British Journal of Sociology* 27(3): 343-352.
- , 1976b. "Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis". *Theory and Society* 3(4): 461-483.
- , 1977a. "The Tasks of Historical Social Science: An Editorial". *Review* 1(1): 3-7.
- , 1979. *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1980. *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy*. New York: Academic Press, Inc..
- , 1983a. *Historical Capitalism*. Verso Editions.
- , 1983b. "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy". *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 24 (1&2): 100-108.
- , 1984a. *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , 1984b. "Long Waves of Capitalist Process". *Review* 7(4): 559-575.
- , 1984c. "Patterns and Prospectives of the Capitalist World-Economy". *Contemporary Marxism* 9(fall): 59-70.
- , 1986a. "Marxisms as Utopias: Evolving Ideologies". *American Journal of Sociology* 91(6): 1295-1308.
- , 1986b. "World System and Civilization". *Development* 1(2): 114-119.
- , 1987. "World-Systems Analysis". Pp. 309-324 in *Social Theory Today*, edited by Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- . 1988a. "Typology of Crises in the World-System". *Review* 11(4): 581-598.
- . 1988b. "Should We Unthink Nineteenth-Century Social Science?". *International Social Science Journal* 40(4(118)): 525-531.
- . 1988c. "The Modern World-System as a Civilization". *Thesis Eleven* 20(?): 70-86.
- . 1990a. "The Renewed Concern with Civilization(s?)". *Thesis Eleven* ?(25): 107-113.
- . 1990b. "World-Systems Analysis: The Second Phase". *Review* 13(2): 287-293.
- . 1990c. "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System". *Theory, Culture and Society* 7(2&3): 31-55.
- . 1990d. "Culture is the World-System: A Reply to Boyne". Pp. 63-65 in *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, edited by Mike Featherstone. London: SAGE Publications.
- . 1991. "World System versus World-Systems: A Critique.. *Critique of Anthropology* 11(2): 189-194.
- . 1992. "Liberalism and the Legitimation of Nation-States: An Historical Interpretation". *Social Justice* 19(1) 22-33.
- . 1995. "What are We Bounding, and Whom, When We Bound Social Research". *Social Research* 62(4): 839-856.
- . 1995c. "Hold the Tiller Firm: On Method and the Unit of Analysis". Pp. 239-247 in *Civilizations and World Systems: Studying World-Historical Change*, edited by Stephen K. Sanderson. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Waters, Malcolm. 1995. *Globalization*. Routledge, Inc..
- . 1996. *Daniel Bell*. London: Routledge.
- Webster, Frank. 1996. *Theories of the Information Society*. London: Routledge.

White, Randall. 1995. *Global Spin: Probing the Globalization Debate (Where in the World are We Going?)*. Toronto: Durdurn Press.

Worsley, Peter. 1990. "Models of the Modern World System". *Theory, Culture and Society* 7(2&3): 83-95.